

When Confessional Parties Compromise Ideology: A Comparative Study of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India

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Abstract

According to inclusion-moderation theory, political parties' participation in the electoral process leads to the moderation of their initial ideological position. Studies on West European political parties — radical socialists and Christian confessional parties — that entered into political space with radical ideologies support this. Against this backdrop this article aims at testing inclusion-moderation theory in the context of South Asian Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). In order to do this we will modify moderation theory and examine JI's behavior since its founding. We will also try to figure out the specific mechanism for moderation. By studying the existing secondary literature on JI, it is found that state repression causes JI's moderation high moderation. On the other hand during democratic regimes where they faced no antagonistic forces, low moderation has been observed. We also find that moderation also takes place when JI operates in Muslim minority context. Our understanding of confessional parties would help us to put in proper institutional mechanisms that would contribute to taming the much-suspected anti-democratic forces. It will also help us to assess the political science debate regarding the (in)compatibility of Islamic tenets with democracy.

Keywords : Party, Ideology, Politics Jamaat-e-Islami, South Asia

Introduction

Political parties' moderation is their "movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives" (Schwedler 2006:3). Studies attest that political parties tune their ideologies with capitalism and democracy when they enter (or are allowed to enter) into political space. Robert Michels (1915/1962: 333-41) demonstrates this regarding European socialist parties and Kalyvas (1996) did the same for European Christian democratic parties. These parties' moderation was so profound that it is difficult to imagine for a common person that once they had the intention of altering the capitalist democratic system. Recent studies on the confessional political parties in Muslim majority societies, ranging from democratic regimes (e.g., Turkey) to autocratic ones (e.g., Yemen),

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show that as they enter into political space, moderation of varying degrees takes place. But scholars are divided into two camps. Some (Wickham 2004; Schwedler 2006; Sinno & Khanai 2009) argue that political openness of Muslim societies promotes parties' moderation, while some others (Trezcur 2009; Somer 2007) argue that moderation process is not deterministic and mere inclusion of political parties is not enough for moderation. From the literature, we also get the impression that moderation of Islamic parties is an exclusive phenomena of Muslim majority countries. Besides, moderation literature is also silent regarding what is the specific mechanism and what aspects of their ideology will change and what kind of costs are involved in moderation process. So, in this paper we will try (i) to figure out the process of moderation and the factors that contribute to high/low moderation, and (ii) if moderation takes place only in Muslim majority societies by studying JI, the major Islamic political party that operates in three separate countries of South Asia.

Jamaat (established in 1941) operates in South Asian countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Its ideological foundation was laid by the self-made scholar politician Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) in colonial India. And after the partition of Indian sub-continent JI's chapters were opened in three countries that operated independently. Observably, the current political positions of all JI chapters stand at stark contrast with its original ideological platform with which it started. The JI had the vision of replacing anything Western. Currently, they — Jamaat-e-Islam Pakistan (JIP) and Jamaat-e-Islam Bangladesh (JIB) and Jamaat e Islam Hind (JIH) — have accepted Western democratic system. Of these chapters, JIP and JIB have shown the tendency to go towards the center right position opposing secularism and socialism while JIH float political party has taken leftist position advocating secularism, democracy and socialist ideals.

Literature Review

If political parties participate in the political process, their policy and behavior, as a result, moderate over time. Przeworski and Sprague (1986) demonstrated that European socialist parties thoroughly revised their ideology and course of action. Kalyvas (1996) also did the same for European Christian democratic parties. Both socialists and Christian democrats had previously anti-system stance. In order to test whether now anti-system Islamic political parties will undergo moderation, a group of political scientists (Wickham 2004; Schwedler 2006; Sinno & Khanai 2009) applied this theory in Muslim majority states and found that Islamist parties also undergo moderation if they enter into public political space, though the degree and rate of moderation varies greatly. Some skeptics question the authenticity of Islamic parties' moderation and accuse them of using the democratic process to change into an undemocratic (Islamic) one. Sinno and Khanani (2009: 32) refute their claim arguing that if these confessional political parties participate in electoral politics and succeed in winning public mandate it is unlikely that they would abrogate democratic regimes. They will not do so because by abrogating the democratic regime that brings it to power, the party will a) risk losing part of its democratic support, b) forsake the moral high ground and the ability to claim that it represents popular preferences, and c) subject itself to possible international sanctions and isolation. After studying of confessional and socialist parties' original ideological claims and their subsequent political decisions/actions in the real political space (Kalyvas 2003: 297) and Sinno and Khanani (2009: 47) find that ideology is a flawed predictor of their political

actions. In political space, we always find mismatch between what confessional parties preach/claim and what they do/behavior. Moderation theory fills the apparent gap between their ideology and actual behavior. Confessional political parties' moderation is explained by two variables (Kalyvas 2003, 2010): a) structure of opportunities afforded by the existing political system; and b) structure of electoral constraints. Let us elaborate these points.

Structure of political opportunities are "consistent — but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national — signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements" (Tarrow 1996:54). According to Koopmans (2004:63), variations in opportunity are the most important determinant of variations in collective action; relevant variations in opportunity results primarily from the interaction of social movements with political actors and institutions; and variations in opportunities are not random or a mere product of strategic interaction; but are to an important extent structurally shaped.

