

The Transformations of Charisma : A New Look at the of Sociology Domination¹

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1. Theses

I would like to begin this presentation with two observations. They focus on the usage of the concept of charisma inside and outside of Weber's work. Firstly, the concept of charisma, which Weber himself drew from Protestant theology of his time, has become part of everyday usage. In this process of popularization, its meaning has been broadened beyond 'theoretical' control. The efforts of scholarly literature moved in the opposite direction : here the attempt has been made to narrow down the theoretical potential of this concept. Secondly, Weber's own discussions of charisma has a specific focus. Even a quick look at the relevant texts reveals that the greater part of these texts was dedicated not so much to charisma, but to its transformation or routinization (*Veralltäglicung*). In the older manuscript of *Economy and Society*, whose composition is normally dated from 1910 to 1914, the short chapter, "The Nature and Impact of Charisma" (*ES* 1111-1120, *WG* 662-669), is followed by the much longer one on "The Genesis and

Transformation of Charismatic Authority" (*ES* 1121-1157, *WG* 669-689). In the newer manuscript of *ES*, written from 1919 to 1920, the chapter sub-section, "Charismatic Domination"² (*ES* 241-245, *WG* 140-142), is followed by a section three times as long, "The Routinization of Charisma" (*WG* 142-148),³ which is in turn followed by the section on "Feudalism" (*ES* 255-266, *WG* 148-155) and finally, the section on "The Transformation of Charisma in a Democratic Direction" (*ES* 266-271, *WG* 155-158)⁴. Whereas in the older manuscript, the treatment of the transformation problematic is approximately three times as long as that of genuine charisma, in the newer manuscript, it is even four times as long. Thus, one can conjecture that Weber's interest in the transformation and routinization problematic did not diminish in the course of the development of his work; it appears to have grown.

These two observations lead me to my main thesis: one can only obtain a sociologically-adequate version of the concept of charisma-which complies with Weber's own use and meets the demands of systematicity-if one interprets the concept from the perspective of the problematic of transformation and/or routinization (hereafter referred to as the "transformation problematic"). Such an analysis demonstrates that "genuine charisma" can be the starting point for two radically distinct processes of transformation. On the one hand, a transformation from within can take place, something Weber also termed a revolutionization or a rationalization from within. It leads to depersonalization (*Entpersönlichung*) of the principle of the mission, with varying consequences. On the

other hand, a transformation 'from without' can be set in motion, also termed a revolutionization or rationalization from without by Weber. It leads to a routinization of the principle of the mission, and also has varying consequences.

This thesis can be divided into four sub-theses, related either to Weber's work directly or to subsequent discussions :

1) Take Weber's own analysis of the developmental history of Christianity from the movement of Jesus up until the reforms of Gregory the VII (ca. 1020-1085), i. e., up until the establishment of the medieval Christian Church. He conceived the latter as a rational bureaucracy endowed with charisma. This analysis can only be reconstructed without contradiction, if one distinguishes between the two processes of transformation.

2) Take Weber's concept of social forms (*Gebilde*), which can also be termed his concept of the institution. Take also his thesis of the modern state (*Anstaltssaat*) as a legal and administrative state which is to be regarded as a continuous enterprise. This concept and the related thesis can only be fully understood, if one here, too, distinguishes between the two transformation processes.

3) By distinguishing the two transformation processes, it becomes a historical-empirical question whether an institutional setting has a charismatic core or not.

4) By distinguishing the two transformation processes, it becomes a historical-empirical question, whether the legal type of domination has a charismatic core or not. This entails the rejection of the applicability of the

distinction between legality and legitimacy to Weber's analysis of the modern state. (This rejected alternative would necessarily have also implied either a polarization of the concepts of positive law and natural law or the interpretation of the historical process as a dialectic of bureaucratization and revolutionary charismatic transformation. This in turn would have implied the equation of bureaucratization with instrumental rationality and the iron cage of serfdom, and of charisma with value rationality and individual freedom.)

