

# **The Pattern of Saudi Aid to Bangladesh**

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## **Saudi Arabian Aid**

Saudi Arabian bilateral assistance has been selected as a case study here for two reasons. Firstly, because of its position as the largest contributor among OPEC countries. Secondly, the Bangladesh-Saudi relations typifies the way in which Islamic ideology blends with political and economic considerations of development assistance. In order to understand this phenomena better, we shall first of all review the current position which Saudi Arabia occupies in world politics and how it affects it's relation with the developing countries and then proceed to review it in the South Asian context, with particular reference to Bangladesh.

Three important facts account for the importance of Saudi Arabia in the global arena, the first is the size and strategic location of Saudi Arabia between the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, which borders on a number of small weak Arab oil sheikhdoms. The second fact is that Saudi Arabia controls huge oil reserves, and this together with the first point helps to make Saudi Arabia strategically very important for

the superpowers. The third fact contributing to the global importance of Saudi Arabia, is her influential position as leader of the Islamic World. It may be noted that the Saudi state based as it is on an orthodox form of Islam, contains within it two of the most important pilgrimage centres of Islam, Mecca, and Al Medina, and this attracts over 600 million muslim followers from around the world.

The first two points will be considered together as forming the material basis on which present Saudi political power is based. The second point constitutes the ideological basis of Saudi politics.<sup>1</sup>

The contemporary character of the Saudi state originates in the 18th century as reflected in the alliance forged between the religious scholar and preacher, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab, who called for a return to the orthodox practices of early Islam, and the ruler of the Najdi state of Dariya, Muhammad Ibn Saud, whose intention it was to spread the Wahabbi message of tawhid throughout the Arabian peninsula. Defeated at first by the Ottoman government in their campaign, their efforts at reconstituting the Saudi state began again in 1902, and took the better first quarter of the 20th century to accomplish.

The Saudi state was based on the injunctions of the sharia, with the prerogative of interpretation being given to the king and his advisors. However from 1926 to 1947, a significant role was given to domestic commercial interest. From the 30's, western companies started exploring and subsequently exploring oil, but it was not until the late 40's that the substantial

influx of oil revenues started to transform the economy. The commercial sector which had constituted the principal instrument through which Saudi Arabia was increasingly drawn into the economy of the capitalist world and the principal channel through which outside ideas penetrated the country.<sup>2</sup> This role was taken up by the oil sector. This oil sector became important not only to Saudi Arabian economy, but also to the world. It was estimated that Saudi Arabia had the largest surplus oil reserves in the world. About 27% of the world's proven oil reserve is located here.<sup>3</sup> In 1978, Saudi Arabia accounted for over 13% of the world's oil production and 40% of Middle East oil production. Also the financial reserves which are recycled or held by the Saudis are enormous. At the end of 1978, Saudi Arabia's foreign asset were \$60 billion compared to \$28 billion for Kuwait, \$4.3 billion for the UAE and \$8.6 for Iraq.<sup>4</sup> In addition Saudi Arabia also possesses the capacity to set the price of its own marker crude, which affect OPEC decision as well.

Its maneuverability in formulating an oil policy also extends to its capacity to determine the production level and availability of crude oil. The Arab oil embargo in October 1973, created a precedent which meant that oil could be used as a political weapon, and the above-mentioned mechanisms became potential ways in which it could be done.

The ideological basis on which Saudi Arabia seeks to attain a place in the world, is by claiming to be the legal protector of Islam, by virtue of having within

its boundaries, two of the most important pilgrimage centres of Islam. It also occupies a prominent place, in acting as one of the champions of Arab Nationalism, i.e. supporting the Arab cause vis a vis the Zionist movement.

However although it's religious character and financial power gives it a definite form of influence in the Arab world and beyond, Saudi Arabia is in certain essential aspects, a weak country, even when compared to other developing countries. Population wise, (in the mid '70s), it was relatively insignificant—5 million—compared to Iran's 36 million, Egypt's 40 million, Brazil's 120 million. Also most of this population is nomadic, with a literacy rate around 30%. Modern skills are scarce and life expectancy only about 40 years. Aside from oil, it has virtually no other economic resources it can depend on; the industrialisation rate is not promising, and manufacturing is very much dependent on foreign assistance. The military section is a lot more ill-equipped compared to other poorer countries, e.g. Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan.

This dichotomy in the power constitution of the country results in an ambivalence in many of its relations with the superpowers, as well as developing countries. Thus on the one hand, Saudi Arabia takes an anti-Zionist stance in the Arab-Israeli dispute and thus plays a pivotal role in the cause of Arab nationalism vis-a-vis western imperialism. This is reflected in the oil embargo in 1973, and in the subsequent threats of smaller nature voiced by its oil minister. At the same time however, the conservative government and leadership

of the Saudi state, shows a staunch resistance to communism, and insists on combatting the intrusion of socialistic ideas, or rather Soviet ideas, through the advocacy and propagation of the Islamic ideology. Because of this stance, therefore, the Saudi state more often than not plays into the hand of US power politics. From the viewpoint of the United States, the Saudi state can play the following roles in the interest of US foreign policy :

1. it can provide continued and guaranteed supplies of oil at levels determined by western demand.
2. near monopoly of supply rights for it's oil companies.
3. continued support for the dollar.
4. exercising a moderating role in OPEC.
5. purchases of US exports, particularly in the military field.
6. an active and supportive role in regional affairs, especially in playing an increasingly active anti-communist role.
7. permission to station US forces.

The Saudi state in turn expects that the US offer it's support in terms of economic assistance, and military protection, and progress on the Arab-Israeli question, with a view to keeping at bay leftist forces which may cause instability and tension in the region.

For these reasons, the Saudi state is prone to hesitancy and ambivalence in many of it's positions adopted vis a vis the US and towards other developing countries. Due to the close liason with us interest, especially regarding it's anti-communist stance, the

forging closer links with developing countries can be interpreted as an extension of western policy to counter Soviet advances in developing countries, through the use of the Islamic ideology. At the sametime it cannot be denied that there are limits to which the Saudi state would bow down to the wishes of western interests. The negative impact of the oil embargo and price hike on the lesser developed countries may have generated sincere concerns on the part of Saudi Arabia to recycle some of it's petro -dollars towards the development of these countries, and in this respect, the Saudi state does have a role to play in increasing South-South patterns of cooperation. The 'riyal diplomacy' of Saudi Arabia has thus been successful in helping to bolster the economies of less developed countries, and meeting their balance of payment gap, as well as encouraging and strengthening Islamic and anti-communist forces in these countries e. g. rebels in Afghanistan, the more conservative forces in the PLO and right-wing fundamentalists in Bangladesh. It has also sustained tribal and right-wing elements in North Yemen and contributed to the survival of the Moroccan monarchy, as well as indirectly influence Iraqi policy to take on a more rightist stance. In other words it is the ideological basis of the Saudi state, which helps it to take on a anti-imperialist, anti-western stance and champion the cause of Arab nationalism, especially in the Arab Israeli dispute. But it is this same ideology which in a global perspective, helps to subserve western interest, by being used as a tool to combat socialism. In this sense the Saudi Arabian mode of assistance to

developing countries, fails to translate itself into any real alternative to which countries like Bangladesh can turn to.

It has been mentioned before that the sudden rise in oil prices in the early 70's and the worldwide recession throughout the decade led to the increase of oil revenues of the Saudi Arabian economy on the one hand, as well as the severe balance of payments deficit in the LDC's on the other. Recycling of these petro-dollars to the benefit of these impoverished economies thus seemed to be one of the possible solution to the problem. It was thus not surprising that it was during this period that Saudi Arabia made its entry into the list of important donors, previously occupied by western powers such as USA, West Germany, France, and Japan in Asia.

