# The Crisis of Intellectuals in a Peripheral Society : The Case of Bangladesh-1947 to 1981

Nazrul Islam
S. Aminul Islam

## Introduction

In one of his recent studies Kadushin observes that despite many works on intellectuals, there is no adequate sociological theory of intellectuals or of intellectual life. He argues that theory building in this field has been 'marred by an abundance of opinion and moralization, a dearth of facts, and a plethora of parochial definitions' (Kadushin as quoted by Brym, 1980 : 73).

The first problem for a sociologically grounded theory of intellectuals is that of definitions. Intellectuals have been primarily viewd in terms of normative definitions (Parsons, 1969 ; Shils, 1974 ; Hussain, 1977). Even normative judgements are implicit in the views which see them as ocupational or role categories (Lipset, 1959 ; Merton, 1962). The second problem centres around the relationship between social background of intellectuals and their structural location in a given social system and their world views. Do they reflect their class background or achieved class location or are they relatively classless ?

A third problem follows from the second-categoriza-
tion of intellectuals in terms of their structural location
and/or differing worldviews. Fourthly, how do they
respond to a change in their social status or control over
resources in the present and future in short, the relation-
ship between social mobility and intellectual response.
And finally, how do they create or change collective
consciousness of the group which they represent ?

This paper seeks to understand the intellectuals in
a peripheral society, namely Bangladesh, while develop-
ing a theoretical model to shed some light on the above
problems. Towards this end the paper first attempts to
identify the structural location of the intellectuals in
terms of the class background, group affiliation, spatial
location, the process of socialization, including education
and subsequent location in terms of institutional affilia-
tions and occupations. It is argued that the structural
location defines their control over resources, which in
turn gives rise to specific world views the intellectuals
espouse. These world views are then communicated to
the rest of the society, building up the consciousness and
ideology of the groups they are associated with. These
general theoretical observations are then modified by
taking into account the structural peculiarity of the peri-
pheral situation. The final portion of the paper puts these
theoretical formulations to test against qualitative and
quantitative data from Bangladesh between 1947 and
1981. It is held that the role of intellectuals, particularly
their political role, needs to be understood in relation to
the development of an intellectual tradition dating back
to the precolonial days and in terms of the limitations

imposed on Bangladesh as it was gradually incorporated into the capitalist world system.

## Intellectuals and Their Social Location

Defining intellectuals has remained the major problem for studies concerned with this specific group of individuals. Most authors tend to devise their own definitions and as a result there is no universally accepted definition of intellectuals. Broader definitions seem to be too abstract but the narrower definitions are not free of abstractions either. Narrow definitions are abstractions of either the role or of the occupational categories. These normally serves the purpose undertaken by the authors but are rarely used or are applicable in other studies, For studies dealing with broad historical periods such definitions have very limited use as most categories may not correspond to the same group over time. This study, being historical in nature, will, therefore, use a broader definition of intellectuals.

Intellectuals are treated here primarily as creators of ideas (Brym, 1980). They are a specific group found in every society as a small minority whose special task is to 'provide an interpretation of the world for that society' (Mannheim, 1936 : 10). They deal with the values and culture of the society and create for the its "world views" in terms of symbolic universes. And as Shils (1974 : 5 'puts it. (t) through their provision of models and standards, by the presentation of symbols to be appreciated, intellectuals elicit, guide and form the expressive dispesition within a society'.

Beside the creation of various ideas-values and

cultural norms-intellectuals communicate these to the rest of the society. The ordinary person in society is infused with these ideas, 'with a percetiveness and imagery' and are brought into a wider univese by coming in contact with the intellectuals (Shils, 1974). Various communication media, including the radio, television and the print media are used by the intellectuals to communicate their ideas to the public, who in their turn look up to the intellectuals for finding meanings to their lives.

The process of communication and the eventual acceptance of ideas by the public is complicated by a number of factors. In the pre-capitalist societies, as Mannheim (1936) noted, the castelike groups of intellectuals, the brahmins or the Chinese mandarins, maintained a virtual monopoly over the ideas or teaching and preaching of those to the other members of the society. Being a closed stratum and with restricted entry, these intellectuals presented a unified view of the world and allowed little deviation either amongst them or in the rest of the society. In the capitalist society the bourgeois came equipped with its own intellectuals, who not only challenged both monopoly and content of the ideas but successfully broke through them and replaced these with new sets of ideas. With the end of restriction on entry and the increasing division of labour, intellectual world soon came to be composed of individuals representing various social strata, groups and institutions. These variations in their turn resulted in multiplicity of ideas, often forced into competition with each other. Indeed, competition among ideas is the hallmark of the modern society.

In the face of such competition, as Marx and Engels (1966) noted, the ideas of the ruling class predominates. Indeed, the ruling ideas of every epoch is the idea of the ruling class (Marx and Engels, 1966). This does not preclude the existence of other sets of ideas opposed to the ruling ideas. Thus in every society there are found intellectuals who belong to the ruling stratum or profess its ideas to help maintain the hegemony of that class, while other intellectuals propagate ideas in opposition to those of the ruling set of ideas. As the ruling group is replaced, so do the ideas. Thus, the changing relations among various strata within society determines the role of ideas and the originators of these, the intellectuals. The intellectuals, therefore, need to be seen in terms of the specific locations they occupy within the social structure.

This, however, is not an easy task if only for the reason that few thinkers actually concur on the specificity of the location of intellectuals within the social structure. Assessments vary from viewing the intellectuals as relatively classless (Mannheim, 1936) to forming a defintie class, well on its way to becoming the ruling class (Gouldner, 1979). Most authors, Marxist or otherwise, treat the intellectuals as belonging to some variety of the middle strata. Marxist thinkers tend to see the intellectuals as forming a part of the 'ensemble' of the petty bourgeoisies (Poulantzas, 1976), placed in between the bourgeois and the proletariat. Intellectuals are thus identified as mere wage earners lacking in ownership of the means of production and gradually falling to the ranks of the proletariat. Alternatively, the intellectuals

are viewed as gradually improving over their middle class position, particularly in the managerial fields of work and are slowly acquiring a position close to that of the bourgeois. An excellent critic of these positions is offered by Brym (1980), who argues that both these perspectives may be true simply for the reason that the proletarianization thesis only looks at the production side, while the *embourgeoisement* thesis refers only to the distributional aspect. Howevere, he notes that none of these positions stand up to empirical tests particularly in relation to the historical development of the intellectuals. Brym (1980) regards these as greatly over-simplified explanations.

Oversimplification of the issue seems to be chronic in the literature on intellectuals. First, the society is treated to be conforming to the rigid division into three classes, upper, middle and lower or in the Marxist terminology, the bourgeois and the proletariat, and those who do not fall in these two are be default classed as the 'petty bourgeoisies. Second, the intellectuals are almost without exception treated as a homogeneous group. True, various occupational or other categories among them are often identified, but when it comes to determining their class position, such differentiations among categories are rarely taken into account. Third, the influences of various groups and institutions over the lifetime of the individual is not even taken into account and the 'original' class position, referring merely to the class location of the family, is treated as fixed, shaping his ideas permanently. And fourth, the specificity of the historical situuation given

little credit, so that, irrespective of the location of his generation or his society in time and space, the intellectual is doomed to the fate of a middle stratum.

Intellectuals, therefore, need to be seen not only as heterogenous in terms of various occupational and other categories, their affiliations with various groups and institutions must also be taken into account along with the changing historical situation of these. They must also be accounted for in relation to spatial differences, thus the peripheral social conditions need not conform to the conditions at the core, nor the urban to the rural,. Neither can the intellectuals be classified as belonging solely to the middle stratum. Thus, while Marxists today tend to classify the intellectuals as petty bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels during their time found the intellectuals (thinkers, in their terminology) as forming part of the ruling class - the bourgeois, and capable of changing their idealogy to identify them-selves with the causes of the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 1966). Therefore, much of the confusion regarding the role of the intellectuals can be avoided if one takes note of the internal differences among them both in terms of the fluidity of social background originating in the family and subsequent socialization process and in terms of the various groups and institutions they are affiliated with during their life time. And more importantly, in relation to the historical situation he and his society is placed.

Few scholars have taken these conditions in developing their theory of intellectuals. An attempt is made

here to build a theoretical model based primarily on
the works of some such thinkers. The following
exposition is based primarily on the works of Gramsci
and Mannheim, Who more than anyone else have
identified the intellectuals both in terms of their relation
to the means of production and also looked at the internal
differences among various categories that distinguish
each stratum of intellectuals from others.

Plurality of intellectual strata and the hierarchical
arrangement of these in relation to the control over
society is clearly developed in the works of Gramsci.
Gramsci (1982) argues that every social group creates
along with itself 'one or more strata' of intellectuals.
These he called the 'organic' intellectuals. Beside
these organic intellectuals, there are other intellectuals
already in existence, which he termed as the 'traditional'.
These traditional intellectuals are in fact the organic
intellectuals of other social groups. Each organic group
of intellectuals offers its social group 'homogeneity
and awareness of its own function not only in the
economic but also in the social and political fields'
(Gramsci, 1982 : 5). Thus, the capitalist entrepreneur
created with itself the industrial technician, the spe-
cialist in political economy, the organizers of a new
culture, of a new legal system etc. (Gramsci, 1980 : 5).

Gramsci was not satisfied by merely identifying
the plurality of the intellectual strata, he sought to
understand the position of each of these in relation
to the world of production. He was, of course, aware
that this was not as direct a relation as that of the
'fundamental social groups', like the workers, but was

mediated by the 'whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures'. This realistic approach allowed Gramsci to measure the nature of control each stratum exercises over the society. He argued that it is possible to measure the 1. organic quality of various intellectual strata, 2. their degree of connection with the fundamental social group, 3. to establish a gradation of their function and 4. also of the superstructures they are associated with. These he proposed to do in relation to their control of the social and political life, in terms of the hegemony and state domination. These, Gramsci (1982) argued have given rise to a 'particular division of labour and therefore a whole hierarchy of qualifications' some of wihch may have no apparent contribution to the organization of control over the state or society. Gramsci also notes the differences bred by the schooling system including the types of schools attended by the intellectuals. He also feels that intellectuals must also be differentiated in respect to its 'intrinsic characteristics' wich indicate real qualitative differences. On the basis of these differences he also distinguishes a hierachy at the top of which are the 'creators of various sciences, philosophy, art, etc.' and at the lowest level the "humble 'administrators' and divulgators of pre-existing, accumulated intellectual wealth" (Gramsci, 1982 : 13).