The first two theses are 'intrinsic' to Weber's own work, whereas the latter two are related to discussions going beyond that work. However, since these discussions do not always reach the level of conceptual differentiation found in Weber, they themselves can in turn be criticized with Weber's own arguments, assuming one thinks out Weber's own suggestions in terms of the distinction between the two transformation processes.

Therefore, my presentation has the following outline: As a first step, I would like to characterize more precisely the problem situation resulting from the two phenomena observed at the outset of the essay. In other words, I would like to deal at greater length with the problem of the broadening and emptying of the meaning of the charisma concept and then give a short sketch of the 'counter-movement' observable in the secondary literature. Thereafter, I will turn to Weber's own analysis of the charisma concept and attempt to show that it remained ambivalent. Therefore, as a second step, I would like to develop Weber's sociology of domination further. This will be done

from the perspective of a concept of transformation which makes the distinction between the two types of transformation processes cited above. As a third and concluding step, I will discuss several consequences of such a further development of Weber's sociology of domination.

2. The Problem Situation :

(a) *The Broadening and Narrowing of the Meaning of the Concept of Charisma*

The greatest possible reduction of the meaning of the concept of charisma occurs where charisma is held to be a historically invariant personality trait. This is usually the case when it is said that someone has charisma. Here though it is not necessarily considered historically invariant, it is viewed as strictly a trait of personality. Weber himself can be used against this view. He, it must be remembered, developed his interpretative sociology as a theory of action, and upon this foundation, as a theory of orders. This, however, implies that personality traits as such are not significant, but only in their relationship to social situations. Situations are to be characterized, in which definite individual qualities (e. g. a specific capability or competence) are provided with social recognition. This holds quite generally, charisma being but one quality which falls into this line of analysis. What, however, are the situations and qualities which play a role in a charismatic relationship? Both are precisely characterized in his writings. Charismatically-relevant situations are those of inner crisis, in which the trans-

mitted interpretations of life lose their meaning. Frequently, this inner crisis is connected to a situation of material crisis, i. e., to a situation where the traditional pattern of distribution of life chances no longer functions. Thus, charismatically-relevant situations are situations of existential impact, where, in a certain sense, life is at stake, where the routine of everyday life is destroyed. In such situations, persons of supernatural or superhuman qualities or capabilities are sought out. Here, qualities must be involved which cannot be possessed by everyone, which strictly speaking cannot even be acquired or learned. Though Weber spoke of charismatic education in various passages of his work, he nevertheless made it clear that at least genuine charisma cannot be the product of such education. The supernatural or superhuman qualities, i.e., the extraordinary ones (*außeralltäglich*), are, in fact, those which allow the person distinguished by them to enter into a relationship with the sacred, with the numinous. Admittedly, Weber did not reserve the concept of charisma solely for the realm of magic or religion. He also spoke of charismatic war heroes, for whom such a relationship to the sacred or the numinous does not appear to exist. Nonetheless, even a war hero, like a magician or a prophet, has to accomplish a miracle and miracles are never purely individual accomplishments. Only those qualities are held to be supernatural or superhuman which partake of the 'radically other.' For this reason, the charismatic principle of legitimation can ultimately be understood as a principle of mission.

What then, in Weber's view, was the relationship

between the charismatically-relevant situation and supernatural or superhuman qualities? His answer appears to me to be unequivocal. The supernatural or superhuman qualities provide new meaning to a situation of existential crisis. The person who submits to this transformed definition of the situation, experiences a rebirth, a revolution from within, a *metanoia*-he or she becomes a new person. Charismatic situations, thus, typically lead to revolutions in convictions (*Gesinnungsrevolutionen*); conversionary experiences are characteristic for them. Put in terms of a theory of action, affective orientations predominate, which in terms of Weber's own discussions, are closely linked to value rational orientations.