Saudi assistance to developing countries increased dramatically in 1974 and 1975 before peaking in 1976 at \$2,407 billion. After 1976, the total declined slightly in the following year and substantially in 1978 to \$1,455 billion. However viewed in the context of world recession, the 1978 Saudi aid figure was still sizeable enough, ranking second behind USA in absolute total aid disbursed. As a percentage of GNP, Saudi commercial foreign aid in 1978 was lesser than that of other OPEC members e. g. UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, but still far above the 0. 22% of USA (1977) and 0. 31% of the Development Assistant Committee members of the OECD.

In keeping with this spirit, the Saudi Development Fund (SDF) was established on 26th August 1974, the objective of which was to contribute to develop-

ment projects in the developing countries through extending loans. Prior to the establishment of the SDF, in 1974, Saudi Assistance was extended on an ad hoc basis with little possibility for extensive economic evaluation of the projects for which aid was provided. Although there still exists a certain amount of government bilateral assistance outside the format of SDF assistance, the creation of the SDF as a specialised bilateral lending agency indicated the Saudi emphasis on the development aspect of the recipients. There are several aspects of SDF which differentiate it from other types of assistance from other industrialised states. Firstly, the SDF loans contain a high 'grant' element, and the lending terms are considered 'soft' when compared with those prevailing in the commercial credit market i.e. interest rates are low usually around 3./ the maturity period is long, about 15-20 yrs, and so is the grace period, frequently 5 yrs. Saudi aid is not tied to purchases within the donor country.

Saudi Arabia also channelises much of its aid through multilateral agencies, significantly OPEC (43./) Special Fund, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Islamic Development Bank of OIC, IFAD, IDA etc. All such aid less the same characteristics as Saudi bilateral aid.

Besides official forms of assistance, there are also innumerable instances of private donations and humanitarian relief assistance, e.g. for flood relief orphanages, & madrasahs. The latter type is significantly noticed in the case of Bangladesh.



Understandably, a large chunk of Saudi Assistance goes to Arab League countries, e. g. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen Arab Republic, Oman, Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria and Djibouti. The frontline on states (Jordan & Syria), the occupied territories of Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan Heights are the main recipients followed by Oman, Djibuti, Pakistan & Yemen Arab Republic. Main recipients of bilateral loans disbursements were Morocco, Sudan & Turkey.<sup>35</sup> However towards the later part of the decade, the geographical distribution of assistance strengthened in favour of non-Arab recipients the Arab share in Saudi aid was 75./ in 1978, 40./ in 1979, and 20./ in 1980.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, Arab African recipients share was on the rise from 59./ to 39./ in 1980, and the Non-Arab Asian countries share rose from 39./ to 41./ in 1981. Out of these non-Arab states, Pakistan and Turkey have received sizeable Saudi aid. (See Tables 1 & 2). Among Saudi government assistance outside SDF format, certain developed industrial countries like the USA, Germany and France are also recipients.

Saudi project aid has emphasised transportation, electricity and industry, in other words infrastructure development projects. Plans to extend assistance to least developed regions, and educational, health and social development projects are in the making. Apart from such project aid, however a large part of assistance comes in the form of general support assistance (non-project aid), which predominantly, though not exclusively, support Arab recipients.

Saudi Arabia became a donor to Bangladesh after

August 1975 i. e. not until it had accorded Bangladesh formal recognition, which was well after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Though a Saudi grant of 10 million, through the U. N. did come to Bangladesh in 1974/75, before formal recognition of the state, Saudi Arabian aid assumed apolitical colour in the context of Bangladesh, especially if viewed from the role it played (or did not play), at the time of liberation. It may be mentioned that Saudi Arabia had supported the Pakistan position, for ideological as well as strategic reasons and had had declared the Bangladesh liberation struggle as a Separatist movement, and hence constituting an internal business of the Pakistani state. Non recognition of the newly independent State also disclosed the particular conservative Islamicist view of the Saudi government, especially when several other Arab states had accorded recognition to the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman e. g. Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Algeria. After Pakistan awarded recognition, in 1974, Iran Turkey, Kuwait and UAE followed suit.<sup>10</sup>

It was after Pakistan's recognition, and the second Islamic Summit Conference held in Lahore, and attended by Sheikh Mujib, that the Bangladesh government, started sending out delegations to the oil-rich middle eastern countries, to procure assistance for its fast deteriorating economy. Thus Riyadh received the Bangladesh Foreign Minister who came with a personal message from the Prime Minister and responded with 11,933 metric tons of wheat as grant.

The seeds of an Islamisation policy had already

been planted in the Sheikh Mujib era, continuing when the regime was abruptly terminated by a military coup, which subsequently installed ex-President Ziaur Rahman into power. With the secular-socialistic orientation of the previous Awami League regime abandoned, the Saudi recognition followed. With it came Saudi foreign economic assistance. From 1971 to 1981, Saudi assistance constituted 3.27% of total assistance, 4.9% of total bilateral assistance, and 51.35% of total assistance from OPEC countries. (see Table 3). The large portion of Saudi assistance began from 1976-77, most of it came in the form of project aid. (see Table 4). The terms for loan disbursements are also lenient. (see Table 5).

In some respects, especially regarding the leniency of its terms the Saudi economic assistance can be looked upon as being non-political. However that is not the conclusion reached here. For though this aid is apparently not tied to any purchases in the donor country, it is tied to the ideology of Islam, in other words to the politics that lie behind the propagation of the ideology, especially in the perspective of current global politics. It is not a coincidence therefore that abundance of Saudi aid was made available at the adoption of a pro-Islamic stance by the new regime of President Zia. He managed to establish a link between forces of Islamic fundamentalism gathering strength within Bangladesh and the 'royal diplomacy' of the oil rich middle-eastern states, Saudi Arabia among them. Such a linkage served to counter the more secular-oriented centrist and leftist political

parties. It is a trend which is continued by the present regime.

Directly or indirectly these processes laid Bangladesh open to pressure exerted by the donor states. One such pressure was to strike off secularism as a principle of government from the constitution. In specific aid policies, the pressure is more evident as in the following case regarding the training of the women's force in the metropolitan police. Initially the police-women were required to operate on the streets i.e. to control traffic, but soon they were withdrawn into indoor duty either at traffic control booths or important check points. One of the reasons for their withdrawal was obvious male harassments on the streets. The other reason, known from reliable sources, were pressures put on by the Saudi Arabian government in its capacity as donor state. Obviously maintaining a women police-force which operated on the streets, did not quite tally with certain Islamic values e.g. the seclusion of women, which was being cultivated by the Bangladesh state. In this way, some of the ideological positions taken by the government on the basis of Islamic ideology, often fragmented or negated the development processes instigated by the needs of international capital.<sup>11</sup>

Many Saudi Arabia assistance, also goes towards the funding of orphanages, and madrasahs, which teach and propagate religious values as opposed to secular ones. Another important factor to be considered in evaluating the actual impact of Saudi-Bangladesh relations in the society, is the migration of Bangladeshi

workers to the middle east. They have acquired for the state, an important source of earning foreign exchange via the remittances sent back by these workers to their families at home. It is little wonder therefore that manpower export has been given top priority among governmental policies, during the Zia regime, understandable why the Bangladesh state readily agrees with the ideological dictates of the Saudi government, and the stakes that Bangladesh government has in sustaining friendly and cordial relations with the Saudi state.

Another more long term effect of this migration is brought about by the importation of the Islamic ideology by returning migrant workers, and the type of investment entered into with the money earned. Most investment are consumption oriented e.g. purchase of land (not cultivating it), construction of houses procurement of gadgets, and electrical equipments e.g. two in ones, T. V. etc.<sup>12</sup> In other words the values which are found to dominate the scene are simultaneously orthodox, conservative and consumption oriented. In this way Islamic values and beliefs are reinforced and cultivated together with the consumption aspects of a capitalist society. Thus as thirst for consumption goods increase with the rise in purchasing power, capitalist values gain a upper hand, and at the same time joins hand with right wing fundamentalist forces in the constraining and suppressing of socialist or left-wing forces. As a result the chances of delinking the Bangladesh economy from the world capitalist system becomes more and more remote.

