

Consequences of Military Rule

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Classical Theory of Civil-Military Relation

The classical writers on war as well as the leading statesmen and the revolutionaries of the twentieth century have long argued for civilian control over the military. General Von Clausewitz, wrote about 150 years ago :

“the subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for the policy has created the war, policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible’.¹

No group of politicians are more appreciative of the role of violence and armed force in state and inter-state affairs than Marxists. But Marxists revolutionaries have been most careful to keep tight control over the instruments of violence and to determine the extent and nature of violence to be employed. Lenin was quick to note Clausewitz’s “famous dictum” that “war is politics continued by other means” and stated : “The Marxists have always considered this axiom as

the theoretical foundation of the meaning of every war."² The basic operational strategy of the Chinese revolution was laid down by Mao Tse-Tung in his celebrated phrase "Politics in Command." Mao asserted: "Our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party."³ Statesmen like Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Churchill and Kennedy thought war was too serious a business to be left to generals.⁴

Modernization and Role of the Military :

Some Empirical Findings

This theory of supremacy of politics and political control of armed forces has not worked in a large number of developing countries in this latter half of the twentieth century. As many of the new states which emerged in the era of decolonization came under military rule in late fifties and sixties, a number of respected social scientists argued that, in the context of the slow pace of modernization and political development in the new states, military takeovers would have beneficial consequences for these nations. These scholars developed theoretical models depicting the military as a highly modern force capable of transferring its organizational and technical skill to the field of government and administration.⁵

Late empirical researches on the actual performance of the military regimes has largely belied those early theoretical expectations. Eric A. Nordlinger, drawing upon an analysis of cross-national data of 74 non-Western and non-Communist countries finds negative

and zero-order correlations between the political strength of the military and social and economic modernisation.⁶ In another cross-national aggregate study of all independent, non-communist countries with populations exceeding one million, covering the period 1951-1970, R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan conclude that "there is no profound effect on economic performance produced by military regimes when MR (military regime) and CMR (period of civilian rule in countries that have experienced military regimes) are compared with CR 900.-(low income countries which have experiences only civilian rule)."⁷ In yet another study with period covering the period 1960-197 for 77 independent countries of the Third World Robert W. Jackman reports :

'In short, military intervention in the politics of the Third World has no unique effects on social change, regardless of either the level of economic development or geographic regions.'⁸

The validity of these quantitative analyses have, however, been questioned primarily for two reasons. The first criticism related to methodology and argues that these cross-national studies do not take into consideration crucial variables like natural resources, size, *geographical locations and depend solely on economic and statistical indicators* of the countries concerned. Moreover, as the second criticism goes, these statistical socio-economic data on the Third world countries are notoriously unreliable.⁹ But even if these quantitative studies are taken with reservation and one pursues a case-by-case analysis, one can readily notice that military

regimes hardly perform better than civilian regimes in bringing about social and economic development. In countries where a comparatively higher rate of economic growth has taken place under military regimes, development has not been the result of military rule per se but of some fortuitous factor like massive infusion of foreign aid (Pakistan under Ayub and South Korea under Park), availability of natural resources like oil (Indonesia, Nigeria and Libya), sudden price rise of certain exports (copper and tin in Zaire). Besides, the type of development strategy followed in most of these countries has led to highly skewed distribution of wealth. The result has been the generation of severe social and regional tensions forcing countries into social and political turmoil and washing away economic gains achieved.

There is, of course, a quick growth in one particular field under military regimes. Military regimes almost invariably increase defense budgets soon after takeover¹⁰ and once raised defence allocations usually remain at high level in subsequent years. In Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, military government's average annual percentage expenditure of defence out of state budgets were almost double that of non-military governments in the 1960s.¹¹ As a result it is no wonder that the rate of growth for defence expenditure in the developing countries is surpassing the rate in the developed nations.¹² As most of the defense budget in the developing countries is spent on buying sophisticated weapons in hard currency from developed countries, it does not have

any multiplier effect on national economy. High defence expenditure therefore becomes a permanent debilitating factor in the economic growth of the nations concerned.