Now there are, in my view, three positions in the sociological literature, which build upon this correct understanding of the charisma concept and develop it further. Contributions have been made in this context, which are of importance for the subsequent discussion. Three positions can be marked off, those of Reinhard Bendix, Guenther Roth and of Edward Shils and S.N. Eisenstadt. Each dealt with different aspects of charisma. The suggestion, to distinguish between charismatic leadership and charismatic domination, originates from Reinhard Bendix.⁵ Whereas charismatic leadership refers to action in those situations of extreme crisis that Weber had in mind when he spoke of genuine charisma, these unstable extreme situations are given enduring status, in a certain sense, in the case of charismatic domination, Guenther Roth provided the idea that charisma itself has a developmental history. Moreover, it is a history that did not come to an end, as one could conclude from remarks of

Weber's with the charisma of reason.⁶ In Edward Shils' and S. N. Eisenstadt's view, charisma should not be understood as a marginal phenomenon, but as a central component of all institution building. No stable society exists, which is lacking a center, a charismatic core.⁷ All of these authors have without doubt accomplished important contributions for a better understanding of the concept of charisma. Nonetheless, in my view, none of them taken alone suffices for a satisfactory clarification of Weber's problematic, encompassing both his texts and the subsequent discussion. This task demands a differentiated perspective on the process of transformation, especially since Weber himself remained ambivalent on this point. This leads us to the second aspect of the state of the problematic.

(b) *The Ambiguities in Weber's Use
of the Concept of Charisma*

Weber made a high claim for his sociology of domination as a whole, of which of course his charisma concept was an integral part. Two letters testify to this. On January 23, 1913, he wrote to his publisher that he had developed a "complete sociological theory of state." And on December 30, 1913, he even spoke of a "comprehensive sociological theory of state and domination."⁸ Two aspects of the quotes appear to me especially noteworthy: first, the claim to completeness, and secondly, the reference to a *sociological* theory of the state and domination. This alone shows that he was not following in the tradition of normative theories of state and its forms. Quite the opposite: this theory

represented a radical renunciation of this tradition of political thinking.

What was the background of this change in the history of science? In his sociology of domination, Weber utilized insights developed in the neo-Kantian school, by writers such as Lotze, Windelband, Rickert and Lask on the one hand, and Georg Jellinek on the other. This neo-Kantian theory, which conceived of itself as a critical theory of value, can be characterized by its Copernican and axiological turn against natural law on the one hand and against historicism on the other. This resulted in a dualism between philosophical and non-philosophical perspectives. Whereas the philosophical perspective deals with axiological questions, serving the analysis of supra-empirical (*überempirischen*) meanings or values, the non-philosophical perspective is historically and empirically oriented, limited to the analysis of the meanings of realized values or of forms of objectified culture and their impact. It led to more than these divisions, though. The non-philosophical perspective on state and law was itself split, recognizing a dualism between a legal perspective and a historical and sociological one, a dualism accord with the twofold nature of state and law. Whereas jurisprudence, a non-philosophical discipline, proceeds dogmatically, and analyzes objectified culture as a complex of historical meanings, the historical and sociological perspective proceeds causally, by investigating the impact of these forms of objectified culture as real cultural factors. This resulted in a three-dimensional analysis, a kind of theory of three worlds, with

philosophy, jurisprudence and history and sociology as its representatives. In terms of law, philosophy investigated legal norms in terms of their supraempirical validity. Jurisprudence investigated legal norms in terms of their empirical validity. Finally, history and sociology, investigated legal norms in terms of their empirical impact. Three concepts of meaning result: the concept of the metaphysically true, which is the subject of philosophy; the concept of the dogmatically correct, the subject of jurisprudence; and the concept of subjectively-intended meaning, the subject of history and sociology.