## Notes

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Table : 1 SDF Aid to Non-Arab Countries.

Country/Year	Loans and grants (\$ millions)	Description of projects for which loans were extended
<b>Bangladesh</b>		
1977	50.0	Railroad renovation
1979	30.0	Limestone and mining project at Jaipurhat
<b>Cameroon</b>		
1977	29.9	Hydroelectric dam project
1979	3.6	Tshanshi-Foudair highway
<b>Comoros Islands</b>		
1979	14.5	70-km of roads on Islands
<b>Congo</b>		
1976	28.0	Railway project
<b>Gambia</b>		
1977	6.6	Development of Yundum Airport
<b>Ghana</b>		
1977	29.9	Electricity projects
<b>India</b>		
1976	107.0	Power projects
<b>Indonesia</b>		
1976	70.0	Fertilizer Plant in South Sumatra
1977	50.0	Road project in East Java
<b>Kenya</b>		
1978	25.0	Expansion of Nairobi water network system
1980	22.4	245-km road linking Rift Valley Province with southern Sudan
<b>Liberia</b>		
1978	11.0	Thermal power plant
	9.0	Bridge across St. Paul River

		and road linking it to mining region of Bomi Hills
Malaysia		
1975	76.6	Medical school; technical university; reclamation and resettlement projects
1979	30.4	Establishment of scientific institutes; levelling and landscaping
Mali		
1975	2.25	Assistance for drought and development projects
1976	6.0	Assistance for drought and development projects
1977	5.0	'Urgent' development projects
	15.0	Development assistance
	15.0	Sankormi River dam construction
Mauritania <sup>a</sup>		
1976	51.5	Steel plant
Pakistan		
1976	32.1	Mirpur Mathelo fertilizer project
1979	90.2	Thermal power station at Pipri near Karachi
	48.8	Tarbila dam project
	31.2	Fertilizer plant construction at Mirpur Mathelo
	14.7	Port Qasim project
	10.3	Purchase of diesel locomotives for Pakistan Railways
1980	60.0	Repairs and modifications of Tarbila dam
Rwanda		
1976	5.4	Kigali road project
Senegal		



1976	36.0	Dhakar-Thias motorway
1978	3.9	First stage of 2,500-hectare land reclamation scheme in Anaby River basin
Somalia <sup>a</sup>		
1976	72.6	Sugar cane factory
1980	10.6	For establishment of a national university
South Korea		
1976	44.2	Highway and port projects
Taiwan <sup>b</sup>		
1976	53.0	Taiwan highway projects
1977	30.3	Railway electrification
1978	30.0	Automatic telephone system
Turkey		
1980	250.0	Railway modernization ; power lines and lignite power mixing yard ; other public-sector ( especially energy ) projects ( amount negotiated in 1979 with disbursements made upon submission of projects by Turkish government )
Uganda		
1975	31.0	Development projects
	18.0	Agricultural and livestock projects

Sources : *Middle East Economy Survey*, selected issues, 1975-80 :  
*Saudi Development Fund First Annual Report*  
 (March-July 1975).

**Table : 2 Selected List of Saudi Governmental Aid to Non-Arab League Countries, 1974-80**

Country/Year	Loans and grants (\$ millions)	Purpose
Bangladesh 1974	10	Flood aid (grant)
Federal Republic of Germany 1980	2.6	Direct and indirect credits
France 1974	200	Loan from SAMA (10 years), at 10 per cent, recycling petrodollars
Hong Kong 1979	0.3	Mosque renovation
Iran 1978	10	Tabas earthquake victims (grant)
Ireland 1976	300	Loan (5 years), at 9.2 per cent, guaranteed by EEC
Italy 1980	10	Earthquake assistance (grant)
Japan 1974	1,000	Loan from SAMA (5 years), at 10 per cent, recycling petrodollars
Malaysia 1975	85	Development projects
Malta 1974	5	Interest-free loan repayable in 20 years
Niger 1975	10	Drought assistance (grant)
1978	5	Islamic University of Niger
Nigeria 1977	5	Islamic University of Nigeria
Pakistan 1975	100	Interest-free loan for industrial projects
	10	Earthquake assistance (grant)
South Korea 1975	70	Development Projects (repayable over 25 years)
Turkey 1977	5	Earthquake assistance (grant)
Turkish of Cyprus 1975	5	Economic assistance
United States 1975	100	Loan to AT & T (American Telephone & Telegraph), repayable over 6 years at 8.4 per cent
1980	300	Loan to IBM (SAMA placement of notes), 10.8 per cent, average life 5.5 years, redeemed within 7 years
Yugoslavia 1979	2.5	Renovation of Sarajevo mosque

Source : *Middle East Economic Survey*, various issues, 1974-80.

Table : 3 The Saudi Contribution to the total Aid Committed to Bangladesh (1971-June 1981)

	In US \$ Million
Total Aid to Bangladesh	— 10878.4
Total Bilateral Aid to Bangladesh	— 7259.8
Total OPEC country Aid to Bangladesh	— 692.2
Total Saudi Aid to Bangladesh	— 355.5
Saudi Aid as % of Total Aid	— 3.27%
Saudi Aid as % of Total Bilateral Aid	— 4.9%
Saudi Aid as % of Total OPEC country Aid	— 51.35%

Source : *Computed from EKD Statistics, ibid.*

Table : 4 Category and Regimewise Breakdown of Saudi Aid Commitment to Bangladesh in US \$ Million

Category	Mujib Regime (1971-1975)*	Zia Regime (July 1975-June 1981)
Food Aid	10	60
Commodity Aid	—	156.5
Project Aid	—	129

\* This is a rough estimate as the financial year ends June, and Mujib was assassinated August 1975.

Source : *Computed from ERD statistics, ibid.*

Table : 5 Terms of Saudi Loans Received by Bangladesh (1971-June 1981)

Loan Agreement	Rate of Int.	Down Payments	Grace Per.	Repayments
Project Loan : 1977	2%	—	5yr.	15yr.
Project Loan : 1979	2%	—	5yr.	15yr.

Source : *ERD statistics, ibid.*

# Modernization, Power and Values : Some Conceptual Issues

S. Aminul Islam

## Introduction

Macro-level theoretical discourses on the Third World manifest a persistent silence on the problematics of power among the peasantry. In recent years the 'awkward' class, has emerged as "a subject of and within social reality" (Shanin in Zamosc 1986 : XII). Significant contributions have been made on historical and theoretical aspects of peasant movement (Scott, 1976 ; Skocpol, 1979 ; Guha 1983 ). A growing number of micro-level studies have focussed upon the pattern of leadership, factional structures and patron, client relationship which characterize the rural power structure. Yet we are far from having an adequate understanding of the structure distribution and dynamics of power in peasant society within the larger frame work of world capitalism and nation-state.

There are two formidable difficulties which confront theory construction in this area. First, there is no macro level theoretical paradigm about Third World which is internally coherent possesses sufficient explanatory power and is subscribed by a large number of practicing scientists ( Kuhn, 1970 ). In the absence of such a paradigm, it is difficult to articulate specific theories of modernization and power. Secondly, there is

no adequate theory of power and even its conceptualization is far from satisfactory.

In the absence of conceptual precision and theoretical innovation, there has cropped up a plethora of empirical studies of descriptive worth which do not always explain what power is all about. There are authors who start with Weber or Blau's conception of power in terms of action-matrix, but locates the phenomenon within structural parametre without realizing the analytical gap it creates (for example, Chowdhury 1978 ; Ahmed, 1983). Again there are studies which employ a kind of reductionism to treat power-structure in terms of leadership (Rahman, 1981 ). Thus, empirical studies have often contributed little towards conceptual clarity and theoretical articulation.