Military Rule and Circle of Political Underdevelopment

The performance of the military regimes in the sphere of political development is much more disappointing. Samuel P. Huntington has been lavish in praising military coups. Frequent coups according to him, "are a sign of change and progress."¹³ Coups are a sign of independence Huntington says again, and the real beginning of the process of modernisation and development.¹⁴ Huntington also eulogised Field Marshal Ayub Khan of Pakistan for coming close to filling the role of a Solon or Lysurgus or Great Legislator on the Platonic or Rousseavian model.¹⁵ But the much vaunted political institutional innovation launched by Ayub Khan—"Basic Democracies"—was designed primarily as an instrument for depoliticization of the people. Ayub Khan failed to develop legitimate political institutions and ensure meaningful participation of the people in the political process. It was no wonder that the Ayub system resulted in a mass upheaval and led finally to the break-up of the country—the ultimate in political decay. The process of political disintegration in Nigeria started after the coup of January 15, 1966 when major Nzeogwu and his cohorts launched a ruthless blitzkrieg on major military and political figures in Nigeria.¹⁶

Because of the "revolution of rising expectations,"

conditions of acute scarcity and the consequent revolution of rising frustrations, there is always a store of accumulated resentment against any incumbent government in the developing nations. There is, thus, a sense of relief among a large section of the people whenever a fall of the government takes place. The military rulers often take this general sigh of relief as the acceptance of their rule by the people. The general process of modernization increases inequality and exacerbates social changes in all developing nations. Thus, the people, suffering from 'the sense of relative deprivation' quickly become disenchanted with the military regime. A severe problem of legitimacy then begins to shake the military regime.

As S. E. Finer has pointed out, 'the cardinal weakness of the military as a political force' stems from the fact that force does not automatically create right. Rule by force invites challenge and coup paves for a series of counter coups.¹⁷ Legitimation of any type of regime requires the leaders of the regime to devise of a political formula and a political ideology and securing the acceptance of these by the people at large. The political formula assigns political roles to the people and ideology provides rationality and moral sanctions to the political roles under transcendent principles of social order. Ideology creates symbols and rituals which condense apparent contradictions of the political process into meaningful categories, ennoble political conflicts and bring about a reconciliation of the victors and losers at the higher intellectual and psychodramatic level. By creating a

world image conducive to support a sense of identity, ideology develops a psychic bond between the ruler and the ruled and thus stabilize the polity.¹⁸

But it is in formulating ideology that the military politicians fail most. An army is a bureaucracy par excellence and the fundamental principle in bureaucratic organisations, as Edward Feit has pointed out, is vertical emulation. Each hierarchical level of a bureaucracy conforms to the order from and follows the example of the immediate higher echelon. The bureaucrat at the top also does not work to generate ideas. He gets instructions from without in the form of a 'policy'. It is not only that the organisational principles of bureaucracy inhibit the growth of original ideas, ideological thinking is also consciously discouraged in bureaucracy to give it the colour of an "a political" and "nonpartisan" organisation serving the state—not the government. The military officers conditioned in the atmosphere of emulation and ideological neutrality can hardly be an effective source of ideas. Thus the military politicians usually start with the administrative doctrine that difficult problems, when reduced to essentials, have simple solutions. In the end when the logic of politics force them to formulate ideologies they failed to 'espouse imaginative doctrines that will set men's mind on fire.'¹⁹

When political organizations are valued for their effectiveness and sublimated by an ideological aura these are transformed into durable political institutions. Military politicians generally seem incapable of creating political organisations not to speak of effective political

institutions. Military skills are hardly transferable to the sphere of politics. Society is more complex than an army and as Morris Janowitz has argued, the organisational logic of the armed forces is different from that of the political formations.²⁰ Military personnel can bring only specialised perspectives and specialised 'skills' to the political arena. The development of political organisations, however, requires political skills which transcend functional specialisations and can be acquired only through long and hard experience in public life. Even military leaders like Ayub Khan in Pakistan (1958-1969), Ne Win in Burma (1962 to date), Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt (1952-1970) and Primo de Rivera (1923-1931) in Spain who all had fairly long periods of rule, did not succeed in developing enduring political institutions.²¹ Nasser, who seemed to be comparatively more popular than the other military politicians, launched three political movements for popular mobilisation—the National Liberation Rally in 1953, the National Union in 1957 and the Arab Socialist Union in 1961. 'Each of these political movements' Ruth First writes, 'in turn went from torpor to paralysis, intrinsically unable to stir vitality in villages, factories and neighbourhood communities.'²² There is now almost a consensus among scholars who have examined military regimes, that if political development is defined in terms of popular participation and the building of legitimised political institutions, for most of the new states which fell under military rule, the period of military rule was sterile as far as political development is concerned.²³