Thus, Gramsci not only elaborates on the internal differences that distinguish various categories of intellectuals but sets to arrange these and the institutions they are affiliated with into hierarchies both in relation to their control over society and administration and

also interms of the qualitative differences among them. Gramsci however, continues to treat the intellectuals as mere 'deputies' of the ruling class, performing only the 'subaltern' functions of maintaining hegemony and state administration. The actual control of the means of production remains in the hands of the ruling class (the Capitalists). This, as will be argued later, is not necessarily the core in the peripheral. Moreover, Gramsci's analysis is rather static refering strictly to his Italy of the 1920s and 30s. and in need of further development to be applicable in the historical analysis of intellecturls in other societies.

Karl Mannheim, beside emphasizing the differential nature of the intellectuals' social location also builds up a relatively more dynamic model than Gramsci in which the changes over time among various generations of intellectuals, their institution of affiliation, and even the changes over the life time of the individual intellectual are taken into account. Mannheim was one of the very first to point to the 'relative' classlessness of the intellectuals. While developing a Sociology of Knowledge in his *Ideology and Utopia* (Mannheim, 1936), he showed how due to the increasing division of labour recruitments from different strata of the society, and socialization process in terms of schooling, the composition of intellectuals took a heterogenous form. Their lack of direct connection to the process of production forther allowed them to associate with various classes at will.

In his later works, particularly in his essay on "The Problem of the Intelligentsia" (Mannheim, 1956),

Mannheim further elaborates on these ideas showing also how the social location shapes the ideologies of the intellectuals, both as individuals and groups. He argues that the situation of the intellectuals cannot be understood in terms of a clear-cut class analysis (Mannheim, 1956 : 158). A large complexity of factors both define his location and give rise to his particular variety of ideology. He also argues that the intellectuals' ideological position is not a fixed one and may change very easily depending on various factors. Thus, he notes that those Italian intellectuals who supported the political left after the first World War helped to shape Fascism shortly after (Mannheim, 1956 : 158). Therefore, the complexity of their ideology and indeed, their social location must be mapped out carefully by taking into account a large number of factors. The most important of these, according to Mannheim (1956 : 158) are : 1. social background of the individual ; 2. the particular phase of his career curve-whether he is on the upgrade, at a plateau or on the down grade ; 3. whether he moves up individually or as a member of a group ; 4. whether he is blocked in his advancement or thrown back on his initial situation ; 5. the phase of social movement in which he participates ; 6. the position of his generation in relation to other generations ; 7. his social habitat ; and (8) the type of aggregation in which he performs.

Beside discussing the importance of social background, in terms of class and vocation and the role they play in developing various strata of intellectuals, Mannheim places these in the context of the larger society and history, particularly in relation to social

mobility. Mannheim (1956) dwells at length to show what form of ideologies intellectuals espouse in relation to both their ascendence and blockage of social mobility. Ascendence into higher position, as during the rise of the bourgeois, gave birth to the ideology of success and an acceptance of the hierarchy, while blocked ascendence or uprootedness produces radical critics of society. Indeed, in part such blockages of ascendence is in itself a condition that breeds intellectuals (Mannheim, 1956 : 145 -146), who during the various phases of their development first idolize the past 'good old times', falling back on traditions and turning into romantics. Later, in view of continued failure over the generations, these intellectuals turn into sceptics and reactionary ideologists. Blockage of ascendence thus, gives rise to a rational critique of society and a realistic opposition in the form of counterimages of society or 'utopias' (Mannheim, 1956).

Blocked ascendence has also been emphasized by a number of other thinkers as shaping the ideologies of the intellectuals. Shils (1974) shows how intellectuals in a colonized socitey develop the idea of nationalism. Gouldner (1979) uses this concept to explain alienation among intellectuals both in the colonized countries and the developed countries of the core. Gouldner argues that blocked ascendence produces an increase in the political activity by the intellectuals (1979 : 63). This is more acute where there is an initial upward mobility which later gets blocked. Nationalist movements in the colonized world was thus promted by the intellectuals, who first achieved upward mobility by being absorved

in administration and was later denied the same as their number grew in proportion to the jobs available. Recent studies of Quebec separatism (Guindon, 1964 ; Cuneo and Curtis, 1974), shows this to be true not only for the intellectuals but also of various social and occupational groups in varying degrees and at different times depending on whose mobility is blocked. Thus mobility, upward, downward or blocked leads to various ideological and counter ideological mentality among the intellectuals and the groups and institutions they represent.

The structural location of the intellectuals, therefore, is defined in terms of both the original location of the family, the generation and the historical situation and also in relation to the various groups and institutions the intellectual comes to be affiliated with including the educational institutions. The structural location denotes the kind of control the intellectual has over the resources of the society. Control over resources defines the attitude the intellectual holds towards the situation he is in. This is translated into the kind of ideology he may pursue. Greater or increasing control will mean an acceptance of the situation and give rise to ideologies varying in forms from liberal to conservative geared to the glorification and maintainance of the status quo. While lack of control or increasing lack of control. blocked mobility-real or anticipatory, is likely to lead to denial, criticism and opposition of the present system and lead to ideolgies varying in degrees from traditionalism and romanticism glorifying the past to scepticism, or often radicalism geared to reshape the present.

Varying degrees of control (or the lack of it), real or anticipatory, over resources of the society, therefore, suggest whether the intellectual accepts or rejects his present situation, as they indicate the kind of ideology he may hold. Mannheim in his *Ideology and Utopia* (1936) went into great details to explain the forms each ideology the ideas of the ruling group - and counter-ideology, the 'utopias' may take. He argued that these must always be seen in relation to the acceptance or rejection of the 'here and now'. (Mannheim, 1836 : 154). He also noted that the ideologies and utopias represent a time dimension, that are either oriented to the past or to the future. Thus, control over resources may be seen as describing two dimensions, one in terms of the acceptance or rejection of the present—the 'here and now', and the other, the time period the ideologies are directed at. These may be represented graphically as follows :

Acceptance

$Y^+$

$X^-$                                                    $X^+$

Past——————— Here and Now——————— Future

$Y^-$

Rejection

In this graph, intellectuals, as individuals or groups and the groups and institutions they represent, including political parties, may be located with ease. Thus, for example, those of the ruling group, its intellectua's or other institutions propagating their interests are likely to be quite in conformity with the present and their ideology directed at maintaining the status quo may be located along the $Y^+$ axis. While those who do not accept the here and now may either espouse ideologies glorifying the past can be located in the lower left quadrant, or those who turn into radicals talking in terms of future state of soc'alism would be located in the lower right quadrant.

It may be noted that such a model is rather static for the fact that it merely denotes the acceptance or rejection of the here and now and the ideologies at a given point in time. However, the model can be transformed into a dynamic model to analyse historical data simply by plotting such graphs at different junctures of history or at regular intervals. The model, on the other hand, is general enough to be applicable in any historical situation and can accomodate any numder of observation and show their relative positions as well. Present study will make use of such graphs to locate various intellectuals and groups and institutions at different points in time as the history of Bangladesh unfolds.

To summarize from the above, then, this paper holds that : 1. the intellectuals cannot be fully understood in terms of clear-cut class distinctions 2. They are a relatively classless group, identifiable in a multiplicity of strata, which may vary in location from the ruling or

dominant group to the lowest strata of the society. 3. Social location originating in the family is restated through education and later affiliation with various institutions and groups in society. 4. The various strata of intellectuals and the institutions and groups to which they are affiliated are arranged hierarchically both in terms of the qualitative differences among them and in relation to the control each has over state administration and the society in general ; and as will be argued shortly, the control over the process of production. 5. Differential social location of the intellectual, or the groups and institutions he represents, in relation to control over society, state, and often economy, defines his particular ideas and ideology. 6. These are further articulated in relation to his prospect of social mobility, individually or as part of a group or institution, often giving rise to counter ideologies or utopias. 7. Ideologies, thus formed, need not be seen as permanent and may change over the lifetime of the individual as the control over resources shifts. 8. Intellectuals or their groups and institutions can be represented on a graph, whose X and Y axes denote the time over which ideologies are oriented to and the acceptance or rejection of the here and now respectively.

### Intellectuals in the Peripheral Societies

As has been alluded to above, the peripheral societies present a vastly different socio-political and economic situation than those in the core countries. As the peripheral societies got incorporated in the capitalist world system, and as their economic exploitation increa-

sed, these societies became dependent politically and culturally on the core countries. Social structure in the periphery lost its autonomy. Intellectuals in such a milieu both developed and played or continue to play roles quiet differently then their counterparts in the core countries. An analyssis of these calls for a structural and a historically grounded examination of the intellectuals within the dynamics of world capitalist system. The theoretical generalizations reached above, therefore, need to be modified further to accomodate such an examination. This section of the paper will deal with the issues intellectuals in a dependent society have to facte. It will be argued that the peripheral situation is in itself a crisis situation for the intellectuals.

Intellectuals in the peripheral societies have been studied by many a scholar previously. Fanon (1974) for example showed that intellectuals in the third world in the course of their encounter with colonialism, undergoes evolution in three phases. The first phase is one of assimilation and imitation in which intellectuals absorb Westerm culture 'greedily' and endeavour to be accepted as cultural equals of their Western counterpart. The racial barrier of colonialism and nationalist movements trigger of the second phase, a phase of withdrawal from the cultural matrix of the West. It is essentiatlly a transitional stage in which intellectuals remain trapped into the cultural values of the past. They can not as yet become a part of the living people. In the face of ambivalence and stress, they engage themselves in the glorification of the past, of the dead and of the 'geist'. They reconstruct the

nation in the symbolic sphere. Finally, the intellectuals, 'after having tried to lose himself in the people, will on the contrary shake the people' (Fanon, 1974 : 179). This is the fighting stage in which they 'substantiate the nation' not from culture but through praxis through concrete anti-colonial struggles.

Intellectual response to the colonial situation in similar phases changing from admiration, acceptance to withdrawal, rejection and eventual struggle for nationalism have been variously emphasized by a number of other thinkers as well ( see for example, Shils, 1974 ; Khatkhate, 1977 ; Chirot, 1977). Though, perhaps, essentially correct such formulations are too sweeping in nature. The history of the period is often too vast, yet these studies lack proper periodization. They are a rather simplified version of the major trend and do not take into account the internal differentiation within the colonies in relation to the regions, ethnic diversity, or of the various strata of the intellectuals as they develop. Moreover, few such studies venture into uniting the colonial experience of the intellectuals with those of the post colonial era. A theoretical formulation of the intellectuals in the peripheral societies must be general enough to explain both the colonial and past colonial situations. The following exposition is geared to such an end, with empirical substantiation from a case study of Bangladesh. It may be noted here that this is merely an expository type of study and data from Bangladesh is limited and scarce, so that generaliztion beyond this study must be made with caution.