In this context, it is imperative to examine the conceptual and theoretical issues more closely and create greater theoretical resilience in this area of research even at the cost of speculative analysis. This paper focuses upon some aspects of the relationship among modernization, power and values in rural society. It primarily deals with the phenomenon of power and attempts at construction of a conceptual schema through which it can be better understood. It also examines the relationship between power and alienation within the social structure of peasantry trapped in the process of modernization. Alienation reflects both a state of powerlessness and normlessness. Values are related to power in two different ways. It is one of the bases of power and at the same time essential for its legitimation. The paper suggests that modernization does not produce linear

development in the areas of power-structure and values. It may even perpetuate the essential features of power structure. Alienation and often class-based resistance may increase along with modernization. The outcome of the process often appears paradoxical and disarticulated. An optimum research strategy for the time being is to adopt a so level analysis which can adequately take into account the paradoxical trends which characterize the power and normative structure of the peasantry in the Third World.

It is now generally accepted that there was no generally held or accepted 'norm' which could provide the epistemic foundation for theoretical articulation or coherence to the plethora of empirical studies conducted under the rubrics of modernization (Islam, 1986). The 'paradigm' of modernization thus failed to provide any theoretical framework for the study of social change in the Third World. Even with its pronounced stress on the realm of the 'normative order', it was unable to flesh out any relatively valid analysis of the peasant values or changes within it.

The alternative paradigms which began to blossom from the sixties-theories of dependency, modes of production or World system are either 'dead' or adolescent. Frank's (1980 : 323) survey of the wreckage in 1980 is revealing :

... orthodox development theory and ideology, as well as progressive dependence or even (not as revolutionary as hoped) new dependence theory-not to mention the Chinese 'three worlds' theory and the Soviet supposedly 'non-capitalist' third way to

national liberation, democracy, and varieties of socialism-were all completely bankrupt. Today none of these theories and ideologies can offer realistic policy alternatives and practical political-economic guidelines for the pursuit of economic development or national liberation, let alone socialist reconstruction. Independent national development in the Third World has proved to be a snare and a delusion, and self-reliance, collective or otherwise, is a myth that is supposed to hide this sad fact of life in the world capitalist system.

The world system theory is yet to develop a framework which can integrate economy and ideology, social system and power and a more resilient local structures with less powerful world system. Again there has been very little consensus on the specific modes of productions obtaining within a particular social formation in the Third World. The issue has been clouded by various ideological positions adopted by different communist parties and Marxist groups.

In such a situation empiricism appears to be a tempting way out. But as Kuhn (1970) shows, facts can be understood only in terms of metatheoretical or paradigmatic framework. Empirical research is also forced to use what Gouldner (1970) calls domain assumptions. The pursuit of pure empiricism is thus equally unproductive.

The only way out appears to be what is called meso-level research strategy which was advocated by Merton (1967) long ago. In this strategy attention is focussed upon specific phenomena for conceptual

clarity and codification and efforts are directed towards low-level generalizations. The analysis of power and values which follows is an attempt to employ this strategy.

### Power

Power is a pervasive aspect of social life. As Howley (1970) observes-every social action happens to be an exercise of power, every social relationship involves power-equation and every social group or institution is a fountain of power.

The centrality and ubiquity of power in social life have received increasing attention of social scientists in recent years. One of the research traditions in this area which may be termed conservative-liberal centres around the writings of Lasswell (1950), Huntington (1968) and Lensky (1966). Another important research tradition follows from Marx and Gramsci and is manifested in the works of Althusser (1977) and Poulantzas (1982), among others. Lastly, there are figures like Foucault (1979) and more recently Anthony Giddens (1981) who have worked on the fringes of Marxist tradition and made important contributions in the study of power.

The phenomenon of power has fascinated man for centuries and powerful minds have unravelled many of its structural aspects and its dynamics, yet we are yet to have an adequate theory of power. In 1949 MacIver (1947: 432) pointed out that there is no reasonably adequate study of the nature of social power. In 1957 Robert Bierstedt (1950:



730 ) observed : Few problems in sociology are more perplexing than the problem of social power. In the entire lexicon of sociological concepts none is more troublesome than the concept of power. In 1966 Lensky ( 1966: 74 ) pointed out 'of all the concepts used by sociologists, few are the source of more confusion and misunderstanding than power.'

Although the phenomenon of power has received greater attention in recent years, very little has been achieved in terms of conceptual clarity and theoretical articulation. Existing meta-theories of power are, so to say, 'space-travellers'-conceived at such a high level of abstraction that they are unusable for micro-level studies, piecemeal or are confined to an analysis of extremely narrow areas of power-structure. Furthermore, most of these studies are static or confined to the study of changes in leadership. Such studies even do not pose elementary questions on the elements of power-structure or the nature of the dynamics of power. In this regard one can cite *Power, Politics and Progress* ( Whyte and Alberti, 1976 )-a work based on extensive empirical research in rural Peru and one of its authors is a famed sociologist William Foot-whyte. Its major effort was theory construction, yet it ended up with a few boxes on cooperation, and conflict and diagrams on spreading structural linkages among the peasantry.

There seems to be no satisfactory definition of power. Max Weber ( Gerth and Mills, 1946 : 181 ) defined power as the chance of a man or a number of man to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are partici-

pating in action. He did not equate economic power with power as such in the restricted sense but thought that it was a basis of power along with status honour. In the similar way political power could be converted into economic power. In a broad sense, Weber viewed economic, political and status resources as constituting power in a community. A central concern in Weber's sociology of power was the reasons for which men accepted domination of others. Political order in a community could only emerge if the unequal distribution of power was socially accepted. He, therefore, concentrated upon the way power was legitimized. When power is legitimized, it tends to turn into authority or institutionalized power. Thus Weber undertook to analyze some of the key aspects of power-conversion of nonpolitical resources into power, resistance and legitimacy.

Blau (1964) from the perspective of exchange theory provides a definition of power which has been quoted or followed widely. According to him (Blau, 1964 : 117 ), power :

is the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as well as the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction.

Blau's definition brings into relief the relationship between power, force and resistance. According to Olsen (1970) there are three types of power : force' dominance and authority. He regards that the use of force involves deployment of uncommitted resources into the situation.

and goal attainment through compensation, deprivation and persuasion. The phenomenon of domination is situated within an organization or social system and as actor's resources for domination are delimited by his status within it. But his status allows him to exercise power because of the functional inter-dependence of the actors within a social system.

Olsen does not clearly differentiate between dominance and authority. It is simply treated as legitimate power and he follows Weber in his analysis of authority. Olsen also does not consider the dynamics of power in any detail.

With the eclipse of functionalism and exchange theories, an elaboration of a theory of power remained an unfulfilled goal in sociology.

The reemergence of Marxism as a major theoretical perspective in sociology have led Marxists to pay an increasing attention to the phenomenon of power. The problem of power informs the whole corpus of Marx' writings, yet he wrote very little on it in a direct way. He saw political power as concentration of economic power—as an epiphenomenon. Yet Marx also stressed upon coercion as an agency that secured or guaranteed exploitation in pre-capitalist class-divided societies. In *Grundrisse* Marx (1973) discussed the role of force in history and found that it had only temporary affect upon social life. In the end, when blood and dust had settled down what mattered was the way people produced and reproduced their material life.

Gouldner (1980) has recently argued that Marx had no way of developing his ideas of state and power

within the paradigmatic confines of his theory as it involved an area of anomaly. Whatever may be the reason, Marx or Marxist theorists including Gramsci have failed to provide a specific theory of power. Thus Poulantzas (1982 : 104) a leading Marxist theorist on power, for example, defines power as the 'capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests'. This definition suffers from two severe limitations. First, the phenomenon of power is located exclusively at the class level. Secondly, the very process of the class formation involves 'structuration' of power which is left out of the definition.

It is not possible to go into the depth and details of a critical analysis of power within the space of this paper. What follows is a conceptual schema the author is trying to develop so that, at least meaningful questions can be asked about the phenomenon of power.

We define power as the capacity of an actor or a group or a class to exact obedience or compliance from others on the basis its greater command over resources which are useful for the production and reproduction of social life or held to be valuable in society or which are physically threatening to an individual or group.