On the basis these three concepts of meaning, Georg Jellinek, in his influential *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (General Theory of State), distinguished between the philosophy and the theory of state, subdividing the latter into a legal theory of the state and a social theory of the state.⁹ Weber followed Jellinek.¹⁰ but he was not interested in the legal theory of the state, but in the social theory of the state, in two senses. It was for him the starting point for a causally-oriented theory of domination. The state is but one structure of domination among many. A causally-oriented social theory of domination, however, has to distinguish between two constellations of domination: domination by virtue of interest constellations and domination on virtue of authority. It is important to keep in mind that this is a distinction *within* the social theory of domination; thus it is not equivalent to Jellinek's distinction between the legal theory of state and the social theory of state. As is well-known, Weber developed the distinction between

the two forms of domination (based on interest and authority, respectively), in the older manuscript on *ES*, where he illustrated it in terms of the market and patriarchal power. Domination by virtue of interest constellation appeals primarily to motives of utility, whereas domination by virtue authority appeals to motives of obedience and duty. Utility and duty are two basic terms which pervade all of Weber's sociology of domination. Moreover, every form of domination results in a relationship, an order, which demands legitimation and organization. This holds for domination based on interests as well as on authority.

What follows from this theoretical model? The analysis of domination always has to clarify the relation between authority and interest, as well as that between legitimation and organization. As a result, a typology of domination developed from this perspective has to distance itself from the classical theory of state forms. And in fact, Weber's famous three types of domination do not correspond to the conventionally-accepted forms of the state. Traditional domination cannot be identified with monarchy or aristocracy, nor can legal domination be identified with democracy. Moreover, charismatic domination is not tyranny. It represents, like the other two types, a positively characterizable structural principle of domination, which can unify a host of structural forms within its domain.

How was this general model of the sociology of domination worked out in detail? As indicated above, Weber developed the three famous of domination based upon authority, which he contrasted to that type of

domination based upon the constellation of interests. These types are located on the highest level of abstraction, and in this sense, complete. At least that was Weber's claim; whether it was warranted is something that needs to be discussed below. Though he did dedicate comprehensive analyses to domination on the basis of the constellation of interests,¹¹ especially in his sociology of the economy, the three types of domination on the basis of authority occupied the center of his attention. How can they be distinguished from one another? Weber chose to do this in terms of the characterization of the structure of authority, which can be conceived in terms of three aspects: 1) in terms of the source of authority (extraordinary or everyday; 2) in terms of the embodiment of this source of authority (personal or impersonal); and 3) in terms of the relationship to economic activities (economic considerations or the lack thereof).¹² The first distinction leads to the contrast between extraordinary and everyday structures of domination; the second to the contrast between personal and impersonal authority structures; the third to the contrast between structures of domination or authority that are bound to the economic (*wirtschaftsgebunden*), and those which are not. This leads to the following conceptual "links": everyday = continuous or stable = economically-oriented behavior, on the one hand, and extraordinary = ephemeral or unstable = economically indifferent behavior. Here it is important to note that the stability or instability of a structure of domination is determined not by the personal or impersonal nature of the structure, but by its economic orientation or lack thereof. If,

however, the structure lacks economic orientation and is of a personal nature, this multiplies, so to speak, its instability.

This, indeed, is the case with genuine charisma. As a result, Weber viewed it, in its very nature, as being inherently subject to transformation. This transformation, which he termed *Veralltäglicung* (routinization), can only mean, if one follows the premises of this approach, that genuine charisma will either be traditionalized or legalized. In fact, this was Weber's view, as found in the newer manuscript on the sociology of domination in *ES*. Thus, we read there, under the title, "The Routinization of Charisma," the following :

In its pure form charismatic domination has a character specifically foreign to everyday routine structures. The social relationships directly involved are strictly personal, based on the validity and practice of charismatic personal qualities. If this is not to remain a purely transitory phenomenon, but to take on the character of a permanent relationship, a "community" of fellow believers, or warriors, or disciples, or a party organization or <any sort> of political or hierocratic organization, it is necessary for the character of charismatic domination to become radically changed. Indeed, in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only *in statu nascendi*. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized (legalized); or a combination of both. The following are the principle motives underlying this transformation : (a) The ideal and also the

material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples, the party workers, etc. in continuing the relationship. Not only this, but, they have an interest in continuing it in such a way that both from an ideal and a material point of view, their own position is put on a stable everyday basis. Externally, this means the establishment of lives in families, or at least materially well-provided ('satiated') lives in place of those 'missions' divorced from the world and lacking in familial and economic orientation. (Cf. *ES* 246, *WG* 142f.)