The incorporation of the peripheral societies in the capitalist system gives rise to or accelerates uneven social, economic and cultural development, produces different contradictions and modes of consciousness. Although it is difficult to generalize for the periphery as a whole, at least three patterns of uneven development can be mapped out : 1. Uneven development between the core and the periphery in which the periphery undergoes a continuous process of economic exploitation by the core, along with political and cultural subordination. 2. Uneven development between regions within the periphery : due to differential modes of incorporation and levels of capitalist penetration, the periphery becomes subject to uneven regional development. And 3. Uneven development among different communities/ethnic groups.

Parallel to the above process of uneven development, capitalism also creates or greatly intensifies class differentiation. Thus in the periphery there may emerge typically four major contradictions : 1. between core and periphery ; 2. between regions ; 3. among ethnic groups communities; and, 4. among classes. These contradictions may not be present or equally pronounced in each culturally delimited area of the periphery or at a given point of time. But social change in the periphery is punctuated by all these contradictions in a greater or lesser degree.

One of the major manifestations of regional uneven development is noted in the differential growth of the urban and rural societies. Even in his study of Italy Gramsci ( 1982 ) notes that rural areas house their own

bands of intellectuals comprised of priests, teachers' lawyers etc. These intellectuals, Gramsci notes, have a complete dominance over the rural life and help to maintain contact with the larger society. In his study of Java, Geetrz ( 1969 ) argues that the peasant society is bifurcated by a ruling class or cultural elite located in the urban centres and commands the 'central symbolic resources of the society' and a peasantry which controls the 'central material' resources or food production. This bifurcation entails the emergence of the Great Tradition of the elite and the Little Tradition of the peasantry. These two traditions, though distinct, tend to interact and influence each other. In the peripheral society, therefore two sets of cultural or intellectual traditions may be operative with certain amount of communication between them. The urban cultural setting or the great tradition incorporates within itself ideas emanating from various sources including outside of the society. While the rural tradition is often complete with its own version of culture and its own variety of intellectuals. Because of the vastness of the rural population and the dominance the intellectuals have over the rural life, any study of the peripheral society must take account of the conditions prevailing there.

Beside the predominance of the rural setting, the peripheral social structure presents a problem of even greater magnitude. It lacks autonomy. The social structure is mutilated by the presence of extra-territorial forces. Direct and monopolistic dominance of these societies during the colonial times merely gives way to indirect and oligopolistic control of the core countries

in the post colonial era. To facilitate their rule, the colonial powers create from among the natives various grades of collaborators, including training up of intellectuals to assist them in the administration of the colonies. Thus beside imposing themselves as the rulers in place of the native ones, the colonials distort the social structure further by raising individuals and groups to the apex of the social structure irrespective of their previous social position, solely as a reward for their collaboration. Colonial policy is also marked by differential treatment of social and ethnic groups, often setting one against the other. This leads to unven development of the social strata, which are in perpetual lack of alignment.

End of colonial rule simply sets in motion another stage of realignment of the various strata in society in relation to their control over the resources, now, including extraterritorial ones. Oligopolistic core control over the peripheral countries is manifest not only in the flow of aid trade and the economy and politics in general but in the exposure, training, and often employment opportunities of the intellectuals as well. The peripheral situation for the intellectuals, as for the rest of the society therefore, is in a permanently malformed state in which groups and institutions attain differing control over the resources of the society or fall from grace, often in quick succession or with little control over their affairs. Thus intellectuals move from one state of control over their own affairs. Thus, intellectuals move from one state of uncertainty to another and as the position of each stratum in relation to the resources is restated with each change, the ideologies of the intellectuals are in

need of readjustment. This is evident both over the gene-
ration and often within the lifetime of the individual. This
perpetual state of uncertainty resulting from differential
control over resources forces the intellectual to live
from moment to moment without ever acquiring mastery
over his situation or even a true understanding of the
factors that shape or distort his situation. Often, as in the
post colonial era, these forces are simple beyond his
reach. Though he may attain an understanding of these
he can hardly conceive of ways to defeat them.

The peripheral situation, therefore, is in itself a
state of crisis for the intellectual. Particularly for the
fact that it is they who have to interprete the situation
for the rest of the society and often it is they or a part of
them on whom falls the responsibility to find a remedy.
It is in the interest of the collaborating groups to
maintain the status quo, while other oppressed groups
lack the means and understanding of the dynamics of
the situation to make any effective challange. Thus,
it is left to the intellectuals, and on many a occasion
the students alone, to try and master forces to overthrow
the system.

Depending on their share in the control over
resources of the society, different strata of intellectuals
respond to the peripheral situation differently. Acceptance
or the rejection of the circumstance depends on the
nature and extent of control each stratum exercises
or anticipates for the future. These give rise to various
ideologies ranging from total rejection of the colonial
rule, glorifying and protecting the past, to the accep-
tance and submissions, resulting in a different set of

ideologies. In the face of uneven development of the social groups and institutions, such ideologies are likely to be at variance, indeed, in competition with each other. The only ideology that achieves certain amount of cohesiveness among these appear to be the question of nationalism; and in post colonial times, separatism in various forms reflecting contradictions growing out of uneven developments. Idea of nationalism succeeds because each group or stratum can expect a change of its position.

Nationalism in the peripheral societies may be anchored in the consciousness of common culture or distinctiveness of region, language, religion, tribe or other such categories. Wallerstein (1980 : 184) views nationalism as the manifestation of ethnic consciousness. By ethnic consciousness he means 'the sentiment shared by a group of people who define their boundaries in cultural terms (a common language, religion, color, history, style of life, and the like, or a combination of these), that they must seek to assert or extend their rights in the political arena in order to defend possibilities for their continued existence as a group and/or to maintain or improve their material conditions' (Wallerstein, 1980 : 184). Ethnic groups are seen by Wallerstein as status groups, which are 'blurred collective representation of classes' and in times of heightened social conflict 'status group lines approach class lines asymptomatically' without ever reaching it (Wallerstein, 1980 : 181). Thus, nationalism growing out of ethnic consciousness is hardly the solution to the crisis in the periphery.

Nationalism, which carries different meaning to

different groups, rarely fulfils its assumed obligation after it attains statehood. It soon becomes apparent that it is but a partial and one of many possible solutions. The crisis in the peripheral societies hardly abates as the new nation state soon finds itself responding to the World System in a new guise.

Indeed, crisis deepens for the intellectuals whose various strata are newly realigned to the oligopolistic influences of the World System. As different strata of intellectuals, including the bureaucrats and the politicians, acquire greater control over the resources of the society and despite the involvement of other strata in political opposition, many of the intellectuals, who were partly responsible for nationalist movement, are forced to withdraw from politics or other social involvement, even to emigrate. While at the same time incorporation in the World System allows a number of them to enhance their socio-economic postition by accepting jobs with the multinational firms and international organizations. All these lead to a complete lack of unity and the intellectuals are left as individuals to fend for themselves or cling closer to the institutions they are affiliated with, trying to promote themselves through these. The interests of the greater society is, more or less, abandoned. Those who still value the ideas of serving the society are most likely to be the most alienated.

Nation statehood, however, achieves for certain strata of intellectuals, primarily the bureaucrats, often the politicians and increasingly the military elite, a greater and often direct control over the total process of production. Most peripheral states today practice some

form of socialism, meaning state control of certain sectors of the economy, like heavy industries, transportation and communication, often banking and insurance etc. In aid dependent societies, the state also administers the flow of huge sums of cash and commodities. In states with civil and military bureaucracy in the ruling position, control over the economy and society is virtually unlimited. In such states intellectuals from other strata or occupational categories, Including politicians, are barely tolerated while their control over resources wane. Thus, the post colonial situation at the periphery offers the intellectuals of various strata control over resources within the society ranging from substantial and total to a complete absence of such control. Being a part of the World System also allows them access to extra-territorial resources. The ideological commitments of the intellectuals also vary according to their share in the control over resources. It is within these theoretical formulations that the intellectuals in Bangladesh, through its different generations and in terms of their changing fortunes, are examined. It is argued that they merely move from one stage of crisis to another.

## Intellectuals Crisis at the Periphery : The Case of Bangladesh

### Background

An intellectual crisis is a reflection of economic and social crisis, produced and reproduced historically. The intellectuals' efforts are also geared to mapping out the causes, characteristics and consequences of such a crisis, offer solutions to it in terms of symbolic meaning and at the level of practice. Any intellectually constructed

and socially accepted solution to a historical crisis may not resolve it, but lead to a sequence of crisis over time. The tragic universe of Bangladesh provides a fascinating example of such a sequence of crisis both at the societal and the intellectual levels.

The root of the crisis, the first solution to which emerged as the 'Pakistani' nationalism in the 1940s, is to be located in the sequence of events that not only incorporated Bangldesh into the World System but gradually transformed it into what may be termed 'ultra-periphery' a periphery to a periphery. During the colonial times Bangladesh served merely as the hinterland of Calcutta, birth of Pakistan lowered it to the status of a periphery of the Western wing of Pakistan, a hinterland of Karachi. Since the advent of colonial rule the exploitation of its economy has been so thorough that from being one of the richest lands in the world, definitely one of the richest provinces of India (South Asia), it has been relegated to the status of 'the poorest among the poor'.

The collapes of the Mughal Empire and the incorporation of India into the World Capitalist System created deep social and intellectual crisis. It was keenly felt both by the musiim upper class, the deposed ruling class, who had lost political as well as economic powers and the *Ulema* (intellectuals of the religious order). Throughout the colonial period their efforts were directed at gaining greater access to the control over resources. The task was primarily visualized in terms of organizing the muslims into a religo-ethnic category—the muslim community'—and resistance against the colonial power in the earlier phase (before 1857 Mutiny) and,

failing at which, collaboration in the later phase.

In Bengal the muslims had suffered economic decline much further than any other region. Even during the twilight of the Mughal rule, it was the land revenue of Bengal which sustained the centre. It was in Bengal that economic surplus was extracted most efficiently, and this led to the emergence of large estates under the control of hindus. Thus, the decline of the muslims in Bengal had begun earlier than the colonial period. The muslim upper class in Bengal was merely a thin stratum of official elite, who was linked with 'external coercion' and did not turn into a landed aristocracy (Karim, 1980; Ray Chowdhury, 1969) During the colonial period the muslim began to lose their administrative positions, small to medium-scale Zamindaries, and tax free land grants, while the hindus were favoured. These led to the uneven development of these two ethnic groups.

Parallel to this, there emerged another pattern of uneven development. The colonial economy was centered in Calcutta as the new seat of trade and commerce. The mining belt and the later-day industrial complex were built near or around it. The deltaic region of Eastern Bengal (Bangladesh) with its impassable rivers and poor communication system and subject to frequent floods, cyclones and diseases emerged as a hinterland for producing raw materials. Although most of the cash crops like indigo, opium, sugercane and jute were grown in Eastern Bengal, the british, hindu, and the 'marwari' interests dominated them. Eastern Bengal was transformed into an 'ultra-periphery'.