Opportunities are "options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilizing group.... People choose those options for collective action that are available and are expected to result in favorable outcome." (Koopmans 2004: 65). Generally, political actors encounter four different kinds of political opportunity (Tarrow 1996: 54-61): a) the opening up of political access (is the core element of opportunity), b) unstable alignment of political elites and this is manifested by divisions within the elite c) the availability of influential elite as allies and d) diminishing state repression. Our understanding of political opportunity is further refined by Gamson and Meyer (1996) who points to subjective aspect of political opportunity: 'opportunities must be perceived in order to be achieved' and that is why an 'opportunity not recognized is not an opportunity at all'. This observation helps us analyzing actual decisions of political parties as rational actors seeking to operate in competitive political space. Evidently, if a party perceives that its entry into the political space and subsequent moderation will bring benefits, it will go for moderation. Likewise, if it perceives radicalization with sanctions from the environment, then too, it will moderate. Parties participating in electoral process moderate further by "structure of electoral constraint". If it is able to win majority then its moderation will be dependent on the presence or absence of non-electoral agency (for example- military); and if it is unable to win majority independently and must need the help of other parties in order to win, then the major partner of the coalition will be in the driving seat and will be in a position to cause moderation of its junior partner, the confessional party in question. Sinno and Khanani (2009) add that if the parties are organizationally strong and are confident of reaping expected benefits that political systems would offer through elections, they would participate in electoral process.

Studies of Wickham (2004), Schwedler (2006), Sinno & Khanani (2009) and Gurses (2014) have shown us that inclusion results in the moderation of confessional organizations not only in democracies, but also in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. Wickham (2004) demonstrates that inclusion (or prospect of inclusion) and political learning of parties [Wasat Party of Egypt] contribute to moderation. Schwedler (2006) studied political parties of Jordan and Yemen. In analyzing moderation she wants to put equal emphasis both on ideological and behavioral change of parties instead of focusing exclusively on actual political behavior. But if we want to concern ourselves with ideological issues of confessional parties, we may risk being stuck with their canonical issues, which are not valid predictors of parties' political decisions. So her proposition is party problematic.


Besides, in comparing changes in the ideologies of political parties/organizations, we may find that they become open in some aspects and may regress in some other equally important aspects and the net result of change is zero.

Some scholars (Somer 2007, Tezcur 2009) contend that mere inclusion causes moderation. Somer demonstrates that moderation of Turkish party AKP is not the result of mere participation of inclusion in democratic process, rather it was a complex mixture of opportunity structure of 'guided democracy'. He stipulates the presence of countervailing actors in moderation. Tezcur argues that "process of moderation is not deterministic" as he has demonstrated that moderation takes place in diverse contexts as in Islamist Iran and secularist Turkey.

Finally, we look into the cost of moderation. Wickham (2004) has shown that Wasat Party had to pay the high cost for moderation as it had been accused of betraying Islam by embracing the institutions of the West. With a detailed discussion of moderation process in authoritarian regime of Mubarak, he concludes that "it is not at all clear that the strategic benefit of ideological moderation outweighed its costs". Tomsa (2012) pointed out that Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party suffered "internal division, and compromised the party's credibility among its original constituents while failing to convince potential new supporters". Political parties are obviously interest maximizing actors. So, they must have the tendency to avert whatever they encounter as 'cost'. But the literature does not provide us any clue of how this cost have an effect on moderation process. If benefit of ideological moderation does not outweigh its cost why a interest maximizing political actor would moderate? Wickham's conclusion pushes us against other studies that assert 'political parties are reluctant to alter their ideologies" (Budge 1994).

Existing inclusion-moderation literature provides us valuable insights regarding moderation of confessional (Islamic) political parties. But their moderation seems to be a majority-only phenomenon. So, in order to have better understanding of specific mechanism for moderation we would like to put things in the following way.

Figure : Mechanism for moderation



Moderate moderation means the acceptance of nationalism and electoral democracy. High moderation means acceptance of liberal ideas e.g., female leadership, secularism, minority rights etc.

Moderation is high in both majority and minority contexts when parties facing openness suddenly face repression. And immediately after the lift of banning, high moderation decisions are taken.

Case Selection and Methodology

Anyone seeking to examine if moderation takes place under democratic regimes where confessional parties face political openness or under repression where they are barred from operating in the political space, needs to place these actors under both democratic and repressive regimes. That is, if we want to understand if political openness/repression produces high/low moderation then, we need to find out such political systems that had both been open as well as repressive towards Islamic political parties. For this purpose, South Asia is an appropriate example: in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh Jamaat faced openness — during most of its lifetime; it also underwent repression during Ayub regime in Pakistan (1958-1964), Indira regime in India (1975-1977) and Mujib regime in Bangladesh (1971-1975). Secondly, if we want to test if Islamist Party's moderation is an exclusive phenomena of Muslim majority states, then we need to measure moderation of an Islamic political party that operate in Muslim minority context. JIH — struggling to win hearts and minds of millions of Indian Muslims — offers us that opportunity.

Question may also arise as to why JI is being studied? JI is an Islamic political movement in the Muslim world that is based on an ideology that can be successfully used to counter Western dominance in Muslim countries (Ahmed 1994: 462; Iqtida 2014: 2; Nasr 1996: xiv); a vanguard that inspires Muslims around the world for their cherished socio-political order (Jackson 2011:2). JI formally started in 1941 in a colonial India to protect and promote causes of suffering of Muslims who had been shivering from severe nationalist fever. After India's partition JI's ideologue cum leader Maududi moved to Pakistan in 1947 although he was opposed to its creation on Islamic grounds. In subsequent years, it formed chapters in India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. JI is the most dominant Islamist platform in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In India, it has recently floated a political party named Welfare Party of India (WPI). JIP tries to mobilize the Muslim identity of for 95% people of Pakistan (out of 190 million), while JIB caters for 90.4% Muslims (out of 148 million) in Bangladesh while JIH struggles for winning the hearts and minds of 172 million Indian Muslims (about 14% of total Indian population).¹ Studying all three chapters of JI will help us understanding if (i) inclusion-moderation theory applies to heterogeneous contexts (both in Muslim majority and minority contexts). It will also help us to figure out the specific mechanism for moderation of confessional parties.