This definition covers both micro and macro-levels and puts stress upon means of production, means of communication (symbolic system) and 'means of destruction' as the basis of power.

An analysis of power must start from the elements which compose it. Fundamentally, power is grounded in the production and reproduction of material life in

society. It includes reproduction of human beings not only as sources of labour, but also as agents of physical coercion. Human body is the most primitive resource for power as well as the target of its exercise. Again nature is not only a resource for human existence but also an object of awe and devotion. It is conceived as supernatural power through the agency of human consciousness. Thus nature, body and consciousness form the organic basis of power. Body and nature are converted into productive system of the society to form one of the social bases of power. Every human society also converts body into a system of physical coercion to maintain its command over existing valued resources or demand it from others. Values and norms are created to justify such claims.

In the class-divided societies, there occurs an accelerated inequity in the distribution of power among classes, groups and individuals which is legitimized through the dominant ideology. But less powerful classes or groups also tend to produce counter ideologies to resist the existing distribution of power.

The productive system or the coercive apparatus are not the only loci of power in society. In fact, every social institution is a power-bank from which actors or a group can draw resources to exercise power. Through institutional configuration power is converted into authority.

The discussion above relates to the 'structuration' of power in society and its distribution. Another aspect of it is the way power is exercised. In every society power is routinely exercised through institutional means

and socially approved way. But even the most well-ordered society experiences occasional violence among individuals or groups to maintain or change positions in the power structure. Routinized use of violence is also a regular feature of state or state-like apparatus. Again there are societies where violence is a general feature of social life. European feudal societies of specific periods and some tribal societies like Yanomamo (Harris, 1978) would come closer to a social structure punctuated by regular violence. Such violence can also be located at the institutional level on the margin of society such as the slum studied by Lewis (1972) or rural families in poor countries where women may be regularly subjected to violence.

Domination is always both accepted and resisted. Resistance may be offered loudly or in silence, in organized or spontaneous manner, and at individual or group level. It may be charged with violence or threat of it or peaceful. It is equally an exercise of power.

For many societies or groups power may be a zero-sum game. But any changing society creates new bases of power. Generation of power can be effected through various means, the most important of which are science, technology and group solidarity which are products of raised human consciousness, deployment of greater violence (body) and expanded reproduction (conversion of nature).

There are a few tentative and adhoc attempts at a classification of pre-capitalist or Third World political systems (Almond and Powell, Jr., 1978;

Giddens, 1981 ). In the absence of a rigorous taxonomic schema, there has been little progress in the analysis of power structure over time and space. Specially, we have extremely limited knowledge about causes, processes and directionality of changes in the power structure. It has largely resulted from a cognitive equation of power structure with the elite. There has been plenty of study on the social background and composition of the elites and their role in rural society. An increasing focus on the factions and patronage in recent years has deepened our understanding in this area. But we are as yet without a minimal theoretical framework for mapping out the general process of change in the structure of power in the course of 'modernization'.

On the basis of the conceptual schema developed here and the literature on political development, it is proposed that changes in the power structure can be understood if we focus on the changes in the following elements.

1. Generation (of power)
2. Differentiation :
  - a) institutional differentiation
  - b) segmentation
  - c) class differentiation
  - d) changes in the authority and leadership pattern
3. Legitimacy
4. Equality
5. Participation

### 1. Generation of Power

A significant aspect of the rural power structure is related to the capability of the rural social system to generate more power. Diffusion of new technology and information and increased demand for agricultural products have increased the actual and potential resource-base of the Third World rural system. But it has been preceded and accompanied by a persistent trend of resource-outflow from it. On the basis of it, it has been powerfully argued that the rural society in the Third World is facing increasing impoverishment or under development and hence a decrease in power (Frank, 1980). Even if such a process is occurring, it is bound to be variable over time and space. There might occur short term gains in some places, while other areas may suffer from 'backwash' effect and secular decline of power.

### 2. Differentiation

Differentiation may occur through development of new institutional loci of power and its spread over a larger number of institutional forms leading to de-concentration of power. Differentiation may also occur through segmentation or emergence of factional structures and significant changes in the patron-clientele relationship. In its another form, differentiation may lead to polarization of classes among the peasantry with consequent inequality of power, class consciousness and class struggle. Such a situation calls into question the legitimacy of the existing power structure. It introduces the interplay of violence in the rural social



system which in some cases, brings about a total change in the power structure.

'Modernization' tends to bring about fundamental changes in the authority and leadership pattern. The rural social system increasingly encounters the legal-rational authority created by the state. The ascriptive leadership gives way to open leadership which is based more on the individual qualities of the leader and consent of the led.

It creates new bases of legitimacy. Descent, lineage or religious education as the basis of power tends to decline. Wealth, modern education and individual capabilities become more important in legitimizing the inequity or power.

But more importantly the political structure may achieve more legitimacy or face an erosion of it. The erosion of legitimacy is pronounced in a political culture which shows a high degree of fragmentation, alienation and violence (Huntington, 1961 ; Pye, 1962).

Capitalism produces political equality or legal essence and thus creates a minor rupture between economic and political power. In this way 'modernization' tends to create greater equality in the distribution of power. But in a peripheral society an authoritarian state may create a greater inequity of power through private and public employment of coercion. The landed elite in the rural social system comes to enjoy, quasi-monopoly of power through its connection with the state apparatus.

In the similar way 'modernization' may increase or depress political participation. Increased political participation takes place through the emergence of

new institutional forms and democratic practices. Increased participation means greater sharing of power. Depressed participation may occur due to the perpetuity or an authoriatrian regime or as a counterblast to over-participation which produces so much strain on the political apparatus that it reverts to an authoritarian form.


In the pre-capitalist rural social systems, however, a widely prevalent institutional form is the community structure. Recent research works have shown that pre-capitalist communities are characterized by a great deal of structured inequality. Unequal distribution of power occurs across the axes of age, sex, status, lineage strength, control over land and tribute (Seddon, 1978; ). Within the community structure family is the institutional arena where men mostly dominate women and seniors dominate juniors. In the lineage elders dominate juniors and the chiefs the ordinary members. Again high status or numerically superior lineage has more power than the low-status or a weak lineage. Authority is exercised through traditional assemblies within the lineage or the village by elders or elders of the dominant lineage. Within the community structure there is high dependency of the women, juniors, weak lineages and peasants with inferior rights in land or migrant agricultural labourers. A relatively stagnant peasant society provides little scope for social mobility or generating alternative sources for power within the community structure.

With the incorporation of peasant society into world capitalism through colonialism or semi-colonialism, the dependency within the community structure was

reinforced by the differentiation of the peasantry along class structure. It created a doubly articulated structure of exploitation and domination in which the poor and landless peasants were completely at the mercy of the landed class.

Authority is exercised through traditional courts within the lineage or the village by the elders and elders of strong lineage. Within the community structure, there is a high degree of dependency of women, juniors, weak lineages, and peasants with inferior rights in land or migrant peasants (Jahangir, 1982). A relatively stagnant Peasant society provides little scope for social mobility or generating alternative sources for power within the community structure.

This nature of dependency can be better appreciated from Latin American example where peasant were completely dependent upon the hacendado. Cotler (1967-68) described the power-structure of the haciendo as a triangle without base which is reproduced below.



This simple diagram captures the essence of a 'depressed' and dependent peasantry which was phrased by Marx as a 'sack of potatoes'. It refers to the fact that the peasants were linked only to the haciendado who had monopoly of power and discouraged links among the peasants themselves or to the outside world.

In the South-Asian context, power structure which emerged through the colonial period is highly complicated. Colonialism introduced sweeping changes in the agrarian relations strengthening the legal basis of private property, accelerating the pace of commercialization of agriculture and eroded much of the autocephalousness that the villages enjoyed. It also sped up the pace of differentiation among the peasantry.