A section of hindu Zamindars and professional groups from Eastern Bengal had settled in Calcutta. Through kinship networks the other hindus had access to the urban life in Calcutta. while the muslims had very little of it. Even within Eastern Bengal, most of the muslims lived in rural areas. As late as 1901 census shows only 3.8% of the total muslim population as urban. More than 90% belonged to agricultural and other lowly services in 1881. Thus the muslims in Eastern Bengal constituted the economically depressed majority of an economically backward region. Most of the Zamindars were hindus, so were almost all traders, businessmen and money-lenders. The new professional groups both in administrative and out side were largly hindus.

The muslims as a community in Bengal was internally differentiated on the basis of overlapping categories of class and status. In terms of status, the muslim 'rentier class' can be seen as consisting of ε 1. Mughal Ashraf-Urdu speaking and urban based social stratum, which claimed descent from Arabia or places near it, maintained social distance from the rest of the muslims and tended to follow the sub-culture of North Indian muslim aristocracy. 2. The *Muffasil* Gentry—belonged to the Sunni sect, were mostly landlords, used both Urdu and Bengal as languages and claimed foreign descent. Although it was closer to the muslim masses in terms of religious orientation and agrarian relationship, it tended to follow the Mughal Ashraf in matters of social and cultural practices. Below these two groups were the Lesser Ashraf—the rural potentates, who

also claimed foreign ancestry and had 'weakness' for
'Islamic languages' (Urdu, Persian, etc.). Against the
Ashrafs were the Atrafs, Ajlafs or Arjals - the ordinary
peasants and craftsmen who followed degraded occu-
pations like weaving, oil-pressing or fishing (Ahmed,
1981).

The Ashrafs seem to have been a numerically
small group. The number of muslim who claimed
foreign descent in 1872 was only 1.52 percent of the
total muslim population in Bengal. In Eastern divisions
of Dhaka and Chittagong the figure dwindled to 0.89
percent (Ahmed, 1981) The vast majority of muslims
formed an economically depressed rural group, which
lived in the cultural ambit of the little tradition of folk
Islam. In the absence of a sizable middle stratum,
there was a marked structural gap between the muslim
elite and the mass. During the early colonial period
there hardly existed a consciousness of community among
the muslims of Bengal. The Ashrafs on occasions even
refused to recognise the lowly as muslims. This degra-
ded position of the muslims in Bengal progressively
deteriorated until the very last decades of the colonial
era, when, due mainly to cash crops like jute and be-
cause of their eventual collaboration with the British,
they attained some measure of social and economic deve-
lopments.

It is within these social-economic and political
conditions and the contradictions bred by the uneven
development of the ethnic communities and various
regional disparaties that in Bengal two distinct forms
of consciourness emerge. These are the religo-ethnic

and linguistic-ethnic consciousnesses, both of which in their turn gave rise to two sets of nationalism, which soon competed with each other. The first was the consciousness of a community of muslims, the second the consciousness of a Bengali speaking community. There was a consciousness of Indian nationalism that reflected the contradiction of core and periphery, but remained a minor stream flowing from Deoband ( religious school ) and modern education. Radicalism attracted muslim mind very slowly and can be described as a late phenomenon, which made halting progress from the avid-thirties of this century.

In Bengal during the colonial times six major groups of intellectuals engaged in symbolic reconstruction of the ethnic consciousness, can be identified. The first of these are the *Ulemas* trained in various *Madrasa* ( religious educational institution ). They represent the Islamic great tradition, rejected the present and used the 'past' as a resource to revive the glory of Islam and with it their politico-economic status. Their origin is traced to Northern India at the end of Mughal rule but became organized in the 19th Century (Smith, 1963). They soon spread their teaching to other areas of India, including Bengal. They were responding not only to Indian situation but to a threatend muslim empire in the world or in terms of a world community of muslims.

To the second group belongs the traditional religious functionaries of particularly, were based in mosques, shrines or were even wondering monks. They were stirred by the *Ulemas*, occasionally opposed them,

but eventually followed them to spread the spirit of Islam' among the masses. They were, however, much closer to the folk tradition of Islam and had been historically maintaining the strategic linkage between the great tradition and the little tradition of the rural areas.

It is primarily due to the efforts of these sets of intellectuals that the masses, particularly the peasantry, achieved a heightened consciouness of the muslim community and participated zealously in movements such as the Wahabi movement to end colonial rule, and later the Faraizi movement. These religious functionaries also organized debate sessions which became a forum for the clarification of contradicton between them and reformists. They also published religious literature.

After the Mutiny of 1857 muslims, particularly the elite among them began to be educated in English and in such celebrated institutions as the Aligarh College. Thus a new group of intellectuals emerged with a base in 'modern' education. Many of them occupied positions in the colonial bureaucracy or in modern professions. They showed loyalty to the colonial power and achieved certain amount of mobility. However, they used the past as their refernce point and organized societies to unite the muslims and press for better privileges from the rulers.

Beside these, there began to appear a small middle class of educated muslims, who organized themselves around the Central National Mohamadan Association (founded in 1878). They established contact with

educated muslims in the different districats of Bengal and the *Ulemas*. It created a new 'cultural model' for social mobility, Islamic tradition for sociocultural life, English education, and government or professional jobs. The sperad of Western education among the muslims, however, did not produce a 'proto-renaissance' among them as it did among the hindus. Western education was conceived merely as a technical skill, it largely failed to expand the horizon of muslim consciousness. They remained grounded in religo-ethnic consciousness like the intellectuals of the religious order, the *Ulema* etc.

Two other categories of intellectuals can be identified during the colonial era as forming around the press and linterature. The muslim press from its inception in 1831 remained a fragile medium as it lacked financial strength and wide circulation. But about 150 periodicals published within the next hundred years reflect the interests, world views and passions of an emergent muslim middle class (Islam, 1977). It appears that in the early phase the editors and publishers were predominantly *Ulemas*, religious functionaries, teachers and social workers (Islam, 1977). In the later period it came increasingly under the control of the Western educated muslim middle class. The main efforts of the press were directed at defending Islam (against Christian missionary and hindus), reveal its glory, discover the causes of decline of Bengali muslims and find solutions for it. Inspite of this abiding preoccupation with Islam (Islam, 1977). the press also stressed on hindu-muslim unity and Bengali language and literature. It showed loyalty to the colonial

regime and appealed for greater privilages for the muslims. Thus its dominant role was symbolic reconstruction of religo ethnic consciousness of the muslims. But it also exhibited a latent linguistic-ethnic consciousness, which accepted the tradition of Bengali language and literature.

Similarly, on the whole the muslim literature of the 19th century was conservative and stimulated religo-ethnic consciousness. Most of the literary personnel came from middle class and rural background, lived in regional urban centres and were engaged in low paid employment (Ahmed, 1983). However, certain amount of liberalism is also witnessed among the literary personnel, who espoused reforms in Islams, found it consistent with modern science, accepted Bengali as the medium of expression. Thus, beside religious consciousness, litera-ture in the 19th century also nourished Bengali language and showed linguistic-ethnic consciousness.

A more pronounced liberal stream of literay activities, however, emerged in 1925 centred in Dhaka University. The Muslim Shahitya Samaj was established by a small number of teachers and students of the university and the colleges of Dhaka. Its aim was liberation of the intellect from the shackles of the past and the pursuit of rationality and social progress. Most of the seven major figures of the Samaj came from the lesser Ashraf background. Their education level was high. One was a distinguished professor of Dhaka University. Another a college teacher, ended up as the Vice-Chancellor of a university.

The Samaj survived for ten years and its influence

then was rather limited as the utopia of Pakistan was only a few years in the future. The dominant trend of the time remained conservative, reflecting religoethnic consciousness, which recieved renewed impetus with the adoption of the Lahore Resolution's demand for Pakistan. It is interesting to note that soon after the adoption of the resolution a society was formed with the aim of transforming the language and literature to reflect muslim cultural theme not to disappear from the intellectual scene in years to come.

The process of the creation of religo-ethnic consciousness among the muslims was further boosted by the growth of similar consciousness among the hindus, which led to a series of communial riots. The hindus of Bengal had collaborated with the colonial regime in the initial stage, achieved social mobility and a greater share of the economy and the public services as well as cultural dominance. When this mobility was relatively blocked, the hindu middle class started anti-colonial struggles. It was a period of rapid social mobility for the muslims as they began to collaborate with the colonial power. This brought into open a latent socio-economic conflict between a relatively matured hindu and an emergent muslim middle class. It is particularly evident from 1931, when Shama Prasad Mukherjee, a champion of hindu revivalism, became disenchanted with electoral politics as the numerically superior muslims were to dominate within such a process. The end product of this hostility between the two ethnic community was the acceptance by the Bengali muslims the cultural, intellectual and political leadership of the North Indian muslims (Ghazi,

1972), and consequently the partition of India in 1947.

The establishment of Pakistan was one kind of solution to the societal and intellectual crisis of the Bengali muslims which provided them with the utopia of social mobility for all classes and groups in society. The middle class could look forward to a reserved pasture of jobs, the peasants could be free of the hindu Zamindars and money lenders. Thus it is no wonder that Pakistan created such a fervour within a short period of seven years. Of course, its material and symbolic basis took more than two hundred years to mature.

However, the triumph of the religo-ethnic conscious- ness was far from complete. The folk tradition of Islam still retained some of its vigour. The peasant insurrections of the 19th and 20th centuries showed a distinct consciousness of class among the peasantry (Kaviraj, 1982 ; Alam, 1983) For example, Bose (in Alam, 1983) also shows that in the commnual riots of 1930 in Mymensingh muslim money-lenders were also attacked and looted by their fellow muslims. Even in Tebhaga movement of 1946-47 'a more or less class polarization of peasantry was clearly discernible' (Alam, 1983 : 22). More importantly, for the future course of events in Bangladesh, was the gradual shaping of a liberal linguistic-ethnic consciousness.