As a matter of fact, in most cases the military only creates a vicious circle which perpetuates the conditions of political underdevelopment which initially brings about the military rule. As has already been indicated above, the key factor in political development is the growth of durable political institutions.²⁴ The primary resource for developing political institutions in any country are the political skills of her politicians. As has been argued by the leading authorities on Indian politics, despite the absence of the usual socio-economic correlates of democracy, India has been uniquely successful in building up a developed political system mainly because of the political skills of her politicians.²⁵ Politics is more of a vocation than soldiership. For success, politicians have to acquire proficiency in political skills as much as the military officers have to gain fighting skills through long professional training. The political skills needed for developing a viable and self sustaining political system involve, among others, ideological commitment, capacity to respond to new challenges and the arts of administration, negotiation, representation and bargaining. These skills can be acquired only in the hard school of public life just as the Indian political leaders gained through their active participation in open politics from the 1920s first under tutelage of an sufferance under the British and then under the enlightened leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru.

But what does happen to politics under a military regime? The soldiers donning mufti can not escape the effect of their long socialisation within the armed forces. Because of their military 'mindsets' and perspectives

the soldier-rulers, whether they are Ayub Khan in Pakistan or Acheampong in Ghana or Castello Branco in Brazil, fail to see the functional aspects of the great game of politics and severely restrict the free flow of the political process and force the politicians in the making into a long period of hibernation. The period of military rule, thus, is usually a total waste as far as the development of political skills is concerned. Since about two-thirds of military governments themselves fall victims of military coup d'etat²⁶ the opportunity for gaining political skills by a people once under a military regime is likely to be continually postponed with arrival of every new military regime.

Only about one-third of military governments were succeeded by civilian governments.²⁷ In these fewer cases of civilian restorations, the newly incumbent civilian leaders soon demonstrate their inability to match their official performance with the expectation of the people. This is not unnatural, first, because of the general intractability of the problems facing the developing nations and, secondly and more important, because of the lack of political skills of the civilian leaders resulting from the preceding period of military rule. The military officers waiting in the wings, then, knock down the civilian regime on even a modest manifestation of public discontent against the civilian government and assert the vindication of their self-fulfilling prophecy of 'inevitable failure of the self-seeking politicians.' Thus the period of waste for political growth begins anew,

It is sometimes argued that the administrative-traditional system introduced by the colonial rulers was more in congruence with the social structure and political traditions of the newly independent states and that military rulers soon discover the virtues of the colonial model.²⁸ Most of the military rulers try to revive the colonial framework. But virtues of the colonial model had become irrelevant by the time new states were born. The civil servants have no constituencies and can not provide any political support for the regime. The traditional leaders cannot represent the Western educated and middle class groups — students, intellectuals and professionals. It was the rise of these groups seeking their proper roles in the modernizing society that taught the post-World War II colonial administrators the lessons that the era of the administrative state had passed. In the long run the military ruler also rediscovers the lessons of the colonial administrator.²⁹ But the realisation comes too late. The military ruler cannot prevent the end of his regime and the nation has already been put in circuitious motion of coups and counter coups.

Role Expansion of the Military and Defence Vulnerability

The expansion of the role of a modern army seriously impairs its military efficiency. Soldiership is now a highly technical and specialised profession and requires arduous and continuous training. As Samuel P. Huntington stated, Napoleon symbolized the last successful union of military and political professions. The rise of Bismarck and Moltke indicated the passing away of the Napoleonic

model. In this twentieth century more than ever before 'military genius is work' rather than 'sudden inspiration and wishful thinking'.³⁰ Present day military officers can indulge in politics only at the cost of their fighting skills.

Of course, the senior officers, who take over the control of the state and want to stay in power beyond any specific time limit, usually give up their commands in the armed forces. But as any government of military provenance suffers from innate lack of legitimacy, the military regime has to depend upon the continuous support of the armed forces, specially the officer corps. Politics banned or restricted in other sectors of the polity soon find their expressions in the armed forces and gradually corrode their unity, cohesion and morale. Distraction of politics also inevitably affects the pure technical expertise of the army personnel.