The prevailing power structure in South Asia emerged from the contradiction and conflation of community structure, on the one hand, and class structure and state apparatus, on the other. It led to a partial transposition of power from informal community structure to formally instituted local administrative bodies (Jahangir, 1982). The growth of political parties and peasant mobilization forged a structural linkage between the peasantry and national politics. The ordinary peasants found greater legal protection against the landed class which lost some of its coercive power. The differentiation of the peasantry and its mobilization did not mean that the poor and landless were conscious of its class position. It was the context in which the two basic features of rural power structure took new shapes—patron-clientele relationship and factionalism. The Patron-clientele relationship can be defined as a

vertical personalized relationship structured around an unequal exchange of goods and services between an actor who has greater command over resources and another who has less. Jahangir (1982) postulates that it has three dimensions: economic, political and ideological. The patronage refers to a regular or occasional supply of mainly economic resources to a person of lower economic and political status in exchange for services (including products of services). This relationship is articulated ideologically through personalized bonds and often through fictive kinship. Patronage thus involves both exploitation and marginal redistribution of resources. It may occur under a situation where the patron has a monopoly over resources and the personalized relationship is an ideological mechanism for off-setting resistance. It may also occur under a situation where there is no such monopoly but patronage is extended in the form of economic assistance or brokerage in exchange for, say, political support. Brokerage involves mediation between the peasantry and external institutions. Brokerage may exist independent of patronage. A broker may be a person of lower economic status, but his linkage with the state apparatus or urban centres enables him to provide services to those who have not and reap economic gain (Long, 1977 ; for various types of brokers).

Factionalism is a salient feature of peasant society and appears to be pervasive in South Asia. Fundamentally, factions are formed in response to the competition for domination of the rural society among the elite. The individual actors or segmented

groups within the elite tend to generate additional power by increasing the strength of the group in terms of number and solidarity. Thus a faction is a segmented reproduction of rural social structure. The top of the faction is formed by a strongman or a powerful leader with his kinsmen or a number of sub-leaders and the base by a more numerous group of followers recruited from dependent peasants or vulnerable people through patronage or coercion (Nicholas, 1963; Baily, 1969; Alavi, 1976; Wood, 1978). The patronage also involves mediation with or securing resources from the state apparatus.

Thus factionalism represents horizontal cleavages across class lines instead of vertical class conflict. Factionalism partially and outwardly resemble feudal political structure. A faction may often have 'cosmopolitan' ties, but it is a localized and segmented structure organized to compete for domination in a specific area against other such factions or similiar groups. Thus factionalism represents horizontal cleavages across class lines instead of vertical class-conflict. Each faction is structurally similiar and may be viewed as a segmented reproduction of the rural social structure. The factions are formed in the rural society in response to the efforts of the individual actors or specific groups within the elite to generate additional power by increasing the strength of the group in terms of number and solidarity. Thus a faction is a quasi-institutional arena of power primarily based on lineage, land and a clientele and tends to generate further power by establishing ties with state apparatus and 'cosmopolitan'

elites or urban bourgeoisie. The exercise of power by the factions leads often to latent or manifest conflict situation producing a low level of cohesion in the village. This is largely because no faction is likely to achieve a high level of legitimacy or retain it for long as the exercise of power by one faction tends to be resisted by other factions. This tendency is more manifest in societies where fortune of the lineages changes rapidly due to ecological vulnerability or price-fluctuations or inter-generational diminution of land-holding.

The factional politics in rural society have a number of consequences. First, it tends to forestall class-based solidarities and class consciousness. Secondly, the patrons as they get cheap labour, a high return on their credit, better terms for share-cropping and enjoy high status through factional domination, they are less likely to encourage changes in the village. As Alavi (cited in Wood, 1978 : 34) observes :

“...rival factions or faction leaders fight for control over resources, power and status as available within the existing framework of society rather than for changes in the social structure.”

Thirdly, the local administration may often become involved in the factional politics of the village like the wood worms and provide institutional support to it and divert resources through factional channels. In such a situation the village and the local administration become interlocked into patron-client relationship. The rational bureaucracy turns into what Eisenstadt (1973) calls 'neo-patrimonial' bureaucracy. In fact, Frykenberg substantiates for colonial India the process through

which the local elites operated like ants to destroy the essence of administration and turn it into a hollow-structure. Finally, factional conflicts which often involve litigation are expensive and tends to dissipate resources of each group engaged in the conflict.

The rural power structure is neither self-contained nor encapsulated. Marx (1962) in a powerful analysis of French politics during the middle of the last century showed that a small-holding peasantry within an under-developed agricultural economy produced Bonapartism—a specific form of state which was hero-centred, authoritarian and bureaucratic and was 'independent' of social classes. The contemporary peasantry of the Third World is more closely linked to the politics and economy at the state and global level. The so-called 'awkward class' forms a social basis of the peripheral state and also its nemesis. No peripheral state can maintain or reproduce itself without the sustained support of the rural elite. But the rural society which contains the overwhelming majority of the population is also the theatre of escalating poverty and hunger, of diseases and death and of insurrections and revolution actual or impending. Thus no peripheral state is able to achieve legitimacy without some kind of rural development ideology. The state is forced to maintain both its alliance with the kulaks and its patronage to the poor. There are three possible ways of doing this contradictory task. In a garrison state, both these responsibilities fall upon the bureaucracy which has to defend (i.e. fatten) the rich and protect (i.e. disarm) the poor. In a democratic form, the party men



at the grass-roots level mediate between the factions and the local administration. In a more populist regime the party has a greater say in the allocation of developmental resources in the country-side. In all these forms there emerges a symbiotic relationship between the rich peasants, factions, the local party machinery (where applicable) and the state apparatus and developmental resources are distributed among these agents. There is, of course, a trickle down of resources through kinship, factional and brokerage channels. In recent years, the poverty-focussed programmes and activities of N. G. O. S. have been able to provide more resources to the poor. These may have helped the specific groups but are unlikely to reverse the larger trend of polarization and pauperization in the country side. (Zamoc, 1986).

The role of the state thus may increase the economic power of the rural elite, but reduce their political power by delivering some resources directly to the poor. The rural poor can bypass or supplement factional channels, brokers or patrons and receive resources through their own organizations. Such organizational structures are likely to reduce their psychological dependency and create greater ideological consciousness among them.

But it may also produce inter-role, inter-organizational and inter-group conflicts. There is also a real possibility of these organizations being infiltrated by the rich. But such resource redistribution always depends upon the 'fiscal muscle' of the state, its class character, and ultimately upon the 'bang or boom' of the world capitalism. The magnitude of it is never going

to be so great as to cover a substantial segment of the rural poor. Thus there is very limited scope for the enhancement of the power-position of the poor (Grant, 1983). As Macnamara (1983 : 48) points out :

"In the developing countries with the lowest incomes such as Bangladesh, even a program for small farms and for the urban informal sector would leave out the poorest 25-35 percent of the population-those most at risk".

In this context of limited differentiation and increasing poverty of the peasantry and state intervention for 'modernization', peasant consciousness is likely to undergo important changes and affect crucially the normative bases of authority/leadership, resistance, legitimacy and distribution of power.

#### Values

The term value refers to different phenomena in everyday life. Collins dictionary (1979) assigns twelve meanings to the word. As commonly used in sociology the term in its plural refer to moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of behaviour of a person or group.

Values can also be defined after Deutsch (1967 : 178) "as a repetitive preference for a particular class of messages recurred, transmitted or acted upon in preference to others".

Values and norms are products of human consciousness which provide the self with an embeddedness in time and space constructed socially through interaction with other human beings. Values and norms emerge out of human interaction through which an individual

locates himself in the universe, attribute meanings to objects around him and achieves standard for interacting with other human beings. Since human interaction is premised upon the reproduction of individuals and groups through the production of goods and services and its exchange, values tend partly to follow the same trajectory. In sociology, phenomenological and interactionist 'paradigms' tend to put exclusive stress upon the formation of meaning system as an autonomous process-manifestation of consciousness developed through human encounter which structures the social space, endows it with a store of knowledge and an inventory of rules in terms of which an individual lives out his life. Marxism, on the other hand, allots greater emphasis upon the historicity of consciousness and its ultimate well-spring in the material basis of man and society. In class-divided societies values turn into ideologies which either legitimizes the structured inequality in society or undermines it. As Habermas (1981) argues both science and scientific discourses have a dual nature embodying an ideological component so far as they serve the dominant class.