Thus the colonial situation, which fostered various types of uneven developments and contradictions growing out of those led the society and intellectuals in Bangla- desh into a deep crisis. Due to the failure of an initial stage of hostility to the colonial regime, during which the other ethnic communities, particularly the hindus, made

substantial gains, the muslims in Bengal, as in other
regions of India, began to accept the colonial situation.
In the face of certain previlages offered by the
colonial regime, the muslims sought to make the most
out of the situation. The intellectuals response to the
situation was primarily geared to the development of the
ethnic consciousness of the muslims. Muslim intellec-
tuals of various strata, whose exact location cannot be
ascertained due to lack of data, in the late 19th and
early 20th centuris espoused ideology of past Islamic
glories and remained conservative, inspite of Western
education for some. A minor steram of liberalism was
noted in case of the literary personnel, particularly
of the Samaj established in Dhaka University. This
was a time for upward mobility among the muslim
as it coincided with a blockage of mobility for the
hindus, which led to various forms of hostility,
including riots. In the face of ethnic rivalries the prime
contradiction between the core and periphery lost
significance for the muslims and a separation from
India in the form of Pakistan, gained momentum and
eventually succeeded. Pakistan for the time being was
thought to be the solution to the crisis, both at the
societal and intellectual levels. It was hoped, as with
other nationalistic movements, that Pakistan was 'cure-
all' for the crisis.

Figure I represents the graphic location of the
various categories of intellectuals in relation to the
colonial situation ( the 'here and now'), prior of the for-
mation of Pakistan. In the absence of proper data
only an approximation of the intellectuals' position are

presented. Nor does it refer to any specific date. Given these limitations, it is hoped that the graph will serve as a guide for future research in the area.

### Bangladesh 1947 to 1981

*Introduction*

The narrative which follows traces the intellectual response to the cotinuation of the crisis that intensifies further after the formation of Pakistan. It is noted that incorporation of Bangladesh into Pakistan merely meant for the former another stage of underdevelopment. It again becomes the victim of uneven development as its economy becomes peripheral to the Western wing of Pakistan. The religo-ethnic consciousness that brought forth Pakistan soon loses its meaning and the intellectuals strive to offer a fresh solution in the form of linguistic-ethnic consciousness, which eventually lead to the formation of Bangladesh. But the creation of Bangladesh, as will be noted, simply led to a deeper crisis.

The narrative is based on whatever data are available and may not meet the requirements of a well knit theoretical analysis. The exact social location of the intellectuals is rarely avaiable. The will thus be reported mostly in terms of their institutional affiliatioas, including as members of political parties. They will often be treated as merely radicals, liberals etc. Inspite of these shortcomings, the paper hopes to map out the role intellectuals played in the changing fortunes of Bangladesh. Much of it will be linked, as accurately as possible, with the socio-economic and political situation prevailing at different phases of the development. At least five

phases can be identified, in the short span of a few decades, through which the society and the intellectuals faced a series of crisis. These are, 1. language movement, 2. autonomy movement, 3. mass-movement of 1969, 4. War of Liberation, and 5. direct and total integration with the World System.

### Language Movement

The establishment of Pakistan ended the hindu domination in economy" politics and culture of East Bengal (then East Pakistan, later Bangladesh). But it only started a new process of domination by the West Pakistani power block consisting of the land-lords, bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic classes and groups. From being a hinterland of Calcutta, it turned into the hinterland of Karachi. It needs to be hardly repeated that East Bengal underwent another process of under-development. Its middle class was incipient and its rentier class was to be shortly reduced by the Tenancy act of 1950 (applicable only East Bengal). This structural weakness meant that it was destined to undergo another process of uneven development in relation to the western wing of Pakistan. The ruling class of Pakistan based in the western part began to exert their domination of East Bengal with independence in 1947.

The first manifestation of this domination by West Pakistan was the plan to impose Urdu on the Bengalees as the only state language of Pakistan and was declared by M.A. Jinnah in public meeting at Dhaka in 1948. The imposition of Urdu in East Bengal was likely to forestall or slowdown the progress of education and threaten

the social mobility of the emerging middle class and the peasantry. As Ahmed (in Rahman, 1982) pointed out as early as 1943, Urdu would form an aristocracy, a social barrier, which would effectively block the job opportunities for the middle class. With Bengali as the state language the educated class would be able to play a strategic role in national development.

The language movement which began from 1947 and culminated in the shoroting of 21st February, 1952 and which saw a number of people, including students, killed, was a major turning points in the history of Bangladesh. It marked a new period of linguistic-ethnic consciousness that was to propel Bangladesh towards a nation state.

The students emerged as the leaders of this movement and avante-garde of this new consciousness. By 1948 students had achieved sufficient numerical strength. The enrolement of Dhaka University increased from 1905 in 1921-22 to 1693 in 1947-48 and the number of muslim students from 178 to 885 over the same period (Huq 1984:48). The students who mainly came from rural background were actually conscious of their social location and prospect for social mobility (Hossain, 1979).

It was the students who organized a major conference on education in September of 1950 which was attended by 250 student representatives from all over East Bengal. The conference highlighted the government measures for curbing education in East Bengal. It pointed out that educational premises were being requisioned for government use ; about 40 to 50 percent of the primary schools had been closed down in 1948 ;

tuition fees increased and the budget allocation of the
central government was 2 million rupees, while it was
730 million rupees for defence and police. All these
measures meant, the conference declared, closing the
door of education to thousands of students. This
conference had the blessings of the liberal and radical
intellectuals, political, trade-union and peasant leaders
(Umar, 1985). A local newspaper commented that '...
Darkness awaits the fate of future generations of the
society, (cited in Umar, 1985). The new sentiment was
echoed by Dr. M. Shahidullah, who in his presidential
address of the East Bengal university and college
teachers' conference compared the imposition of a new
language with genocide.

From the colonial period the Urdu speaking Mughal
Ashraf and claimants to such status were advocating the
cause of Urdu as the language of Bengali muslims.
Farrukh Ahmed, a leading Bengali poet put it satirically :

Since the salary shot up to Rs. 250
I have divorced Bengali and been wedded to Urdu.
High hopes have blossomed on cruel labour
Urdu is the symbol of blue blood
(As the close friends know)
I have taken up a strange tongue
For true aristocracy,
A tongue that would frighten the orderly and the
coolie.

(Rahman, 1982 : 10 ; Tr. by the authors)
Historically it was this aristocracy, the Muslim League
and a segment of its student front who were suppor-
ting the cause of Urdu. For the rest it clearly meant

a blockage of social mobility. As *Pakistan Observer* (based in Dhaka) commented on a speech by a member of the Constitument Assembly in favour of the imposition of Urdu that it would immediately lead to the dismissal of 90 percent of the Bengalee government officers (Umar, 1985). Thus, the high hopes of rapid social mobility which the peasantry, the middle class and the youth had dreamt of attaining in Pakistan quickly turned sour. Language controversy excerbated this frustration and anger, directing it against the Muslim League and the central government at Karachi.

The killing of 21st February, 1952 produced an inten e collective emotion and shock. Even government officials came out the'r offices to join in the protest march. The office of the daily *Morning News*, which supported the government on language issue, was burnt down. Led by the students, lawyers and radical party workers, the language movement had spread to urban centres all over East Bengal and even to the rural areas.

The 21st of February was soon turned into a collective ritual. The component elements of the ritual are the Shahid Minar (memorial symbol in memory of martyrs) ; an emotive song titled 'Can I forget 21st February, reddened with the blood of my brother ; a bare foot procession at day break (later, from midnight) with the above song sung collectively to lay wreaths at Shahid Minar ; day-long ceremonies to highlight Bengali language and its culture ; and publication of literary magazines on the day (Musa, 1986).

Thus, the symbolic reconstruction of 21st February

acted as a major carrier of linguistic-ethnic conscious-
ness as the ritual gradually spread to every corner of
Bangladesh. The communist parties and East Bengal
Youth League (founded in 1952) in paricular, were
instrumental in spreading the language movement to
remote areas. Its front organization, East Pakistan
Cultural Association undertook to organize villagers for
the defence of the culture of the people (Prodhan, 1985).

The post-1952 period saw a polarization of forces in
the cultural front with conservative intellectuals claiming
for a distinct Islamic culture on the basis of a Bengali
language which was to be free from "hindu contamina-
tion", and the liberal and radical intellectuals tried
to carry forward 'the glorious literary tradition' of
Bengal. This was the avowed aim of 108 liberal and
radical intellectuals who arranged a conference of
artists, literary personnel and journalists in Dhaka in
1953 (Rahman, 1983). A major and similar cultural
festival was organized in 1957 at Kagmari. The con-
servatives also staged similar events. Pakistan Tamuddun
Majlish organized one in Dhaka in 1952. In 1957
Pakistan Tamuddun Majlis, Pakistan Majlis, Pak-Bangla
Sahitya Mahfil, Silpa-Sanskriti Parisad jointly organized
a ceremony to commemorate the centenary of Sepoy
Mutiny. In 1958 a small number of such intellec-
tuals organized a group called Raonak Ghosti which
used to hold monthly meetings. In the same year, East
Pakistan literary conference was held in Chittagong to
advocate a literay tradition based on Islamic Ideology.

After the proclamation of Martial law in 1958, more
vigorous efforts were directed at incorporating the

intellectuals within the fold of state ideology and apparatus. Pakistan Writers' Guild was instituted in 1959 with direct state patronage. General Ayub Khan introduced President's Award for excellence in the field of arts and literature. Other awards were introduced by leading industrial houses. The Guild introduced by leading industrial house. The Guild introduced an award for literary works which would enhance the integrity of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that the first award of the guild went to Hassan Hafizur Rahman, a leading figure of the language movement (Rahman, 1982).

Journalists were lured with foreign trips and special facilities. As most of the fund for the newspapers came from advertisements from the government and semi-government sources, it became a strategic resource to keep the press within the bounds of official ideology. Newspapers which criticized the government were banned and journalists who braved the censorship were put behind bars (Jahan, 1977).

Throughout this period, a dual policy of reward and punishment was followed towards the intellectuals. 'Government sponsored research, awards, honorary titles, jobs in autonomous agencies, etc, were used as bait to win over or at least to silence scholars and other members of the intelligentsia...' (Jahan, 1977 : 165). The recalcitrants were punished or kept under constant threat by the personalized state apparatus of Monem Khan, the governor of East Pakistan. The bureaucracy, although it had become more powerful and had greater control over resources, were subject to the whims and

dictates of Monem Khan and the ruling party ( Jahan, 1977).

Rapid economic 'development' under Ayub Khan (1958-69) created a sharp class differentiation in East Bengal with a measure of prosperity for the Bengali middle class. As Ahmed (1979) points out, Bengali businessmen were enjoying 'good life for first the time in Pakistan's history' (Ahmed, 1979 ; 102). University teachers and government officers who earned less than thousand rupees a month could afford to buy a new car with special loan facilities. Loan facilities also extended to house building. Thus Ayub's decade provided opportunities to the professional groups to own real estates in urban areas and access to rental income (Farouk, 1982). Even a section of the literary intellectuals could use the most expensive hotel in Dhaka as venue for their regular meetings. Thus in the pre-Pakistan days, a certain amount of prosperity is noted in the lives of the intellectuals, which as will become evident in next section, only made them aware of the possibilities and of the relative deprivation compared to the West wing of Pakistan and gradually led to the separation of the two wings in another nationalistic movement.