This study relies on the publications of Maududi and JI and the studies that have gained reputation in the academia. From Maududi's write-ups and other JI documents we tried to figure

1. According to 2011 census report.

out 'what JI intended to achieve at the time of its founding', which we call 'the original position of JI'. Next, we consulted other published studies on JI in order to figure out its actual behavior as it entered into political field. Then we compare to what extent did JI shift from its 'ideological platform'. We also try to figure in what specific contexts did JI deviate from its avowed position.

Historical Background of Jamaat e Islam

As the colonial rule in Indian subcontinent matured, so did the level of discontent among the native population. By the late 19th century (1885), the first political party Indian National Congress was formed for promoting Indian interest. Partly because of the divide and rule of the colonial rulers and partly because of the discontent of Indian Muslims regarding Congress' failure in voicing Muslim demands, All India Muslim League was formed (1906) to advance Muslim interests. By the third and fourth decade of 20th century, both the parties were determined to oust colonial rulers from India, though they differed in terms of the ways and means of achieving it. Both the parties were Western in their outlook and nationalistic in their positions and were intent on molding the future of Indian subcontinent according to Western values. Some section of Muslims were disgruntled with this prospect as they viewed the Western civilization as the sources of all evils prevailing in Indian sub-continent. To them, Islam was not only the alternative to the evils, but the panacea. According to this view, Muslim League was hypocritical in their effort to mobilize Indian Muslims because instead of being true Muslims and offering Islamic solutions to all problems, it was blindly accepting Western solutions, which would not cure the problems. With a view to solving the problems Indian Muslims in particular and global Muslims in general, Abul Ala Maududi grouped together with like minded people and set up JI in 1941.

Jamaat e Islami as an Ideology and Organization: The Original Position

As stated earlier, Maududi and JI had conviction that Islam was the panacea. And that required engaging in *jihad*. It is necessary for three reasons. First, to change Muslims' outlook by initiating a mental revolution among them through speech or writing; secondly, to deliver good and thirdly, to alter the old anti-Islamic system into an Islamic one. In order to achieve this goal, he says, JI needs capturing state power through revolution as "is left with no other choice except to capture State Authority, for an evil system takes root and flourishes under the patronage of an evil government and a pious cultural order can never be established until the authority of Government is wrested from the wicked and transferred into the hands of the reformers" (Maududi, p.19). To put simply, Maududi was intent upon establishing an Islamic state. He defined it as '*hukumat e ilaihia*' or rule of Allah over earth that will "destroy all states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam" because a Muslim cannot observe the Islamic pattern of life under non-Islamic system of government.² Maududi's Islamic state was essentially anti-democratic and anti-secular (Ahmad 2009:219), anti-capitalist, anti-socialist and anti-nationalist (Bahadur 2008:251), anti-women leadership (Ahmad 2008: 549), and anti-religious minority

2. Maududi, pp. 19-20.

(Jackson 2011: 121). We call this the ‘original position’. In the next sections we would look at the actual practices of JI in three different countries — Pakistan, Bangladesh and India — in the subsequent years and compare its policies with its original position.

Shift from Original Position in Pakistan

When Pakistan was about to be created by dividing Indian subcontinent, in accordance with Muslim League’s demand in 1947, JI opposed it arguing that Islam does not support nationalism. With India’s partition, Maududi preferred taking the citizenship of Pakistan along with the majority members of JI. In the initial days, Mawdudi intended to educate the population in their religious obligations and convince them of the hollowness of the Muslim League’s agenda. JI leadership expected that they would dominate Pakistan politics once the people who were driven by Islamic values to create a country would also subscribe to their politics. As a result, the JI showed its anti-state and radical zeal during the first few years of Pakistan’s independence. In the new state JI discovered that its primary task of mobilizing Islamic identity was accomplished. As it was intent on promoting the same, JI found that entire political space was open for it (Nasr 1996: 116). JI, so, it concentrated on strengthening itself organizationally and then influencing the policy agenda, i.e., constitution making with which Pakistani elites had been struggling. By 1951, it could discipline itself as a cadre based organization and was successful in recruiting 659 full-time members and around 3000 activists³. Though it was originally opposed to any participation in the Western system of government, it could not resist itself from participating in 1951 provincial elections.

At that specific point, JI could choose from a number of options: a) to continue its anti-system position as it was doing and to call upon common people to embrace its ideological platform; b) to go for armed revolution as some leftist groups did in India and risk state repression; c) stay aloof from politics like *Tabligh Jamaat*, a confessional movement that sprang from North India during anti-colonial movement; and d) to enter into political space by accepting rules of the game and avail the opportunity to grab some political office and utilize those. As Muslim League was the only organized political party, JI leadership thought that if it could demonstrate the emptiness of former’s Islamic claim, people would accept them as the only viable opposition. Choosing any of first three options did not require JI to compromise its ideology, but the last one did. But it also entailed a number of opportunities: freedom to put forward some alternative political agenda and get feedback/face alternative views etc. JI chose to compromise its ideology and contest in the elections, in which JIP did not get any single win. It had to pay the price of participation in the elections. In election campaigns ‘pious’ members could not maintain their moral standards. A good number of top JI leaders suggested that it withdraws from politics. But Maududi suppressed their view and consequently a group of founding-members resigned from JI. In this regard, Nasr comments, “politicization both tamed the Jama’at and confirmed the primacy of politics in its agenda” (Nasr 1996: 43, 79).