Recent works in marxism which have absorbed a lot of mainstream sociology including phenomenology are opening up a new horizon of theoretical understanding of the relationship between power and values. One can mention recent works of Godelier (1980); Amin (1980); Scott (1976) in this connection.

Values are related to power in two ways. It is one of the strategic resource bases of power as well as a legitimizing agency which converts force into

power. The structure of social inequality, as it is always threatened through class or group conflict, can be sustained only through a continuous process of legitimization. Thus values tend to be structured in the form of ideologies frosted upon the structure of economic and political inequality.

The 'paradigm' of modernization saw it essentially as a process which created a regular flow of technological inventions and a new system of values. Technology as an expression of human imagination and skill was deeply influenced by social values. Merton (1967) has documented how the pursuit of science and technology in 17th century England was influenced by Protestant values. That protestantism provided a new set of values which was responsible for the emergence of capitalism in the West has remained a central idea in sociology. Max Weber (1958) who advanced the theory found that christianity through Judaism established universalistic models of ethical behaviour through exemplary prophecy and coupled with Greek and Roman ideas of citizenship and legal forms created powerful tendencies towards universalism of ethical norms and rationalization of conduct. The role of Calvinism can be understand as a culmination of this process as well as a breakthrough which created a secular and rational ethic which was qualitatively different from other religious ethics of the world.

It is a major irony that modernization theories failed to grasp the significance of a key aspect of Weber's theory which is more relevant for contemporary Third World. Weber found that religions of

India and China did not provide a uniform ethical standard for the believers. There was a cleavage between the ordained clergy and laity in the religious sphere. The religion of the laity was thus embedded in magical practices. Calvinism was successful in establishing an ideological dominance over the masses and eliminating the magic and folk ideology. Although very recent historical research (Turner, 1980) in the West has cast some doubt about the extent of this role of Calvinism, there is no denying the fact that it was a crucible that dissolved the so-called primordial consciousness of the peasants or its folk tradition of values in the West. Calvinism was at the same time a religion and a non-religion which had put an end to the enchanted world of religion for the West. This worldly asceticism, Weber argued, led through secularization and rationalization to the development of capitalism in the West. Very recently Morishima (1982), a leading Japanese economist has used Weber's theory to explain the economic success of Japan. He finds that confucianism which spread in Japan was significantly different from that of China and it was the key factor which underlay Japan's success.

A different research tradition more relevant to rural society grew up within the discipline of anthropology. Two classic works by Banfield (1951) and Fosters (1967) formed the paradigmatic exemplars of this research tradition. Banfield argued that South Italian peasants followed an ethic called amoral familism. It stressed upon the immediate family as the repository of trust and cooperation. All outsiders

and outside intervention was suspected. There was minimal cooperation at the community level. Thus the peasants were unable either to seize economic opportunities or mount co-operative efforts for development. Foster's study of a Mexican village called Tzintzuntzan led him to believe that peasant communities showed a worldview and behaviour pattern which can be largely explained by what he called the idea of limited good held by the peasants. They believed that all good things of life were scarce and limited in supply. Their supply could not be increased through human efforts. Thus one's gain of these things meant someone else's loss. In the context of this worldview there was strong normative pressure backed by jealousy and slander for redistribution of resources. The process of differentiation was offset by ideological emphasis on egalitarianism through expensive rituals. The peasant ideology was forceful enough to depress individual or collective efforts for improvement of economic status.

The research tradition which grew up around these ideas found that the peasants were bound by traditional values and beliefs, and lacked rationality which worked against change,—innovation and development. Rogers (1969:40) has summarized the model values of the peasantry in the following description :

Peasant communities are characterized by mutual distrust, suspicion, and evasiveness in interpersonal relations ... Villagers are familistic—that is, they subordinate their individual goals to those of the family. Peasants generally lack innovativeness and have an unfavourable attitudes ... ( They ) ... have

relatively limited aspirations. They also lack deferred gratification ... Peasants are also characterized by a limited view of the world... The subculture of peasantry outlined here represents synthesis of what is known. It suggests that the peasant style of life contains many social- psychological barriers to modernization and change.

A related theme which has attracted the attention of the anthropologists is the alienation or atomism which happens to be the structural feature of many peasant societies. It should be noted here that alienation as a destiny of modern man is a pervasive theme of classical and contemporary sociology. But it was also seen as an aspect of primitive or peasant societies. Sir Henry Maine (cited in Levy, 1968:231) wrote: "When... competition for exchange comes to penetrate into the primitive group; it becomes the 'regulated private war' by which ancient or primitive society is gradually broken up into indistinguishable atoms",

Marx (1962) put the same view about the French peasantry in a more picturesque way.

Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse.. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homogenous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sackful of potatoes.

In 1940's Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict and Honigman (1968) pointed out that a number of very simple societies exhibited a set of distinct characteristics and could be described as atomistic societies. Such

societies were mainly small Indian tribes such as Kaska Indians. Subsequently a number of other authors pointed to the existence of such societies.

In 1950 John Embree ( 1950 ) characterized Thailand as a "loosely structured social system." It referred to a set of institutions which provided little control over individual and interpersonal behaviour and an absence of formal organizations. Loyalty to family and dyadic relationships was not strongly entrenched. A number of later works supported this view. Herbert Philips found that here "it is the individual that is primary, not the social relationship". People of Ban Chan, the village he studied, were primarily a bundle of individuals who had formalized rituals for face-to-face relationship, but could not establish or sustain long-term relationship. A recent study ( Mentzer and Piker, 1975 ) has described Thai personality in terms of five characteristics noted below :

1. Perceived indeterminacy of intentions. Peasants believe that it is not possible to know the intentions of others.
2. Distrust of the motives of others.
3. Valuation of the 'cool heart'. It refers to a great deal of emphasis upon emotional indifference to other people.
4. Aversion to open or direct expression of antagonism.
5. Ambivalence toward dependency postures. It means peasants tend to be individualistic and self-sufficient. But the same tendency also sends them to the refuse of worldly patrons and time-



less sublimation of Buddhism. This type of personality is, obviously, unable to build up collective and complex organizations.

Pye (1965) found similar personality and structural features in Burma and Indonesia.

Indonesia, for example has not general social structure which can serve as a framework for the entire society. Instead, Indonesian society is composed of a large number of fluid groups, all of which tend to be parochial and limited in scope. Individual interests tend to dominate group interests, and there are few firmly rooted social and economic relationships.

And :

This fluid social structure has encouraged a more competitive and violent social life.

Findings from other peasant societies came to stress upon atomism or structural looseness. Banfield reported that South Italian peasants tended to contain their social worlds within their respective families, were distrustful of outsiders, and unable to form durable collective enterprises. Foster found that among the Mexican peasants nuclear family was the fundamental unit of social organization. Family roles and controls were flexible. Ties of extended families or lineages were weak and there were no voluntary associations. Such a society was characterized by two forms of contracts — 'colleague contracts' which established reciprocity among people of similar socio-economic status and 'patron-client contract' which formed an asymmetric relationship which tended to be supra-local. In Fosters'

view peasant societies are by their nature atomistic and riven by invidious competition. After reviewing the relevant literature, Honigman (1968) offers five characteristics which underlie atomism.

1. Unrestrained pursuit of individual interests : Individual freedom and interests are so greatly cherished that it prevents the emergence of social forms necessary for collective enterprise.
2. Interpersonal behaviour is marked by reserve, restraint or caution. People tend to avoid unnecessary involvement or contact with other people.