However, before the closure of this section on language movement, two other forms of crisis regarding language must be noted. All through the 1960s Pakistan government tried to weaken the foundation of the linguistic ethnic consciousness by such overt means as the replacement of the Bengali script with the Roman script and a ban on the broadcasting of songs written by Rabindranath Tagore. President Ayub Khan who was GOC,

East Pakistan, in the early phase of Pakistan watched the language movement from close quarters and was keenly interested in changing the Bengali script. The education commission of 1959 and Bangla Academy, formed during the period to bring Bengali language, literature and culture within the fold of state ideology, under the directorship of Syed Ali Ahsan from 1962 lent suppport to this proposal. But it was shelved as it was bitterly criticised by students, intellectuals and the public in general.

Tagore became the focus of a long-drawn conflict from 1961, when his birth-centenary was observed with enthusiasm in various parts of the Bangladesh. High court judges and even bureaucrats actively participated in it. The daily *Azad* the voice of the conservative intellectuals found Tagore dangerous for the cultural life of Pakistan and even dubbed it a call of death. Within a short span of time *Azad* published 26 features and scores of letters to lay bare the dangers of infatuation with Tagore (Rahman, 1982). The conservative literary intellectuals also organized seminars in Dhaka, Chittagong and Feni to underscore the fact that a group of intellectuals, although they enjoyed 'undreamt of prosperity as a result of Pakistan' was acting as foreign agents and cherished the utopia of a united India (Rahman, 1982). The war of 1965 with India provided an opportunity to the conservative intellectuals to reassert themselves. Books, journals and films from India were banned. And in 1967, curbs were to be imposed on the broadcasting of Tagore songs from the state-owned radio network. The measure was immediately supported

by 5 university teachers, 40 journalists and literary and artistic figures, 30 Ulemas and 45 musicians and singers. But the protest against the proposal by the liberal and radical intellectuals was tremendous. All these issues of Pakistani versus Bengali culture remained the subject of public controversy till 1970 (Rahman, 1982).

Thus, though Bengali was recognized as a state language in 1954, along with Urdu and English, a major issue that confronted the Bengali intellectuals between 1952 and 1969 was the status of the script itself, the nature of literary tradition and cultural values in short the question of cultural autonomy. In the meantime, however, Bengali linguistic-ethnic consciousness was nourished and matured through these long and tangled controversies as the liberal and radical intellectuals, and primarily the students, grew in numerical strength and consolidated their position along with the middle class as the symbolic leaders of the society. Location of the various strata and groups on the question of the language along with Bengali culture issue is represented in Figure II. The 'here and now' is represented by the Pakistani state ideology of Islamic culture and Urdu as the language.

### Autonomy Movement

The issue of economic and politial autonomy for East Pakistan emerged in the course of language move- ment. It was a major issue in the provincial election in 1954 which marked a crushing defeat of the Muslim League. In 1956 the ideological basis of the autonomy was clearly spelt out in a conference of economists in

Dhaka through the 'two-economy' thesis. A number of them argued that because of geographical separation and crucial structural differences the economies of the two wings of Pakistan should be treated as separate entities and granted complete autonomy (Sadeque; 1956; Jahan. 1977). The two-economy thesis also drew attention to the increasing economic disparity between the two parts of the country, and in the early 1960s it became a major intellectual and political issue. In 1961 Sayeed Hassan, deputy chairman of the Pakistan Planning Commission claimed in a radio broadcast in Dhaka that there was hardly any disparity between the two wings of Pakistan. It produced a storm of protest. The journalists, economists, businessmen and politicians began to marshal facts and figures to disprove the statement. This created a greater public awareness of the issue. In 1966 a Bengalee civil servant, who had firsthand experience of the mechanism of disparity as a deputy secretary of the ministry of finance, came forward with a concrete programme for ending it. Adopted by Awami League in its party manifesto, it came to be known as the six-point programme (Quddus, 1986).

The six-point programme drew a complex intellectual response· The conservative intellectuals organized around different factions of the Muslim League and pro-Islamic political parties viewed it as the final undoing of Pakistan and the Islamic state. The liberal intellectuals increasingly viewed the main contradiction as between the dominant Punjabis and the subordinate Bengales. Disparity was seen as underlying all the ills of East Bengal. The end of disparity through the six-

point programme, thus, meant prosperity for all in East Bengal. It was a replay of the utopian vision of the early forties. Then the hindus stood against the mobility of the muslims ; in the late sixties it was the Punjabis who had exploited the Bengalees for too long and now must make room for the Bengalee middle class.

The radical intellectuals affiliated with Pro-Moscow National Awami party or the Communist Party trailed behind Awami League to fight imperialism/monopoly capitalism and remnants of feudalism through the mass movements of democratic forces in the country on a minimum programme of restoration of democracy. The pro-Chinese radical intellectuals were sympathetic towards Ayub Khan for his foreign policy which stressed friendship with China, and remained silent or attacked six-point programme as an imperialist conspiracy and petty-bourgeois fabrication.

During the period between 1952 to 1968, a section of the press and journalists played an important role in protesting against the state ideology and censorship on the press (Gupta, 1974). A number of radical and liberal journalists suffered imprisonment. This included the editor of *Ittefaque*, a militant Bengali daily. In 1960 three newspapers were blacklisted. In the following year fourteen journalists from the *Azad* were dismissed. By the end of this period, even *Azad* began to play a significant anti-government role.

The bureaucrats had become increasingly alienated from state ideology during this period. As Jahan (1977) points out a majority of Bengalee civil servants were educated in Dhaka University, were influenced by the

language and other student movement and reflected the views of the Bengalee middle class through the ties of kinship and friendship. Finally, the bureauracy was likely to gain tremendously from the six-point programme as they were to have crucial control over the resources of an autonomous province.

The *Ulemas* and other religious functionaries had by this time lost much of their influence in both the urban and rural areas. The rapid growth of secular education, literature, art, music and media, changed the structure of the great tradition. In the rural areas, the students became increasingly influential as moulders of public opinion.

The religo-ethnic consciousness that had brought about Pakistan as the first solution to the crisis in the society by the end of the 1960s had lost much of its appeal as the socio-economic and political realities failed to live upto the expectations of the members of a new nation. In the mean time linguistic-ethnic consciousness which gradually gained momentum and matured through the arduous period of the 1950s and 60s, and successfully articulated the process of uneven development, disparity, in the present terminology, between the two wings of Pakistan in its favour. Thus the stage was set for the eventual showdown. This came first in the form of a mass movement in 1969, which brought down the Ayub regime, then came its culmination in the War of Liberation in 1972. (See Figure III for the location of intellectual groups on the question of autonomy, with Pakistan in the 1960s as the 'here and now').

**Mass Movement of 1969**

In 1968 Pakistan's 'economic miracle' began to peter out. Its economy had entered into a phase of crisis. The decade of Ayub Khan had brought Pakistan more closely into the fold of World Capitalist System. During 1947-60 the commitment of foreign economic assistance was 2058 million dollars. In the next ten years it shot up to 5582 million dollars. During 1947-70 pakistan had recieved 10 billion dollars as economic and military assistance (Muhith, 1978). These, however, put a great premium on the economy. As a result in 1968-69 the debt servicing amounted to 20 percent of Pakistan's export earnings.

The economy of East Bengal had become particularly vulnerable. Within the frame work of Pakistan the workers and peasants of East Bengal had undergone 'a double articulated structure of exploitation, built on class and imperial domination' (Nations, 1975). It suffered from a transfer of resources to West Pakistan which amounted to 3000 million dollars anually from 1947 to 1968-69 (Faaland and Parkinson, 1976). There was also a tendency towards a sharp polarization of classes with decline in real wages and per capita income of the peasants (Alamgir and Berlag, 1974). The aggregate result was 'a slow and sinister shift toward a survival economy' (Nations, 1975 : 281).

It is within this context that the spark of the student movement of West Pakistan touched East Bengal. On, 19th November 1968 students assembled at the Paltan Maidan (a political meeting ground at Dhaka) to support students of West Pakistan and

claim autonomy and restoration of democracy. Three days later 22 intellectuals gave a statement against the Ayub regime. Within a fortnight members of the bar association and journalists went into the streets on a protest march against the grvernment.

The start of the Mass Movement was triggered off by Maulana Bhasani on December 6 in a meeting jointly called by his National Awami Party, East Pakistan Krishak Samity, and East Pakistan Sramik Federation to protest against government repression. The movement took a new momentum when one liberal and two radical student organizations (Students' League affiliated with the Awami League, and two Student Unions) formed a student action committee and declared an eleven point programme on 4th January, 1969. The programme included the six-point programme of the Awami League and represented the interests of the peasantry and the working class. The eleven point programme sought to end or ameliorate economic disparity, political repression and class contradiction and thus became immensely popular.

The Killing of Asad, a redical student leader, by the police on 20th January. 1969 during a huge student demonstration created a tremendous impact upon the people of East Bengal. The blood-strained shirt of Asad became a symbol of mass protest. as the leading poet of the country put it : ʻThe shirt of Asad flutters on the wind in the blue skies, like the flaming clouds of sunset'. It was an historical conjecture in which students became the natural leaders of one of the greatest mass agitations of our times. On the

following day Dhaka saw the largest procession hitherto held it included litterateurs, artists, lawyers and other professional groups as well (Kamal. 1986). The country came to a stand still and in March the government of Ayub Khan fell.

The student and later mass movement of 1969 made Awami League and its student organization the Student League won the student union elections in all five universities in 1969-70 and in 132 colleges out of 142 (Maniruzzaman, 1980). Almost the entire middle class-lawyers, doctors, teachers and government servents supported the Awami League programme of full regional autonomy (Maniruzzaman, 1980 : 29). Sheikh Mujibur Rahman turned into a charismatic symbol of Bengali ethnic consciousness.

The mass movement, thus, brought in the forefront the demand for full autonomy. However, the young intellectuals affiliated with the radical political parties soon translated this into a demand for independence. This was voiced by Siraj Sikdar who argued that the main contradiction in Pakistan was between the ruling clique of West Pakistan and the colonially exploited people of East Bengal (Amin, 1986). In 1970 East Bengal Communist Party called for the independence of East Bengal through peoples democratic revolution. The idea of independence was also floated by another group of young radicals, mostly from upper middle class background, who organized themselves around the Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (Maniruzzaman, 1980):

Thus it is noted that the liberals and mostly older

radical intellectuals did not reject the idea of Pakistan, but dreamt of changes within its frame work. The young radical intellectuals, on the other hand became committed to complete revolution.