The following, *official version* of the typology of domination results from this perspective : <add Table 10a>

This alignment of concepts has to be discarded, in my view, if the goal is a differentiated understanding of the transformation process. As indicated above, grounds for such an effort are found in Weber himself. On the one hand, the distinction between personal and impersonal domination, is, so to speak, at cross purposes to this alignment or "linkage" of concepts ; on the other, Weber himself expressly said that charisma could take an "institutional turn" (cf. *ES* 1139, *WG* 682). Concretely, he spoke of hereditary and office charisma, i.e., from a type of charisma of the institution, something characterized precisely by its stability and not its opposite.

3. An Attempt to Expand Max Weber's Sociology of Domination from the Perspective of the Transformation Problematic

This attempted expansion will be based upon two lines of argument. Both find their bases in Weber, but they were not sufficiently taken into account in his official version of the sociology of domination. This has contributed to incomplete accounts of this central part of Weber's theory. The first line of argument refers back to the basic sociological categories of *ES*, where Weber clearly delineated the interrelations between the concepts of social relationship, social order and organization (*Verband*). An organization is a form of social order in which the adherence to imposed or agreed-upon rules can be enforced, be it by means of a ruler (*Herr*), or by means of a ruler and an administrative staff. An administrative staff always becomes necessary, as organizations become more complex. Insofar as the organization is an organization of domination, one can distinguish simple from complex organizations, depending upon the absence or presence of an administrative staff. Weber in fact used such a distinction in his sociology of domination, between a simple and a complex structure of domination, both for extraordinary and everyday structures of domination. Thus, he distinguished, in traditional domination for example, between patriarchal-traditional and patrimonial-traditional domination. In contrast, in charismatic domination, he distinguished between genuine charisma and charismatic forms of domination ; a distinction which Reinhard Bendix further elaborated upon. In complex organization of domination, the structure is differentiated into the positions of ruler,

administrative staff and the ruled. This apparently also holds for the case in which a form of charismatic domination develops out of genuine charisma. In fact, Weber clearly distinguished the case in which a leader and a group of disciples interact, from that in which a leader and his group of disciples mobilize and rule over a following-something also seen in the quote above. The structural differentiation of the leader, the group of disciples and the following will always occur, if a larger area has to be ruled and a large following has to be cared for and controlled. One example of this is found in the distinction between the movements of Jesus and Paul in ancient Christianity. Even though, as is well known, Weber was not able to bring to paper his planned study of ancient Christianity, there are enough indications in the "Sociology of Religion" in *ES* to confirm this viewpoint.¹³

My second line of argument is based upon a distinction which Weber himself made, but which he in my view, did not correctly classify: the distinction between the traditionalization and legalization of charisma on the one hand, and the depersonalization (*Versachlichung*) of charisma on the other. In the newer *ES* manuscript on the sociology of domination, all three processes were treated under the title of the "Routinization of Charisma." Precisely this led to the incomplete accounts of the transformation process. The depersonalization of charisma is, however, something fundamentally different from its traditionalization or legalization. This becomes immediately clear, when one subjects the charismatic structure of authority to a detailed analysis.

The charismatic authority structure, that, which Weber termed genuine charisma, represents a total and simple structure of domination. "Total" in the sense that the social relation is closed off to the outside and in the sense that it encompasses *all* activities of life. This structure of authority can be characterized in terms of four aspects: 1) It is based upon a personified mission and is thus an expression of God's grace in the true sense: 2) It is a duty to recognize this mission and its carriers they never derive their legitimation from the ruled: 3) The carrier of the mission must prove himself, i.e., he has to perform miracles; 4) The submission to the mission's and its carriers' claim to rule is absolute. Such a structure, such a social form (*Gebilde*) is in fact unstable, for the following reasons: the attribution of responsibility is fairly unambiguous, the social form is economically dependent on forces outside of it, and it is structurally undifferentiated.