Clearly, political opportunity structure of Pakistan could allure JI into electoral politics forcing it to sacrifice its original revolutionary zeal. Earlier Mawdudi’s held the views that

3. Encyclopedia of Islam & the Muslim World (2004), Richard C. Martin, Granite Hill Publishers, p.371

Islamic state could be produced only when particular religious, social and political factors come together, at the right time under the right circumstances. But in the face of new opportunity structure in the 1950s, he outlined new policies for Jama'at's by putting the last nail into the coffin of revolution and declared that "...transforming the political system can be done only through constitutional means: elections; ... transformation of the political order through unconstitutional means is forbidden by the shairah (Nasr 1996:73).

During first six years of Ayub regime JIP was banned. Its second decisive shift occurred in 1965 Presidential elections. In the pre-election period, JI joined the bandwagon of 'combined opposition party' (COP) which had been opposing Ayub's authoritarian rule and demanding democratic restoration. In that election COP nominated Ms Fatima Jinnah, sister of Pakistan's Father of the Nation Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as the President candidate of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Notably, Maududi in his book '*Purdah*' (Veil) clearly stated that women cannot lead Islamic community. Now, JI revised their earlier position regarding female leadership and supported women candidature on the pretext of extra-ordinary circumstances. JI's anti-Ayub stand in the election was countered by a *fatwa* (religious verdict) from orthodox religious clerics that women leadership is forbidden in Islam and JI was betraying Islam for political purpose. We observe that immediately after the withdrawal of ban, JI took a decisive step in the history of Muslim countries by supporting a Muslim woman as the leader of the country by compromising its ideological position. This compromise in election offered JI numbers of opportunities: first, to gain the recognition of all other political parties as an worthy member and the opportunity to reiterate its democratic stance; secondly, if opposition candidate were come out winner, JI could have established legitimate demand for furthering their agenda for Islamization of the polity. JI availed the opportunity unhesitantly.

In 1970, Pakistan's first ever general elections was held. JIP participated in it enthusiastically. It bagged almost 10 percent popular votes, which is highest in its history. Following 1988 parliamentary elections, JIP opposed Benazir Bhuttu as a national leader on the pretext that she was female and female leadership is prohibited in Islam (Haqqani 2005). From this it becomes clear that JIP's primary concern was politics, not ideological purity or morality. As **Table 1** shows JIP had been in regular electoral politics since 1970. In subsequent elections, JIP had been trying to maximize gain by making electoral coalitions with other political parties. It formed alliance with ultra-right parties in 1977 and 1988 elections, with moderate right in 1993 elections and even center right party of Nawaz Sharif former Prime Minister in 1990. In 2013 national elections JI formed alliance with the center right *Teherik e Insaaf*, cricket icon Imran Khan' party that champions minority rights (especially religious minority) in Pakistan.

During its early years, JIP had been opposing nationalist ideals. Interestingly, its position about Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir is essentially nationalistic. It had active role in the mobilization of separatist groups in Jammu and Kashmir (Puri 2012:102-5). Besides, its position of maintaining territorial integrity of Pakistan at any cost in 1971 also reflects its ultra-nationalistic xenophobic position disguised in Islamic rhetoric. JIP's politics now is nationalistic politics, which is a complete U-turn from its original position. JI, now, is also

vocal about the national integration of Pakistan as USA is continuously attacking the terrorists using Pakistan territory without Pakistan's consent, though it contradicts JI's policy about US friendship during 1980s (Haqqani 2005). All these are signs of its moderation.

So, two phases in JIP's politics is observed. The first phase lasted till 1951, when it concentrated on organization building. After it had become confident about its organizational strength, it started calculating the strategic gain from entering into electoral politics. Being convinced, they opted for electoral politics despite some setbacks like dissension and criticism. In the second phase, JIP's behavior was aimed at maximizing its electoral success. The objective of gaining electoral/strategic advantage got priority instead of ideological Puritanism.

Table 1: JIP in Pakistan Politics

Election Year	Brief Context	Number of Seats	Percent age of Votes	Opportunity and Position Shift
1951	First provincial level election in Pakistan.	0		Goes against its previous anti-democratic position
1970	First ever parliamentary election in Pakistan based on universal franchise, organized by military regime.	2	3	Spearheading major campaign against the atheistic socialists and secularists. ⁴
1977	JIP contested election with four ultra-rightist political party forming Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and opposing ZA Butt's socialist position.	36	-	
1988	Formed alliance, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) with nine right-wing political parties and promised further Islamization of Pakistani polity by collaborating military regime of Zia.	54	-	Campaigned against Benazir Bhutto as a female leader. ⁵
1990	As a junior partner JIP formed alliance with dominant PML (Newaz) and took part in the government.	106		
1993	JIP now formed a new political alliance with other right wing political parties where JIP was chief of the parties. Pakistan Islami Front (PIF). PIF projected itself as the alternative to major political parties and performed very poorly.	3	3.2	JIP leader publicly made statement not to make any statement against female prime minister as she was the choice of the people.
1997	Boycotted the elections	-	-	
2002	Formed alliance with six political parties and had the blessings of the military ruler.	63	11.3	
2008	Along with other political parties JIP boycotted the elections.	-	-	
2013	Collaborated with center right TI, led by cricket hero Imran Khan, in pre and post election campaign.	4	2.12	TI's position was to protect the minority communities.