The conservative intellectuals, specially those oriented to Jamat-e-Islam party, were deadly opposed to the autonomy movement. These intellectuals came mainly from lower middle class background and were recently educated. They found an overarching psychological anchor in the great tradition of Islam (Sayeed, 1967 ; Maniruzzaman, 1980). Jamat began to circulate ten thousand books and pamphlets per month on Islam and Pakistan from 1968 (Maniruzzaman, 1980). They soon retreated to the mosques and used it for political communication (Umar, 1981).

The mass movement, thus, not only achieved the fall of Ayub government, it brought to triumph the autonomy movement and brought to maturity the linguistic-ethnic consciousness. It also lined up forces for and against independence of Bangladesh. Thus, uneven development within the fold of Pakistan bred contradictions which led the intellectuals to eventually reject the religo-ethnic consciousness and to articulate the new linguistic ethnic consciousness and to articulate the new linguistic ethnic consciousness as a solution to the prevailing crisis.

## War of Liberation

The power bloc in Pakistan was unwilling to compromise its dominance over East Bengal and sought to maintain its hegemony through violent means. In effect Bangladesh was born on 2nd March, 1971 when the

radical students of the Students' League and Students'
Union hoisted the flag of independent Bangladesh at a
gathering of the students in the Arts Faculty building
premises of Dhaka University. The whole civil adminis-
tration came under the defecto control of Awami League
and Students' League. In this period Tagore and Jiba-
nanda Das became poets of inspiration. The linguistic-
ethnic consciousness came to a full circle.

Jamat-e-Islam had received the second highest vote in
the election of 1970 (in which Awami League received the
full confidence of the Bengali Nation). However, it failed
to gain a seat. Thus its popularity, particularly in the
rural areas, cannot be discounted. During the War of
Liberation it masterminded many atrocities. The conser-
vative intellectuals, though opposed Bangaldesh, for the
most part remained subdued in the face of the realities
that were taking shape.

The intellectuals of Bangladesh faced the gravest of
crisis after the military crackdown of March, 1971.
Dhaka University was a key target of military operations.
A large number of students and some teachers were killed
in the initial operation. During the period of Liberation
War 21 university teachers, 968 educationists of colleges
and schools, 13 journalists, 68 physicians, 6 litterateurs
and artists and 5 engineers are known to have been killed
(Rahman, 1984). Towards the end of the war, Al-Badar
and Al-Shams, two pro-Pakistani groups that included
conservative intellecturls, blue-printed a scheme of large-
scale massacre of intellectuals and professionals. Many
of the listed above were killed in their operations.
In addition, a large number of intellectuals had to

take refuge in India. The major activities of the intellec-
tuals during this time was helping freedom fighters
inside the country and work for Bengladesh in India
and abroad. They also played a vital role of keeping
the war alive through a radio station founded for the
purpose. Thus, as the ethnic consciousness that the
liberals and radicals spearheaded began to bear fruit,
it took a great toll from amongst them as well.

### The Post Independent Phase

Bangladesh started its nationhood with a war-ravaged
economy, a bureauvcracy internally weakened by conflict
between those who collaborated with Pakistan and those
who supported Bangladesh, men with arms on whom
the government or the political parties had little
control and entrepreneurial and managerial vacuum.
The Bengali bourgeoisie, as Sobhan (1982) shows,
was barely a deacade old with little resources of its
own. The economy of the country was almost com-
pletely under the control of the West Pakistanis.
Their exodus created a sudden vacum. The government
had to resort to large-scale nationaliztion without
organizational capability, or skilled manpower. The
situation was worsened by the armed resistance by
the pro-Pakistani elements and some members of the
radical groups (Maniruzzaman, 1980). All these, in the
absence of a sound political leadership, led to wide
spread corruption, organization, atrophy and general
disillusionment. All of these came to a climax with
the famine in 1974.

To stave off the mounting economic crisis, the

government became increasingly dependent upon foreign
aid. During the ten years between 1971-72 and 1981-82
the country received foreign economic assistance of 8,702
million dollars. In 1971-72 it was only 357.312 million
dollars but in 1981-82 it reached 1236 million dollars.
Bangladesh became increasingly incorporated into
the World Capitalist system as a direct periphery.
One telling example of this is the fact that 80 percent
of the country's development budget is financed from
foreign economic assistance assistance (B.B.S., 1977,
1984 ; Siddiqui, 1985). The economic crisis deepened
during the first ten years of the country's existence. Its
emerging bourgeois class remained practically dependent
upon foreign aid for the windfall gains that it made
and remained trapped within the sphere of merchant
capital. Meanwhile the poverty of the masses increased
and the politics of the country turned into a 'legacy
of blood' (Mascarenhas, 1986)

Thus the intellectuals in Bangladesh soon faced
a closed horizon with only one exit route open-the
road to the World System. Bangladesh became a micro-
world without hope and it did not inspire commitment.
Therefore, migration became an obvious choice. After
the independence, pro-Pakistani intellectuals like Syed
Sajjad Hossain left the country. After the assassina-
tion of Mujibur Rahman, many liberal intellectuals
also left the country. A large number of students
who left for higher studies abroad did not return.
Many highly qualified professionals found jobs in foreign
countries and international bodies and left. In recent
years a major locus of exodus for the professionals

has been the Middle East. In 1977-78 alone eleven thousand professional, technical, and related skilled workers found jobs abroad (Sen, 1981).

Many, among the intellectuals who are still in the country, have been into developmental research associated with foreign aid, and small scale social engineering projects. These have proved to be immensely profitable in terms of personal economics. The local 'consultans' received fees equal to one percent of all aid received over the last fifteen years. Thus, it is not insignificant that one of the top radical intellectuals of the country, is one of the highest paid consultants in the country. Another equally radical intellectral, has opened up a 'world literary centre'.

An associated phenomenon is the transformation of a segment of the bureaucrats into technocrats. Dozens of bureaucrats have allocated themselves (they are in actual control of the process of allocating) researeh scholarships abroad and received higher education, (Masters and Ph D.S). This has been partly motivated by a desire to move to international organizations like the U. N.O. or the World Bank or to get local consultancy jobs. A very well known civil servant of the country left the service to run a consultancy firm.

The relatively low salary of the professional in government. semi-government or autonomous bodies has, on the other hand, greatly reduced their life style in an inflation prone economy. The psychological aspect of this deprivation has been further exacerbated by the instances of immigrant workers' windfall wealth. It has also substantially undercut the social valuation of education. This

factor together with the 'anarchy' that attended the post-
liberation period have undermined the institutional and
cultnral basis of education. A diploma is still valued but
not the education. The decline of the educational stan-
dard has induced the rich to send their children abroad
for schooling.

At the cultural level two contradictory trends-Wes-
ternization and Islamicization-have developed. Both
these processes have been actually reinforced after the
direct incorporation of Bangladesh into the World
System. The emergence of a relatively younger merchant
stratum connected with export import trade, currency
speculation, man-power business etc, the expansion of the
mass media and phenomenal increase in foreign travels
have contributed to the growth of a Western life style
and cultural tastes. The local multinational companies
and consumer oriented firms often sponsor Western
media programmes and cultural shows.

The reproduction of Islamic ideology in Bangladesh
lies in its mosques, madrasas and saints. There has been
a phenomenal increase in the number of mosques and
madrasas since the War of Liberation. After the fall of
Mujib government Islam received a boost up in Bangla-
desh. This resurgence of Islam can be traced to the im-
portance of the Middle East after 1973 as a power block,
and as a labour market; its economic assistance to Bangla-
desh through government and private channels; fear of
Indian domination and the ideological gap created by the
failure of nationalist (linguistic ethnic) ideology to deliver
the goods it promised.

The process of Islamicization has been carried for-

ward by a large number of recently founded organization, which are often funded by foreign assistance. Many of them are highly organized bodies. As Maniruzzaman (1983:216) notes a 'creative minority', drawn from the lower middle class are using sophisticated techniques of organization and ideological manipulation to bring about what they call, an Islamic revolution in Bangladesh. The government of ZiaurRahman encouraged Islamicization by incorporating it within the state ideology using it both as a resource for internal legitimacy and external influence in the muslim countries.

The process of Islamicization is also related to a underlying contradiction of the nationalist ideology of liberal secularism propounded by Awami League. The linguistic-ethnic consciousness logically demands the cohesion of a community based on language. But Bangladesh happens to be a partly linguistic community and cannot sustain its identity on linguistic consciousness alone. The ideology of 'Mujibism' was an effort to solve this contradiction, but failed along with Mujib. The crisis became acute after Mujib. During Ziaur Rahman's rule the title of citizenship was changed from Bangalee to Bangladeshi. It indicated an effort to establish the identity of the people of Bangladesh (separate from Bengalees in India) as simultaneously Bengalees and muslims, with consequent stress on religo-ethnic consciousness. Thus, the problem is back to square one.

It seems to be a significant factor in the faltering commitment of intellectuals in Bangladesh after 1971. As a senior economist of the country pointed out (Farouk, 1982), Bangladeshi elite lacks patrotism. It has grown

used to changing its political colour with the winds of
time as every major change involves redistribtion of
resources among the victors and victims.

This, perhaps, sums up the root of the crisis of the
intellectual in Bangladesh. The peripheral situation has
thrust him into a series of contradictions which in turn
tosses him from one crisis to another. His horizon has
been so limited by the process that each fresh solution
only leads him to a deeper crisis, without ever mastering
the necessary condition or even the understanding the
real crisis and recognising the real contradiction. There-
fore, his efforts only lead nim to the centrer of the web.
The symbolic reflection of the situation has been articula-
ted in a recent poem of Humayun Azad (1986).

### Ad. Bangladesh, 1986
Humayun Azad

Yes, you are the talented man we are looking for
If you have muscles only, not brain
If you have hammer alone and no poetry
If you have an axe only, and no music within you
If you have but a gun to fire, and no dance within you
If you have the hell alone, and no dreams within you
You are the talented man we are looking for
If you can walk to the Pub
Leaving a time-bomb under your father's bed
You will be appointed our chief executive
In charge of our society
Of our state
Of our civilization

                              (Translated by authors.)