In the past two decades there have been several instances where the armies, who had been compromised by their political role-expansions, suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of the armies encouraged only to excel in professionalism. The Arab-Israeli war in 1967 furnished one of these examples. The Syrian army's performance suffered immeasurably because of fratricidal feuds among its officers, which resulted in an inability to mount a serious offensive against the Israeli army. The Iraqi army was similarly debilitated by internal political strifes. The fragmentation of the armed forces of the Arab countries, at the same time facilitated the easy penetration by Israeli intelligence.³¹

Egypt's total military fiasco is also generally attributed to the political role-expansion of the Egyptian armed forces. Partly to take politically unreliable officers outside the defence forces and partly to reward the proteges with more comfortable jobs, Gamal Abdel Nasser transferred about 300 senior officers of the armed services to civilian sectors.³² The exodus of such a large number of officers obviously affected the military services. To ensure the support of the armed forces for his regime, Nasser manned the top echelon of the armed services with his cronies. Many of them proved corrupt and utterly inadequate for the positions in the high command. Besides the armed forces were being run in a most unprofessional way by Field Marshal Abdul-Hakim Ameer, the then Chief of the Armed Forces. Although the lapses of the armed services were known to Nasser, he avoided taking any corrective measure fearing a breach with Ameer who had served him most loyally and had been his right-hand man for fifteen years.³³ The dereliction in the armed forces went so far that the Egyptian Air Force did not take adequate training in the operation of the weapons and combat planes supplied by the Soviet Union.

Although President Nasser himself went to the Egyptian armed forces' headquarters a few days before the start of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and warned the high command that there might be a surprise Israeli air attack on Egypt within 48 to 72 hours,³⁴ the Egyptian air commanders committed the 'monumental neglect of the most elementary rules of protecting the aircraft on the ground.' The result

was that a large part of the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed on the ground and the rest was completely incapacitated by the Israeli pre-emptive attack on the very first day of the war and the Egyptian army rapidly disintegrated in less than a weeks time.³⁵ The Egyptian and Syrian armies with their continuous role expansion repeated their failure in 1973 war against Israel.³⁶

The thirteen-year period of political involvement similarly impaired the fighting edge of the Pakistani armed forces. This was clearly demonstrated in the thirteen day war between Pakistan and India in 1971. One can reasonably argue that the Pakistani forces in former East Pakistan, surrounded by a totally hostile population and denied of all logistical support from West Pakistan because of the Indian blockade, were not in a position to give a stiff resistance to the Indian forces, but the failure of the Pakistan force in making any significant dent on the Indian forces in the Western front of war cannot be explained in any other terms than the inadequate morale and fighting skills of the Pakistani forces.³⁷ Although Pakistan had inherited a highly professional army, the quality of the army rapidly declined as a result of its 'involvement in making and unmaking regimes.' There was an extraordinary waste of skill and experience. A large number of senior officers took up political and administrative roles while many others were forced to retire for political reasons. Arbitrary selection and promotion of officers on considerations other than merit affected the morale and efficiency of the army

especially in the officer corps. Acute factionalism developed among the senior officers and interservice relations became highly strained. These developments virtually immobilised the high command, and as the war broke out, the high command failed to chalk out strategy and tactical plans in a concerted manner.³⁸ It was no wonder that the Pakistan Air Force lent only half-hearted support to the war and a major portion of troops in West Pakistan remained uncommitted to the war effort.³⁹ Obviously, to paraphrase Moltke, politics had spoiled the Pakistani armed forces. The most recent example of how the political role of the armed forces corrodes military vitality is provided by Idi Amin's armed forces. The Ugandan armed forces, which acted as the heinous instrument of Idi Amin's reign of terror, just disintegrated in the face of the poorly equipped, and led, Tanzanian troops and an Ugandan exile force in April, 1979.

Recently there had been major boundary changes in the civil-military relations in some of the Latin American countries. Until early 1960s the Latin American military usually performed a 'moderating' or system maintaining role in politics. Under this model, the military periodically intervened to resolve political crisis and did not aim at prolonged period of rule to effect fundamental transformations in social, economic and political structures. An expanded, directive and system transforming role of the military emerged after the coups d'état in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), Peru (1968) and Chile (1973). The superior war colleges of the above mentioned