(Compiled by the author, 2016)

4. On the eve of 1970 general elections, the JI had been spearheading major "campaign for the protection of ideology of Pakistan" which it believed was under threat from atheistic socialists and secularists". in Haqqani (2005), Pakistan, p.46

5. Haqqani 2005, Chapter-6

JIP officially had been supporting accepted Western system of governance and nationalistic politics in Pakistan; and unofficially it abandoned anti-female national leadership propaganda and recently took up pro-minority policies. All these policies were unimaginable to a JI supporter back in the 1940s.

Table 2: JIP over time

1971-1975	1976-1983	1986	1991	1996	2001-
Suffered ban. Was active through organizing <i>milad</i> & <i>sirat mahfils</i> .	Cooption with military regimes. Participated elections in 1979. Split for moral lapses.	Cooption with junta. Contested elections alone and gained limited electoral success.	Participated in election alone with moderate success.	Participated election alone and suffered much electorally.	From 2001 onwards JIB participated in all parliamentary elections in coalition, which still survives.

(Compiled by the author, 2016)

Jamaat-e-Islam in Bangladesh

Government of Bangladesh banned the operations of Jamaat on charges of war crimes and for opposing Bangladesh's liberation war in 1971. JIB started its official operation after the demise of Mujib regime in August 1975. With Mujib's assassination, his policy of secularism was also altered. Subsequent military rulers used to use dominant religion Islam in order to overcome their legitimacy crisis. Consequently, previously banned JIB found opportunity for resuming its operations. At this cross-road JIB had a number of options: a) to continue its operations in the form of religious rituals and congregations as it was doing from 1971-1975 (and JIH's policy at that moment), b) to enter into political sphere and being co-opted by the military regime, c) to enter into politics and opposing the military regime, d) to go for revolutionary activism as envisioned by the original ideology (that involved risks as the then leftist political parties were undergoing in Bangladesh). Given the organizational strength and its opportunity for Islamic agenda setting, JIB chose to engage in formal politics when Zia regime passed Political Party Regulation (PPR). Bangladesh scenario attests, as the theory predicts, that openness creates such political opportunity structure that confessional parties cannot stay away from politics. In 1979 elections, JIB bagged 20 seats and 10 percent votes with two other Islamic political parties. After its political rebirth through 1979 elections, JIB suffered an internal setback. Bickering emerged regarding questions of Shariah, morality, party constitution. Besides, controversies grew centering the crisis in its students' front and their support of Iranian revolution or Middle Eastern monarchies with JIB leadership. Failing to reconcile, top JIB leader Maulana Abdul Jabbar left the party and its students' front also underwent a split. The cause was not new: "failing to maintain high moral standard" and "losing its ideological unity and strength" (Kabir 2006:71). Their apparent electoral success was followed by a split. It participated in 1986 general elections and won 10 seats and 4.6 percent popular votes. In 1991, JI won 18 seats with 12.1 percent popular votes. In 1996, it won only three seats with 8.1 percent votes. From the election results (as Table 3 depicts) JIB leadership gained understanding of their electoral support and their inability to win majority independently. So, in all the subsequent elections, they participated in coalitions with like minded political parties.

Table 3: JIB in Bangladesh Politics

Electi on Year	Brief Context/Alliance	Number of Seats	Percent age of Vote (Cast)	Positional Shift
1973	JIB was banned for its opposition in the country's war of independence	-	-	Barrier to entry through banning.
1979	JIB cooperated with 1st military regime and Formed alliance with once dominant right wing party Muslim League: Islamic Democratic League.	20	10.1	Opening of the political space, followed by cooption by the regime.
1986	Jamaat tried to promote its agenda by cooperating with 2nd military regime and participated in the elections.	10	4.6	Cooption by the regime.
1988	Termed the regime autocratic and boycotted elections with all major political parties	-	-	Change of strategy and joined the opposition bandwagon.
1991	JIB got the highest number of seats in the country's first ever free and fair general elections and helped center-right BNP to form government without forming coalition.	18	12.1	Supported BNP for making a female head of government.
1996 (Feb)	JIB collaborated with center-left Awami League and launched combined movement against the government. Also boycotted the election.	-	-	Jamaat launched combined pre-election campaign against the right-wing government in the very government it once supported.
1996 (June)	JIB contested independently and performed poorly.	3	8.6	Jamaat made experiment about its strength.
2001	JIB formed electoral alliance with three other like minded political party led by center-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).	17	4.28	Jamaat formed electoral alliance with center-right party and it is stable until this moment.
2008	Contested elections under BNP-led alliance and performed poorly.	2	4.2	
2014	Boycotted elections with BNP-led alliance.	-	-	

(Compiled by the Author, 2016)

In Bangladesh, JIB never questioned the legitimacy of women leadership in politics. During its ban (1972-1975), it focused on internal mobilization by organizing religious and faith based activities like *waz* and *doa mahfil* (Kabir 2006:34). When it entered into electoral politics, it never showed its prejudice against forming political coalition with any political party. It launched joint movement with center-left Awami League against BNP government during 1992-1996. JIB's prime ally in Bangladesh politics is Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which is a center right political party. It considers leftist ideology and political parties its chief enemy (Islam 2015: 121). Currently, it has alliance with BNP and two other Islamic parties, which differ with JIB regarding the correct interpretation of Islamic faith. JIB is most vocal about some of the nationalist issues: protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. It is interesting to note that after JIB's entry into electoral politics, it always sided with nationalist issues, i.e., sovereignty and territorial integrity, expressed commitment for democratic procedure and never officially raised question regarding women leadership. It is showing its nationalist position by taking anti-Indian policy and emphasizing territorial integrity.⁶ Besides, after coming to power, JIB also started celebrating national days by paying tribute to national monuments, which it previously considered idolatrous practice. These shifts are clear signs of moderate moderation.