The transformation process can take place in terms of any of these four components or any combination thereof. A variety of results are thus possible, something which can be easily shown. If the personified mission is transformed, the separation of the carrier and the mission, i.e., the *depersonalization* of the mission results. If it transforms the dutiful nature of the recognition of the mission and its carriers, recognition becomes the basis of the mission. Weber termed this process the *anti-authoritarian re-interpretation* of the mission. If it transforms the way in which the carrier has to prove her-or himself, it leads to an expansion of the realm of proof, and in the extreme case, it

can even lead to a *commercialization* of the mission. If it transforms the absolute nature of submission to the carriers, for example, in terms of a wish of the participants to establish families, an emancipation from the absolute claim of the mission, i. e., its limitation, will probably result. These processes of transformation alone or in combination, work in the same direction: they stabilize a previously unstable situation. This clearly also results in the transformation of charisma. Not every stabilizing transformation, however, necessarily leads to the replacement or destruction of charisma itself. Whereas depersonalization and limitation very often retain the principle of mission in a modified form, anti-authoritarian reinterpretation and especially commercialization do not.

For this reason, I propose something both in agreement and at odds with Weber, namely, the strict distinction between two ways of stabilizing genuine charisma: on the one hand, traditionalization and legalization, which replace or destroy charisma; and on the other, the depersonalization (*Entpersönlichung* and *Versachlichung*) of charisma, in which case, the mission is maintained. This implies, however, that the transformation of genuine charisma can result in either an everyday or extraordinary lasting social form (*Dauergebilde*). In other words, the resulting structurally-stable social form can either be a traditional or legal one, or on the other hand, a personal charismatic or institutional charismatic one. Hereditary charisma and office charisma are the outstanding examples of the latter. What is decisive though, is the following: by combining the

two lines of argument and their conclusions an extended typology of domination emerges, the *unofficial version* :
<add table 14>

4. A Discussion of Some of the Consequences of the Extended Typology of Domination

The extended typology makes it possible to establish a systematically satisfactory classification of the types of domination, which appear in Weber's substantive investigations. Moreover, it also has ramifications for the problem situation outlined at the outset of the paper. It has already been established that a charisma concept in terms of the psychology of the personality is of little help. However, it is not only journalists, but scholars following upon Weber as well, who do not reach the level of conceptual differentiation already developed in Weber. With the extended typology as a means of orientation, one obtains a new view of Weber himself. It leads to two consequences, which were not always unambiguously adhered to by Weber. The first consequence is that social forms possessing a charismatic core, extraordinary lasting social forms, can appear within either a traditional or rational framework (*Rahmenbedingungen*). This throws new light on a variety of subjects, for example, Weber's analyses of feudalism and of the modern state (*Anstaltsstaat*). In the case of feudalism, he himself clearly distinguished between the feudalism of the fief versus that of the prebend. Prebendal feudalism is a social form with functional value, whereas "fiefal feudalism" possesses a charismatic core. It is certainly not by accident that

Weber treated feudalism in the *ES* new manuscript on the sociology of domination in the chapter on charismatic domination and following the section on the routinization of charisma. For fiefal feudalism is not only of charismatic origin, it also maintains this origin, and insofar an element of its extraordinary character. If one applies this perspective to the modern state (*Anstaltstaat*), it suggests itself to distinguish between an *Anstaltstaat* as an *Anstalt* enterprise and an *Anstaltstaat* as an "institution of grace." The former possesses only a functional value, whereas the latter clearly possesses a charismatic core. It is ill advised to equate this distinction, with that between instrumental rationality and valuerationality. The "institution of grace," i.e. the *Anstaltstaat* with autonomous significance, is distinguished from the pure *Anstalt* enterprise, by the emotional commitment of the ruled to it. This, however, is connected to a second conclusion : whether or not a long-term formation tends to have instrumental or substantial character is a historical question. The concept of the social form or institution has to be conceived in such a way, that the answer to this historical question is not analytically prejudiced. Admittedly, in every passage where Weber spoke on questions of modern state organization, he appears to have held an instrumental conception. Moreover, this is not simply the result of his definition of the state, more precisely of the modern state (*Anstaltstaat*), in terms of means and not ends, in terms of the monopoly of the means of legitimate physical compulsion. In addition, on the level of worldviews, he certainly tended to favor an