countries found and funded by the U.S. Military Assistance Mission developed an elaborate, fascist and totalitarian "Ideology of National Security and National Development." This ideology had its origins in the decolonising experience of the French army in early 1950s. It argued that the non-communist and communist nations of the world were engaged in a world-wide 'total war'. In this war, the enemy was not an external one; he was close at hand and sprang from within the nation. It was a war against communist revolutionaries who had grown in the first place because of underdevelopment and inequitable social, economic and political systems of developing countries. The strategy needed to win in this ideological and counter insurgency war involved the 'unity, will and productive capacity of the entire nation.' The key feature of this strategy was 'the close interrelationship between national security and national development.' The days of 'old professional' soldier who had fought conventional war with external enemy were almost over. The 'new' professional soldier trained in fighting a 'total war' with the internal enemy on military, social, economic and political fronts was the prime need of the day. Since the civilian leaders did not have the requisite skill, and organisation to fight the new war, it has become the manifest destiny of the 'new professional soldiers to take over, establish control over all aspects of society, bring about rapid socio-economic development and win the glory of defeating the greatest threat to Western Civilisation.'⁴⁰

Brazil had been the Test case for the implementa-

tion of the "Ideology of National Security and National Development." In the whole of Latin America, Brazil had the best men and material in her armed forces. The "new professionals" of Brazil held power for two decade to show the mettle. The economic and political reforms in Brazil and Argentina effected however by the 'new professional' soldiers proved illusory. In both countries, the military regimes were bedevilled by the growth of factionalism within the armed forces and conflicts between 'military government' and 'military institutions.' The result was frequent instability (changes in personnel of the government including president of the nation) and policy incoherences of which the civilian regimes were accused. On the other hand, the fear of veto by different factions of the army inhibited initiative and slowed down the decision-making process. Popular discontents mounted and the military governments 'deepened the revolution' by resorting to more and more terror and torture. Once again the classic discovery the 'governmental functions are much less amenable to resolution through vertical pattern of decision making and command' and that 'there can be no apolitical solution to the problems of political development' was vindicated.⁴¹

It is interesting to note that the very first scholarly article published in 1959⁴² which argued for the role expansion of the armed forces advocated this technique for mobilizing organizational strength and coercive capacity of the armed force available for fighting communism in Southeast Asia. As the Southeast Asian experience shows military force alone

cannot ensure a victory against communism. If the total war has to be won, victories in economics and ideology would have to be gained first. But as we have argued earlier in chapter, it is precisely in the fields of economics and ideology that the military officers have shown innate incapacity in gaining victories. On the other hand, repression and terror which accompany military's attempt at total control only strengthen the appeals of communism. For ultimate success, the communist revolutionaries prefer repressive military regimes to reform-oriented civilian governments.

Conclusion

To sum up, the military regimes seem incapable on furthering major socio-economic development in the countries they rule, in spite of the claims to the contrary. The military's performance in the field of political development is all the more dismal. They seem only to accentuate the problems of political development with which the civilian leaders were initially faced and they deprive the civilian politicians of the opportunity to acquire the much needed political skills, thus, perpetuating the chain of political underdevelopment. Lastly the role expansion of the military creates both internal and external security vulnerabilities. Dunkwart A. Rustow rightly concludes :

"... the ultimate success of a military regime depends on its skill in allowing or promoting the rise of effective civilian institutions that will render future military interventions superfluous..."⁴³

Footnotes

1. Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.) p. 28.
2. Quoted in Edward M. Earle, 'Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Soviet Concepts of War', Edward M. Earle, (ed.) *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 323.
3. Quoted in Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.) *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*, (Albany State University of New York Press, 1976), p. ix.
4. See, Harvey A. DeWeerd, 'Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian' in Earle, (ed.) *op. cit.* pp. 287-305; S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, London, Pall Mall Press, Third Printing, 1969, pp. 28-29.
5. See, for example, Lucian W. Pye, 'Armies in the Process of Political Modernization' and Manfred Halpern, 'Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class' in John J. Johnson, (ed.) *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-89 and 277-313, Guy J. Pauker, 'South East Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade,' *World Politics*, Vol. XI, No 3, 1959, pp. 325-345. H. Daudler, *The Role of the Military in Developing Countries*, (Monton, 1962) J. J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford University Press, 1964).
6. See Eric A. Nordlinger, 'Soldiers in Mufti: the Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States,' *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, 1970, pp. 1131-1148.
7. R.D. McKinlay and A. S. Kohan, 'A Comparative Analysis of Political and Economic Performance of Military and

Civilian Regimes: A Cross National Aggregate Study,' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1975, p. 20.