6. JIB's position on CHT and Transit issues in its 2008 election manifesto clearly demonstrates this.

Table 4: JIB's transformation at a glance

1971-1975	1976-1983	1986	1991	1996	2001-
Suffered ban. Was active through organizing <i>milad</i> & <i>strat mahfils</i> .	Cooption with military regimes. Participated elections in 1979. Split for moral lapses.	Cooption with junta. Contested elections alone and gained limited electoral success.	Participated in election alone with moderate success.	Participated election alone and suffered much electorally.	From 2001 onwards JIB participated in all parliamentary elections in coalition, which still survives.

(Compiled by the author, 2016)

Jamaat-e-Islami in India

After its establishment in 1948, JIH spent its first twelve years by clinging to Maududi's original position and by staying away from politics/political system. It opposed secular democratic system of India as it was 'anti-Islamic' and called upon Indian Muslims to refrain from participating in that system in any form, be it though educational institutions, judicial or tax system etc. Due to JIH policy, its members did not take part in national or local elections. Disregarding the suggestions of JIH, common Muslims had been enthusiastically participating in elections from the very beginning (Krishna 1967). Being alarmed by the public apathy to its policy JIH felt the necessity of revising its policy.

The second stage starts in 1961 when it sent questionnaire to reputed *ulema* and Islamic institutions asking if *Sharia* permits participation in elections. Following their response, in 1967 it passed resolution allowing its members to vote in elections, but only for Muslim candidates under some stringent conditions. From 1961 to 1985, it gradually shifted from no participation to full participation. In 1985, JIH passed a resolution permitting its members to contest in elections. JIH's shift from limited participation in 1964 to full participation in 1985 demands special attention. This period can be characterized by failure of Indira and Rajiv regimes to promote secularism and minority rights and concomitant rise of Hindu nationalism (Adeney 2010: 133, Lall 2005: 156; Varshney 1993). In the face of adversity, JIH revised its polity of staying aloof from electoral politics and take clear stand for their own protection under the shield of secularism. As early as 1970s, it termed Indian constitution neither Islamic, or un-Islamic and termed India the '*dar ud dawa*' or the land of propagation. This change occurred as JIH was banned on charge of spreading communalism during Indira's emergency rule. JIH became fervent advocates of secularism as Muslims were perceiving threats from the Hindu rightist political forces. For example, when a number of Indian states passed legislation against cow slaughtering after the anti-cow-killing movement launched by *Vinoba Bhave*, JIH mouthpiece ran an editorial with the headline 'Vinoba Bhave won, secularism lost'. In the 1980s, when Indian polity started to be increasingly dominated by Hindutya, JIH was gradually becoming more secular. In 1992, when Babri Mosque was demolished, JIH formed Forum for Democracy and Communal Amity to defend secularism.

Table 5: JIH's transformation at a glance

1941	1948	1961	1970	1985	2002	2011
Maududi formed JI in undivided India	JIH was officially formed with anti democratic and anti secular position.	Start reviewing its policy of abstaining from elections.	Accepting that democracy and secularism are not anti-Islamic	Permission to contest in elections	Defending secularism from attacks of non-secular quarters.	From a Political Party with Secular objectives. ⁷

(Compiled by the author, 2016)

In its third phase, JIH started taking position regarding Indian domestic and foreign policy along with taking active part in electoral politics. In 1996 parliamentary elections, it "gave a call to Muslims to support secular and un-fascist parties [anti-BJP forces] in the coming general election"⁸. In 2002 elections in Uttar Pradesh, JIH fervently campaigned to save secularism from 'fascist' BJP attack. At that time a *shura* (top consultation body) member wrote in JIH's mouthpiece FALAH that 'secularism is a divine boon'.⁹ By 2002, JIH has been changed completely and accepted 'secularism' as one of its fundamental principles. Most importantly, it has altogether dropped its cherished ideal of establishing Islamic state in India by bringing in an amendment to its constitution.¹⁰ Recently launched JIH's political front WPI has announced its goal of forming alliance with the secular and left leaning political parties. In the last parliamentary elections (2014) it supported Aam Admi Party (AAP). Though JIH was late in entering into electoral politics, it is trying to find a match in multi-party settings of state-level elections in India and optimize its interests.

JIH found post-independent Indian political system open for it. In those days it decided to strengthen itself by focusing on self and community development. After a prolonged period of extensive reviews of its position in the face of changed circumstances, it ultimately decided to enter into political space with a new platform WPI, which is a moderated JIH. So, JIH has taken a U-turn from its original position that stipulated that every Muslim has the obligation to strive for establishing an Islamic state. Besides, it has also dropped anti-secular and anti-democratic stand and actively seeking to form alliance with the left leaning political parties.¹¹ Maidul Islam assess the role of JIH "as an anti-hegemonic politics, where the politics of resistance and negotiations with the power bloc for some alternative policies are present, but a politics of social transformation in the form of their cherished vision of an Islamic state is absent".¹² Here, the moderation is high.