instrumental rather than a substantial conception of the state. Here, too he tended to follow Kant rather than Hegel, as in his methodology and in his approach taken as a whole. This is not to say, however, that the distinction between a state with purely functional value and one with a charismatic core is unimportant for *historical* analysis. On the contrary, only by making this distinction and thus not reducing the *Anstaltstaat* from the very outset to an *Anstalt* enterprise, can one do justice to the manifold shapes of modern states.

This in turn, allows us a final word on some typical interpretations of Weber. Not every formation of domination has a charismatic core. It is also not sensible to reduce the legal type of domination to its instrumental variant, let alone to reduce the process of history to a dialectic of rationalization and charisma. These positions are of qualified validity, but only within the framework of an extended typology of domination.

Notes

1. This is the written form of a presentation held numerous times before West German and American university audiences.
2. In the English translation, the German title, "Charismatische Herrschaft," was translated as "Charismatic Authority."
3. This section has been subdivided in the English translation. It corresponds to *ES*, pp. 246-254.
4. The original German title is "Die herrschaftsfremde Umdeutung des Charisma."
5. Cf. Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber : An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1962), Chs. 9 & 10.
6. Cf. Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History*, ch. III ; and Guenther Roth, *Politische*

Typology of Domination (the 'unofficial' version)

<div> <div>Nature of the Source of Legitimation and its Embodiment</div> <div>Degree of Complexity and Continuity of the Coordination of Action</div> </div>	Domination by Virtue of Authority				Domination by Virtue of the Constellation of Interests	
	Extraordinary		Routine		Personal	Impersonal
	Personal	Impersonal	Personal	Impersonal		
Simple (Without Administrative staff)	Charismatic Domination : Genuine Charismatic Movements	Charismatic Domination: Institutionally Bound Charismatic Movements	Traditional Domination From Patriarchalism to Gerontocracy	Legal Domination From Direct Democracy to the Government of Notables	More or Less Complex Relations of Appropriation	More or Less Complex Market Relations
Complex (With Administrative Staff)	Charismatic Domination : Genuine Charismatic Congregations	Charismatic Domination: Charismatic Formations Dynastic, Lineage and Office Charisma	Traditional Domination : From Sultanism to the <i>Standestaat</i>	Legal Domination From Plebiscitary Democracy to the Bureaucratic State		

1. Transformation Model: Genuine charismatic domination is either institutionally bound (i. e. depersonalized : *entpersonalisiert* and *versachlicht* or routinized (traditionalized or legalized/rationalized) Reasons : structural instability and the lack of an economic orientation.
2. Relationship between Domination by Virtue of Authority and Domination by Virtue of the Constellation of Interests : elective affinity between traditional domination and patrimonial domination (*Privilegienherrschaft*), legal domination and market domination ; relation of indifference between charismatic domination and domination by virtue of the constellation of interests.

Max Weber's Sociology of Domination (A Typological outline)

POWER (- "the possibility that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this possibility rests.")