Interpersonal relationships are shifting, brittle and geared to short-term ends :

3. Lack of collective enterprise.

Related to the above, is the disinclination of people to enter into long-term structural obligations, collective action and create and belong to organizations. As a result, the nuclear family is almost the only formal unit of social structure.

4. Weak and informal leadership :

The atomistic-type society is characterized by weak leadership, lack of formal authority and unstable alliances.

5. Pervading hostility :

Lastly, it shows a high degree of 'strain, contention or invidiousness.'

These anthropological views of peasant culture have come under increasing criticism (Long, 1977 for a summary). Contemporary works on peasant society have shown that the generalization reached by Rogers is

nearly fictive. As Hutton and Cohen (1975:105) observe :

'Conservative and innovative behaviour occurs in all societies, but there appears to be no uniform pattern of resistance to change or the acceptance of the new which enables us to say who will resist particular technological, scientific and cultural changes'.

Moerman's ( 1968 ) study of the village called Ban Ping in Northern Thailand provides a fascinating illustration of the above observation which was made in the context of Africa. The villagers of Ban Ping were extreme profit-maximizers with respect to cash-crops, but practiced traditional cultivation for their subsistence requirements. In the same way alienation or atomism is a feature of both peasant and modern societies and every society shows simple or complex 'structuration'.

Scott's ( 1976 ) powerful analysis of South-East Asian peasant culture provides a point of departure for the study of peasant culture. According to Scott, peasant values are grounded in the ecological niche, the structure of their economy and the mechanism of exploitation. His focus is primarily upon subsistence agriculture which is characterized by high scarcity, uncertainty and risk. This subsistence economy gives rise to a specific kind of moral economy which he calls subsistence ethic-a mirror-image of protestant ethic. It refers to the rights and values associated with minimum economic subsistence. It concentrates on the principle of 'safety first'. The peasants structure their existence in the same way as the men at Lloyd's do it-they spread the risk through kinship ties, patron-clientele relationship etc.

Fatalism and dependency are thus related to the uncertainty of the peasant economy. But peasants also tend to engage in collective action on a large scale as they revolt against the fiscal burdens imposed by their lords or the state which threatens their subsistence. Activism, rationality, the sense of selfpotency or large-scale collective efforts are part of peasant life as are fatalism and dependency.

It is in this context that the immense literature on communication and diffusion and individual modernity appears as misconceived, simplistic and false (Pearse, 1966, Staven Hagen, 1968 ).

Similarly, the studies on individual modernity which focused upon the transformation of values and behaviour at micro-level were wrong. Inkeles and Smith ( 1974 ), for example, framed an elegant theoretical model which postulated that school, factory and mass media were the key factors in the manufacturing of modern man and they found through an extremely sophisticated empirical study covering six countries and almost six thousand people that these factors did produce twelve core values of modernity. But the basic assumptions of the model were wrong and so were the results. Most of the studies on changing peasant values focus exclusively on attitudes. But attitudes do not adequately predict human behaviour. Again it is extremely difficult to probe into peasant attitudes. As Hutton and Cohen ( 1975:123 ) observe :

We are not likely to be helped by attitude surveys and cultural studies designed to test receptivity to modernization. Rather we need some understand-

ding of the ways in which particular economics, social structures and cultures are tied together and the impact on these of the experience of colonization and incorporation into a wider economy.

This is exactly what we need to understand the changing pattern of values. But it is extremely difficult if not impossible, to achieve this objective. It is mainly because there is no reliable way of measuring values and norms of the distant past. The peasantry has been the silent substratum of humanity. There is the further difficulty of establishing a meaningful relationship of values with the vast array of variables that the economy, social structure, and culture contain.

Thus an analysis of the changing pattern of values of the peasantry is a challenging problematique which has no easy or even foreseeable solution.

A much less satisfactory but plausible approach is piecemeal empiricism. It does not employ an overarching theoretical framework, but contributes towards it through the articulation of a few conceptual tools supported by selective empirical data.

Such an approach would seem to require emphasis on four areas of the problematique. First, the peasants values have to be located in terms of an interaction between the great traditions of urban civilizations and the folk traditions of localized rural areas. Secondly, it has to be seen in terms of its relationship or contact with or incorporation into the wider economy—a pre-capitalist empire, colonialism or contemporary neo-colonialism. Thirdly, it has to be viewed in the context of state ideology. Finally, peasant values in many

contemporary 'Third World' countries need to be examined with reference to international or locally-based organizations 'doing development'. This kind of work would obviously require a historical perspective with proper periodization of the historical time of a social system. One such effort was undertaken by Clifford Geertz within the partial confines of modernization studies in his series of works on Indonesia of which *Religion of Java* (1969) is a classic work comparable to those of Weber. If such efforts are rare, it is still possible to arrive at a partial analysis of changing values at a specific historical juncture.

The content of the values are to be mapped out at the level of the corpus of knowledge the actors have, the meaning system which they create out of this corpus knowledge and the accomplished behaviour (Berger et. al., 1974 ).

The values of social system may have an inner coherence based on a generalized world-view as it is found in some primitive communities. In class-divided social systems such coherence may be produced by the dominant ideology. Such world-views or ideologies may be fragmented or unstable because of the latent structural features or in times of rapid social change. Finally, a social system may show development of class-based ideologies locked into conflict over the control of the political apparatus.

Economic and structural disarticulation and fragmentation or rapid social change produce a fragmented world-view and consequently a shuttlecock behaviour. The peasant social system often turns out to be

atomistic because of the built in disarticulation of its economy as Marx showed for France. A prolonged period of intensive exploitation and repression may also produce what Marx called 'privatized rabble'. The peasant may find themselves powerless to act in order to change themselves and become alienated. A period of rapid social change may also produce the same effect as peasants tend to adopt shuttle-cock behaviour. Since their corpus of knowledge becomes inadequate to interpret the situation then they fail to establish meaningful relationship among themselves or with the outside world.

But under different circumstances, the same fatalist, atomistic peasantry may turn out to match the mightiest of nations without the aid of 'diffusion'.

The peasants may also undergo a slow process of transformation. New bases of power and leadership, new forms of co-operation and institutions and new values may characterize such transformation. But the very process of change may be disruptive and produce further alienation and lead to an aborted transformation.

Social science is yet to possess adequate theoretical framework or methodological strategy to map out the continuities and discontinuities of social change. Hicks and Streeten (1979) demonstrate how difficult it is to arrive at a rigorous indicator or set of indicators for measurement even of development. James Coleman (1978:61), a leading mathematical sociologist puts it more bluntly for the larger arena of societal growth.

'The measurement of societal growth must wait upon conceptual development, for we must know

what we mean by societal growth before we can begin to measure it.

### Conclusion

In this paper I have argued for a theoretically grounded analysis of power-structure and values among the peasantry which is more responsive to variation, complexity and dyachronism of its social structure. A major difficulty of theory-construction in this area is the ambiguity of the concept of power itself. I have proposed a conceptual schema for the analysis of power which takes into account different basis and dimensions of power and both its structure and dynamics.

The paper has examined the essential features of rural power-structure on the basis of existing literature and in the context of modernization. Modernization which has been conceived as capitalist incorporation of the Third World tends to bring minor changes in the power-structure and preserves or reinforces the essential features of it-factionalism, patron-client relationship and a leadership oriented to windfall profits.

An attempt has been made here to relate power which alienation and consequently, particular attention has been concentrated upon the theme of atomism in peasant society. It has been suggested that atomism does not preclude class-formation or class based resistance among the peasantry. Both are significant features of peasant life. Again modernization may lead to greater alienation or a new normative order. The impact of modernization is not uniform or directional. Its impact varies according to social and historical contexts



of the peasantry.

Thus theory-construction in the area of power and normativ order among the peasantry is a formidable task that demands greater conceptual clarity sustained attention upon theoretical codification and theoretically grounded empirical works.

#### Notes

1. There is little argument on what modernization means (see Islam, 1986 for details). In this paper, I have used the term for short hand expression of the process of incorporation of the Third World within the capitalist system.

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