Two stage of moderation has been observed. From 1948 to 1975, we see that JIH is moving slowly towards moderation in the open political space. It was reluctantly permitting its

7. "WPI insisted it was a secular party upholding the principles of justice, freedom and equality and seeking empowerment of the weak, oppressed and marginalized section" in ; Janmat Launches Party: Christian Priest is Vice President in Indian Express, 19 April, 2011.

8. India Today, 15th April, 1996.

9. Irfan Ahmad, *Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-w-Islami*. Princeton University Press, 2009

10. The Constitution of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, (English version) as Amended up to April 2007 (New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 2009)

11. "The WPI "will try to forge an alliance with secular and like minded parties in order to expand its political horizon," in The Milli Gazettee (Indian Muslims' Leading Newspaper), 4 April, 2011.


12. Maidul Islam (2015), p. 121.

members and supporters to exercise their franchise. Immediately after its two-year long ban JIH had faced the crisis of dissension when Chief of Maharashtra Shams Pirzada resigned to form political party. This hastened the decision of full participation in election. Again, the rise of Hindutva and BJP contributed to the decision of fullest participation in electoral process and shifting towards the left of the political spectrum (Ahmad 2009:229). So, it is observed that when political space is open JIH chose to engage in long term social movement and underwent slow and reluctant moderation. But JIH's moderation was quick and high in the presence of counterbalancing factor (BJP and Hindutva) and state repression.

Comparative Discussion

From Jamaat's journey it is clear that all its chapters underwent moderation both in majority and minority contexts. The degrees of moderation, however, varied depending on the contexts. In Muslim majority societies opportunity structure was conspicuous, which made JIP and JIB to immediately avail the incentives that respective political systems would offer. In contrast, JIH had to operate in an uncertain political condition, where Muslims had to face some negative attitude as they were often blamed for severing Mother India. There JIH took almost four decades to slowly review their position and eventually underwent moderation. We observe two distinct phases in JI's trajectory. During first phase, it consolidated internally, gained strength and manufactured the logic of participation in the political process. Religious education, missionary tasks and community service are the tasks on which the organization focused during this period. JI, in this phase, could hardly be differentiated from other non-political missionary organizations of South Asia like *Tablighi Jamaat* and *Ramkrishna Mission* etc. that also have ideological foundation based on religious texts. JIP took entire 1940s to prepare organizationally. On the other hand, JIH took much longer to decide about its participation in the political process. From 1948 to mid-1960s, JIH was 'intentionally excluded' from the secular-democratic political system. After much internal and external debate JIH has revised its ideological position a number of times and now it is about to enter into electoral politics with WPI banner.

Chart: High and Moderate Moderation in Minority and Majority context



In the second stage, JI concentrated solely on electoral success. In Pakistan JIP formed coalition with ultra right parties during the 1970s, moderately right parties and center right parties in 1980s and it has formed coalition with a center right party.

An analysis of JIP's policy reveals that due to JIP's non-cooperation with autocratic Ayub regime, it heavily suffered. During the subsequent military regimes of Yahya Khan and Zia ul Huq JIP collaborated with the regimes to 'influence policies of Islamization'. Under the Musharraf regime, it joined again with the opposition parties and boycotted the general elections. So, we observe a clear shift of JIP's electoral preference since 1970s. JIB has electoral coalition with major political party BNP which has center right position. Previously, it had pre-election arrangement with center left Awami League. In order to overcome existential crisis in post-1971 period, it cooperated with military regimes of Zia and Ershad. When 'crisis' was over, it joined the bandwagon of opposition political parties and participated in the movement against autocratic regime in the 1980s. So, JIB has been consistently trying to optimize its electoral success by every possible means. In India, JIH has recently launched the party that has declared its intention to forge coalition with like minded political forces.

From **Table 1 and 3** it is clear that JI had never been close to win the status of single majority party. JI's consistent change of coalition may be seen as its concern for interest maximization in a given electoral settings. So, it is clear that once JI had become confident of its organizational strength, it calculated the advantages of participation and entered into electoral politics. And in electoral politics, JI had been consistent in maximizing its electoral advantage, as Kalyvas predicted.

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, JI chapters have consistently been taking positions for nationalism, procedural democracy. In Muslim majority context political opportunity structure was conspicuous and eventually moderation was quick and moderate. In these countries, political elites were interested in manipulating the identity of the majority community and JI had been trying to capitalize that. JIP and JIB leadership use sharp languages like atheist, *kafir*, *fasik* etc. against their political rivals who occupy left position of the political spectrum and also towards secular camps. In Muslim minority context, political opportunity structure was less conspicuous. Political openness was there, but JIH was reluctant to avail it. As it faced short period of state repression followed by the rise of Hindutva and BJP, it not only accepted nationalism and democracy, it took side with secularism and minority rights and the whole bunch of socialist policy. JIH's significant shift from its 'original position' display high moderation.

Though, JI chapters differ significantly in their policies they substantiate respective positions with reference to Islamic texts. This difference clearly demonstrates; first, Islam or Islamic tenet supports neither secularism nor anti-secularism or both secularism and anti-secularism; and second, confessional parties stick to ideological claim, not to ideology itself. It is worth mentioning that though all JI chapters reviewed their position on political issues many a times, none of these revisions has led to the revision of their 'original position'. The changes had only impacted on matters of practicality. In the inner circles of JI supporters and activists the same set of Books and lectures of Maududi are widely read and discussed. From this, skeptics may assume that JI would implement its original set of ideology once they find the environment favorable.