1. *Nature of Possibility :
Utility versus
Duty*

*Domination by virtue of the Constellation
of Interests (especially by virtue
of monopolistic situations*

*Domination by virtue of Authority
(Power of command and Duty of Obedience*

2. *Nature of claim to
Authority :
Routine versus
Extraordinary*

*Domination by virtue
of Routine Authority*

*Domination by virtue of
Extraordinary Authority*

3. *Nature of the
Embodiment of claim :
to Authority
personal versus
impersonal (task-
oriented)*

*Domination by
virtue of tradi-
tional piety
(loyalty) Tradition-
al Domination*

*Domination by
virtue of imper-
sonal statutes
Legal
Domination*

*Domination by virtue
of a personal gift
of grace : Individually
Bound Charismatic
Domination*

*Domination by virtue
of a supra-personal
mission : Institutionally
Bound Charismatic
Domination*

4. *Nature of Organiza-
tional Administra-
tion : with or without
an Administrative
Staff*

*Patriarchalism
and Gerontocracy
(traditional rule
by notables)*

*Patrimo-
nialism*

*Direct
Government
(Democracy)
and legal
Rule by
Notables*

*Representa-
tive Govern-
ment*

*Genuine
Charismatic
Movements*

*Genuine
Charismatic
Congregations*

*Institutional
Charismatic
Movement*

*Charismatic
Formation*

5. *Nature of Recruitment
of Administrative
Staff Open vs.
Regulated vs.
Appropriated*

*Sultanism
and arbitrary
Patrimonial-
ism*

*Prebendal
Feudalism
and
Stände
Staat*

*Elective
Officialdom
(legal domi-
nation with a
'democratic'
governmen-
tal staff)*

*Expert
Officialdom
(legal domination
with a 'bureau-
cratic govern-
mental staff)*

*Elective Charismatic
Domination
(e.g. Plebiscitary
Fuhrer-Demokratic*

*Dynastic
Lineage and
Office Charismatic
Domination
(e.g. Patrician
City-State)
Fiefal Feudalism,
Ansta Hells of
Grace*

*Functional
Value*

*Functional
Value*

*Value in its
own Right*

*Value in its
Own Right*

Typology of Domination (the 'official' version)

<div style="text-align: center;">Nature of the Source of Legitimation</div> <div style="text-align: center;">Embodiment of the source of Legitimation</div>	Domination by Virtue of Authority (Motives of Duty)		Domination by Virtue of the Constellation of Interests (Utilitarian Motives)
	Extraordinary	Routine	
Personal	Charismatic Domination	Traditional Domination	Constellation of Appropriation
Impersonal		Legal Domination	Market Constellation

1. Transformation Model : Charismatic domination is traditionalized or rationalized (legalized). Reasons : Structural instability and the lack of economic orientation.
2. Relationship between Domination by virtue of Authority and Domination by Virtue of the Constellation of Interests : Elective Affinity between traditional domination and patrimonial domination (*Privilegienherrschaft*), legal domination and market domination.

Herrschaft und personliche Freiheit, Heidelberger Max-Weber-Vorlesungen 1983 (Political Domination and Personal Freedom: The Heidelberg Max Weber Lectures-1983) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), Ch. 5.

7. Ch. Edward Shils, "Charisma," in his *Centre and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 127-134. Cf. also S. N. Eisenstadt's "Introduction" to *Max Weber: On Institution Building*, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); and preceding that, Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 500ff. Cf. as well Wolfgang Schluchter, *The Rise of Western Rationalism*, 121ff.
8. Letters footnote, see *ES* essay trans.
9. Cf. Georg Jellink, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Bad Homburg, 1960). On the idea of twofold nature, cf. Wolfgang Schluchter, *Entscheidung für den sozialen Rechtsstaat. Hermann Heller und die staatsrechtliche Diskussion in der Weimarer Republik* (Opting for the Social Rechtsstaat: Hermann Heller and the Discussion of the Theory of the State in the Weimar Republic) Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983²), "Introduction."
10. On this, cf. also Pietro Rossi, *Vom Historismus zur historischen Sozialwissenschaft. Heidelberger Max Weber-Vorlesungen 1985* (From Historicism to a Historical Social Science. The Heidelberg Max Weber Lectures - 1985) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), Chs. 4 & 6.
11. For a detailed account here, cf. Ch. 12 below, "Economy and Society."
12. For a comprehensive account, see Schluchter, *The Rise of Western Rationalism*, esp. Ch. 5.
13. Cf. Ch 5 above.