Acceptance
Educated Muslim Elite
*

Educated  Muslim
Middle Class *
*
Ulema &     Literatteurs *
Religious &  Journalists
Functionaries                    Muslim* Shahitya Samaj
Past                                                 Future

―――――――――――――India, 1940s ―――――

Rejection

Figure I

Muslim Intellectuals on the Colonial Situation
in the  1940s

Acceptance

*

Muslim League
Literary Guild *

Conservative  Intellecials
*
*Raonak Ghosti

Past                                                           Future

Urdu, | 1950s

*
Liberal and Radical
Intellectuals
* Students

Rejection

Figure II

Location of Intellectuals on Language Issue

Acceptance

*
Muslim League                          Pro-China Radicals
                                              *

* Jamat-e-Islam
Pro-Islamic Parties                    Awami League Pro-Moscow
        *                              Radioals
                                          *        *              *
Past_____|_____Future
                    Pakistan | 1960s

                                       Bureaucrats

                                   *   Azad
                                              *

                                          Liberal Intellectuals
                                    * Journalists
                                    *Ittefaque Students' Union*
                                       *Students' League
                                         Young Radicals*

                    Rejection
                    Figure III
        Location of Intellectuals on Autonomy Issue

Bibliography

Ahmed, Sufia. 1974. *Muslim Community in Bengal : 1884-1912.* Dhaka : Oxford.

Ahmed, Wakil. 1983. *Unis Sataker Bangali Musalmaner Chinta-Chetonar Dhaka.* Vol.II, Dhaka : Bangla Academy.

Ahmed, Moudud. 1983. *Bangladesh : Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.* Dhaka : University Press.

Ahmed, Moudud. 1979. *Bangladesh : Constitutional Quest for Autonomy.* Dhaka : University Press.

Ahmed, Rafiuddin. 1981. *The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906 : A Quest for Identity* Delhi : Oxford.

Alam, Javeed. 1983. "Modes of Power : A Critique on Questions of Approach". *Journal of Social Studies,* No. 20. April.

Alamgir, Mohiuddin and Lodewijk J.J.B; Berlage. 1974. *Bangladesh : National Income and Expenditure.* Dhaka : BIDS.

Alatas, Syed Hussain. 1977. *Intellectuals in Developing Societies.* London : Frank Cass.

Amin, Nurul Md. 1984. *Marxist Politics in Bangladesh : A Case Study of the East Bengal Sarbahara Party.* M.Phil Dissertation. Dhaka University.

Azad, Humayun. 1986. 'Ad. Bangladesh, 1986' ( in Bengali ). *Biehltra* Eid Issue.

Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 1977. *Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh :* 1978. Dhaka Govt. of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh.

— *Statistical Pocket Book of Bangladesh.* 1958. Dhaka : Govt. of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh.

— *Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh.* 1978. Dhaka : Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.

Bangla Academy. 1983 *Bhasa Andoloner Itihas : Koekti Dolil.* Dhaka : Bangla Academy.

Bhuiya, M.A. Wadud. 1982. *Emergence of Bangladesh and the Role of Awami League.* Delhi : Vikas, Publishing House.

Broomfield, J.H. 1968. *Elite Conflict in a Plural Society :*

*Twentleth Century Bengal.* Berkeley, University of California Press.

Brym, Robert J. 1980. *Intellectuals and Politics.* London : George Allen & Unwin.

Chirot, Deniel. 1977. *Social Change in the Twentieth Century.* New York, Harcourt, Brace.

Cuneo, C and J. Curtis. 1974. "Quebec Separatism : An Analysis of Determinants within Social-Class Levels". *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology,* Vol. 11.

Faaland, Just and J.R. Paukinson. 1976. *Bangladesh : The Test Case of Development.* Dhaka : University Press.

Fanon, Frantz. 1974. (tran. Constance Farringtion) *The Wretched of the Earth.* Harmonds worth : Penguin.

Farouk' Abdullah. 1982. *Changes in the Economy of Bangladesh.* Dhaka : University Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1969. *The Religion of Java.* New York. The Free Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983 *Nations and Nationalism.* Oxford : Basil Blackwell.

Ghazi, Abidullah. 1972. Muslim Bengal : A Crisis of Identity in Barbara Thomas and Spencer Levan (eds.) *West Bengal and Bangladesh : Perspectives from 1972.* East Lansing : Michingan State University Press,

Gouldner, A.W. 1979. *The Future of the Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class.* New York : Macmillan.

Gramsci, A. 1982. *Selections From Prison Notebooks.* London : Lawrence and Wishart.

Guindon, H. 1964. "Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution". *Queen's Querterly,* Vol.71.

Gupta, Stantosh. 1974. *Muktijuddher Prachchad Pata : Sangbad Patrer Swadhhinata Sangram in Swadhin Bangla Sahitya Parisha-d Raktakata Bangla.* Dhaka : Muktadhara.

Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger ( eds. ) 1985. *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Hossain, Mosharaf 1979. "Nature of State Power in Bangladesh". *Journal of Social Studies,* No. 5. (October).

Hossain, Tofazzal. 1981. *Pakistani Rajnitir Beesh Bachhar.* Dhaka : Bangladesh Books International.

Huq, Khondkar Sirajul. 1984. *Muslim Sahitya : Samaj Chinta O Sahitya Karma.* Dhaka : Bangla Academy.

Huq, M. Shamsul et. al. 1983. *Higher Education and Employment in Bangladesh.* Dhaka : University Press.

Islam, M. Nurul. 1977. *Samajikpatre Jiban O Janamat.* Dhaka : Bangla Arademy.

Jahan, Rounaq. 1977. *Pakistan : Failure in National Integration.* Dhaka : Oxford University Press.

Kamal, Mesbah. 1986. Asad O Unasattarer Gana Abhuthan. Dhaka : *Bibertan.*

Karim, A.K.N. 1980. *The Dynamics of Bangladesh Society.* Delhi, Vikas.

Kaviraj, Narahari. 1982. *Wahabi and Farazi Rebels of Bengal.* New Delhi : Peoples' Publishing House.

Khatkhate, Deena R. 1972. "Intellectuals and the Indian Polity". *Asian Survey* XVII, 3.

Kumar, Dharma (ed). 1983. *The Cambridge Economic History of India.* Vol. 2. Cambridge : Camdridge University Press

Lipset, S.M. 1959. "American Intellectuals : Their Politics and Status". *Daedelus* Vol. 88 (Summer).

Lifschultz, Lawrence. 1979. *Bangladesh : Tne Unfinished Revolution.* London : Zed Press.

Maniruzzaman, Talukdar. 1983. Bangladesh Politics : Secular and Islamic Trends in Rafiuddin Ahmed ( ed ) *Islam in Bangladesh : Society, Culture and Politics.* Dhaka : Bangladesh Itihas Samiti.

Maniruzzaman, Talukdar. 1975. *Radical Politics* and *the Emergence of Bangladesh.* Dhaka : Bangladesh Books International.

Maniruzzaman, Talukdar. 1980. *The Bangladesh Revolation and its Aftermath.* Dhaka : Bangladesh Books International.

Mannheim, K. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia.* New York ; Harcourt, Brace.

Mannheim,  K.  1956. The Problem of Intelligentsia : An Inquiry
        into its Past and  Present  Role  in  E.  Mannheim and  P.
        Kesskemeti ( eds. ) *Essays on the  Sociology  of Culture:*
        London :  Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Marx,  K  and  F.  Engels.  1966.  *The German  Ideology.*  New
        York : International Publishers.

Mascarenhas,  Anthony. 1986.  *Bangladesh :  A Legacy  of Blood.*
        London :  Hodder  and  Stoughton.

Merton, R.K.  1962.  *Social  Theory  and Social Structure.*  New
        York :  The Free Press.

Mohsin,  K.M.  1983.  Trends of Islam  in  Bangladesh  in Rafi-
        uddin  Ahmed  (ed.)  *Islam  in Bangladesh :  Society, Culture
        and Politics.*  Dhaka :  Bangladesh Itihas Samity.

Muhit,  A.M.A.  1978.  *Bangladesh :  Emergence  of  a  Nation.*
        Dhaka :  Bangladesh Books International.

Musa Mansur.  1985.  "Ekushe :  A  Ritual  of  Language  and
        *Language Problems and Language Planning.* Vol. 9 No. 3.

Nations,  Richard.  1975,  The Economic Structure of Pakistan
        and  Bangladesh in  Robin Blackburn (ed.)  *Explosion in the
        Sub-continent.* Harmondsworth :  Penguin.

Parsons,  Talcott.  1969.  The Intellectual :  A Social  Role Cate-
        gory  in  Philip  Rief ( ed. )  *On  Intellectuals :  Theoretical
        Studies.*  New  York : Doubleday.

Poulantzas,  N.  1976.  *Class  in  Contemporary  Capitalism.*
        London,  New  Left  Books.

Pradhan,  Sudhi ( ed. ) 1985:  *Marxist Cultural  Movement  in
        India.*  Vol III.  Calcutta :  Pustak Bipani.

Quddus,  Ruhul.  1986.  Interview, *Meghna* ( 12 March ).

Rahman,  Sayeed-Ur.  1982.  "Kollolita Purba-Bangla".  *Dhaka
        Visva Vidyalaya  Patrica,*  Vol. XVI (December),

Rahman,  Hasan Hafizur  (ed.)  1982.  *Bangladesh  Swadhinata
        Juddha ;  Dolil (History of  Bangladesh War of Independence
        —e : Documents),* Vol. 1. Dhaka :  Govt. of the Peoples,
        Republic of Bangladesh.

        —1984, *Bangladesh  Swadhinata  Juddha :  Dolil,* Vol. 8

Dhaka : Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.

Rahmam Sayeed-Ur. 1983. *Purba Banglar Rajniti-Sanskriti O Kabita.* Dhaka ; Dhaka University.

Sayeed, Khaled Bin. 1967, *The Political System of Pakistan.* Boston : Houghton Mifflin,

Sadeque, A. 1956. *The Economic Emergence of Pakistan,* Part II. Dhaka: The Provincial Statistical Board.

Sen Binayak. 1981, "A Mode of Man Power Export and its Effect on Employment Situation (1931-85) : Some Reflections". *Journal of Social Studies No. 11* (January,

Shils, E. 1974 *Intellctuals and the Powers and Other Essays,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Siddiqui, Kamal. 1985. *Bangladesher Grameen Daridryer Swarupa O Samadhan.* Dhaka: Dana.

Smith W. Cantwell. 1963. The Ulama in Indian Politics in C.H. Philips (ed.) *Politics and Society in India.* London: Allen & Unwin,

Sobhan, Rahman. 1982. The Crisis of the Bourgeois Order and the Growth of Authoritarian Political Trends in Bangladesh in Gopal Krishna (ed.) *Contributians to South Asian Studies: 2.* Delhi: Oxford,

Sobhan, Rehman. 1912. The Crisis of External Dependence: Some Policy Options for Bangladesh. *Journal of Social Studies* No. 18 (October).

Umar, Badruddin. 1981. *Juddhapurba Bangladesh.* Dhaka Muktadhara.

Umar, Badruddin. 1985. *Purba-Bhnglar Bhasha Andolon O Tatkalin Rajniti* Vol. II, Chittagong: Bohi Ghar.