Cost of Moderation: Undeniably, JI's primary constituency is pious Muslims. In order to bring them within its own fold, JI must demonstrate that it adheres strictly to Quran and Prophetic tradition. But whenever JI moved towards moderation, it had to assure its supporters about its commitment towards Islamic values. For example, when JIP supported Fatima Jinnah's candidacy in 1965 presidential election, a number of *ulema* issued *fatwa* or verdict that Jamaat had gone against Islam by supporting a female's candidature as the head of Islamic state (Haqqani, 2005). JI's changing policy sometimes come under attack as 'betraying the religion'. "[W]hen confronted with the reality of its [political] stand vis-a-vis traditional orthodoxy, the Jama'at tended to reaffirm, rather than loosen its link with it" (Nasr 1996: 119). Besides, Maududi had difference with orthodox *ulema* regarding some faith and ritual related. Orthodox *ulema* criticizes all JI moves as '*Maududi fitna*'. The dilemma is reflected in the comment of a JIH leader, "Ordinary Muslims [log] urged Jamaat to change, but when the Jamaat changed there were internal allegations that "we [the Jamaat] are deviating from our ideological line" (Ahmad 2009: 239).

Secondly, it suffered dissension and disintegration. JIP suffered dissention back in 1950s over the issue of participating in elections (Nasr 1996). In India, JIH split in 1977 and its student's wing SIMI severed its relations with it; and in Bangladesh JIB and its student wing divided into two and formed new platforms (Kabir 2006). This split was due to JI's 'not strictly sticking to Islamic principles'. So, JI had to suffer for the moderation it underwent over the years.

Conclusion

Maududi founded JI with the aim of freeing Indian Muslims individually and collectively by replacing the Western system with an Islamic political order. After the partition of undivided India three separate chapters determined their own course of actions on the basis of the same ideology. JIP and JIB operated in Muslim majority context and JIH operated in Muslim minority context. Though contexts were different, the outcome was same: all these chapters had shifted from their original position. JIP, JIH and JIB moderated by sacrificing its anti-democratic, anti-nationalist and anti-capitalist stand and accepting female leadership. JIH further moderated by accepting secularism and leaning towards socialist ideas. Though it is late in entering the political process, WPI has declared that it would forge alliance with the like minded secular socialists parties. We observe that though JI had always claimed that it is committed to uphold Islamic values, when ideology and political interest stood face to face, it showed preference for political gain. In all crucial issues '*political considerations won*' giving us the impression that JI was eager to justify Machiavellian maxim 'the end justify the means' even if at the cost of its '*ideological position and teaching*'. Though JI had significantly shifted from its original position and had produced papers explaining their new positions, they still recognize Maududi as their ideologue. So, there still remains some grounds to suspect the authenticity of their commitment. In this regard, it can be mentioned that though Christian democratic by name, confessional parties of Europe are totally secular now; and they are yet to change their name in order to establish their commitment to secularism. And we have found that JIP, JIB and JIH have all compromised their ideology to be compatible with and to cope with democratic institutions, as theory predicts. And if they are given enough time to operate under correct institutional constraints it is likely that they will come out of un-secular politics in future.

Appendix 1: Moderation Chart of JI

<p>1. If political opportunity exists, i.e., political system is open, then in majority context, JI shortens its social movement phase. Since the condition is not unfavorable, JI will moderate to the extent that is sufficient for its entry into political space. That is accepts the procedural democracy.</p>	<p>1. If political opportunity exists in majority context, and JI still chooses to lengthen its operations only as social movement, then capable members and activists will try to avail those opportunities by forming other organizations and that will result in split. Exactly this happened, when Maududi was interested in grabbing the opportunity by entering into politics, while other section was interested in forging social movement and strive for self development after 1951 Provincial elections. In 1983, JIB faced similar split as a faction was interested in maintaining high moral standard and continue more as faith movement.</p>
<p>2. If in minority context, political opportunity exists -- i.e., political system is open -- then JI, in hypothetical condition will not be able to enter into political space with its ideological rigidity in the short term due to institutional constraint/social resentment (as was in India). In order to do that it must moderate to a certain extent.</p>	<p>2. In minority situation, if political space is open and the organization with ideological rigidity wants to continue as a faith movement, it can afford to do so. This was the case about JIH in India during 1948-1964. In such case, there is low/no moderation.</p>
<p>3. If Muslims are majority and no political opportunity exists, i.e., political system is closed for them or ban is in place on the said organization, then JI still survives as an organization and tries to shorten its period of ban/sanction. Immediately after the ban, the moderation is high. For example -- after its persecution during Ayub regime, JI in Pakistan even accepted the women leadership. In Bangladesh, JIB was co-opted by the military regimes immediately after the ban was lifted.</p>	<p>3. If political openness does not exist in majority situation and JI hypothetically has to prolong its social movement, then it can risk its public attention. Besides, capable members may leave organization seeing little/no opportunity and only more conservative/highly indoctrinated members will remain to continue with JI. In such cases, there would be low/no moderation/radicalization.</p>
<p>4. If Muslims are minority and no political opportunity exists, i.e., political system is closed for them or ban is imposed on JI, then too it survives and it tries to shorten its period under the ban [for example, JIH took went to court to prove that they are not fundamentalist organization]. Immediately after the ban is lifted, JIH went for moderation and went for fullest participation in electoral politics and accepting secularism.</p>	<p>4. If political openness does not exist in minority situation and JI has to continue prolong phase of less-optimistic social movement, then it may be left with more motivated and indoctrinated members as it will lose its less motivated and opportunity-seeking members and activists. In such case, there will be low/no moderation/radicalization.</p>

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