8. Robert W. Jackman, 'Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World,' *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, 1976, p. 1096. Philippe Schmitter's study dealing exclusively with Latin American States also shows negative relative relationship between military rule and socio-economic development. See, Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1957,' in Morris Janowitz and J. van Doorn (eds.), *On Military Intervention*, (Rotterdam University Press, 1971), pp. 425-506. See also Jerry L. Weaver, 'Assesing the Impact of Military Rule: Alternative Approaches,' in Philippe G. Schmitter (ed.) *Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Perspectives*, (London, Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 58-116.
9. See, Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 21.
10. Only in the Middle East the defence expenditures of military and non-military regimes have been the same because of the continuous conditions of belligerence in the area. *Loc. cit.*
11. See, Table 3 Chapter 9, 'Politics and Defence Budgets,' in Gavin Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World*, (London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1974,) p. 163.
12. Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
13. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Patterns of Violence in World Politics' in Samuel P. Huntington, (ed.), *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1952), p. 40.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
15. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, Ninth Printing, 1975), p. 251.

16. See Luckman, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.)
17. See, S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, (London, Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp.17-18.
18. For an excellent discussion on the functions of ideology in developing a stable regime, see, Edward Fiet, 'Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political Institutions,' *World Politics*, XXV, 2, January 1973, pp. 251-255.
19. See, *ibid*, pp. 255-273.
20. See, Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
21. See, Feit, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-273.
22. Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat* (London, The Penguin Press, 1970), p. 443.
23. See, Thomas S. Cox, *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976), pp 16-17; Claude B. Welch, Jr. (ed) *Soldiers and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 49-50.
24. See, Samuel P. Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay,' *World Politics*, XVII.
25. See, W.H. Morris-Jones, 'India's Political Miracle,' *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. XII, 2, 1966; 'Political Institutions in New Commonwealth States' Hamilton, Robinson and Goodwin (eds), *A Decade of the Commonwealth 1955-1964* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 42-62, especially last 3 pages; Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress*, (University of Chicago Press, 1967) especially, pp. 11-16; Stanley A Kochanek, *The Congress of Indian*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958)

pp. XIX-XXV.

26. See Chapter II below p. 10.

27. *Loc. cit.*

28. See, Robert Dowse, 'The Military and Political Development,' in Colin Leys, *Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in Theory Practice of Development* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969).

29. See, Vabrie P. Bennet, 'Patterns of Demilitarization in Africa,' *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, October, 1974, pp. 12-13.

30. See, Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 114.

31. See, Neville Brown, 'The Third Arab-Israeli War,' *The World Today*, Vol. 23, 1967, pp. 269-271.

32. See, J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (London, Pall Mall Press, 1969,) p. 134.

33. See, Peter Mansfield, 'Egypt since June 1967,' *The World Today*, Vol. 24, 1968, pp. 414-417.

34. Walter Laqueur, *The Road to War: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968) p. 322.

35. See, Brown, *op. cit.* pp. 270-271.

36. See, Amos Perlmutter, *The Military in Politics in Modern Times*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977,) pp. 282-283.

37. See, W. H. Morris-Jones, 'Pakistan Post-Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh,' *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 43, 1972, pp. 188-189.

38. For excellent discussion of how the political role expansion of Pakistan armed forces affected their morale and morale efficiency, see, Chapter XVII, "Reasons For Debacle", Fazal Muqim Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership*, (Islamabad, National Book Foundation, 1973), pp. 255-269.

39. See, Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, *The Liberation War* (New Delhi, S. Chand & Co. Ltd., 1972), pp. 215-218.

40. See, Alfred Stephan, "The New Professionalism of Internal

- Warfare and Military Role Expansion" and Guillermo A. O. Donnell, "Modernization and Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons and the Argentine Case" in Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Armies and Politics in Latin America* (New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc. 1976) pp. 244-260 and 208-213.
41. See, Part IV, "The Brazilian Military in Power, in 1964-1968" Alfred Stephan, *The Military Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971) pp. 213-271; Guillermo A. O Donnell, "Modernisation and Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons and the Argentine Case" in Lowenthal, *op. cit.* pp. 228-229. Peru's military regime seems to an exception. It seems to have been able to carry out fairly radical land reforms and maintain a degree of cohesion and a less repressive process of governance. See, *ibid*, pp. 9-11.
42. Guy J. Pauker, "South East Asia as Problem Area in the Next Decade", *World Politics*, Vol. XI. No. 3, 1959, pp. 325-345.
43. Dankwart Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics" in Sidney Nettleton Fisher (ed.) *The Military in the Middle East* (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1963) p. 19.