

# East Timor : Diversity & Conflict in an Emerging Nation

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
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## Abstract :

East Timor is a very prominent island of Southeast Asian archipelago. It has a long colonial history as well as a long history of independent struggle. Near about four hundred years it was under Portuguese control and after that it went under Indonesian rule. But its history was never smooth, the people of East Timor revolted against their ruler when they got any scope. Last of all it is going to be an independent nation by the help of the United Nations. In this paper an attempt has been made to analyse of East Timor's colonial history and its development, the views and the role of political parties of East Timor regarding independence and examines the present situation of East Timor.


## 1. Introduction :

East Timor is a small island of Southeast Asian archipelago. It is prominent not for size but for its history. It is the easternmost of the lesser Sunda Island in the Malay Archipelago. Timor is divided into two provinces : West Timor and East Timor. West Timor is administrated as part of Nusa Tenggara Timor, which includes nearly island and East Timor is administrated separately. For a thousand years before the arrival of the first warships of the Dutch and Portuguese colonizers, much of the archipelago including Timor, had been part of the Sriwijaya and Majapahit Empires, which successively dominated much of South East Asia.<sup>1</sup> The Portuguese arrived in Indonesia in 1511 and they settled in East Timor in 1633. Portugal founded Dili as the capital of East Timor in 1769.<sup>2</sup> The western half of the island had been a Dutch colony and was therefore part of independent Indonesia after Second World War. But the eastern half, which had been ruled by



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Portugal became independent with the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1975. Indonesia invaded the country in that year and annexed it the following year, then the East Timor as a crisis scenario surfaced in the international arena.

## 2. Geographical location of East Timor :

East Timor Island is situated in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago, between Latitudes 8° 17's and 10° 22's and longitudes 123° 25'e and 127° 19'e. The area of this island is 14,874 sq. km and the island is approximately 500 kilometers long and 60 kilometers wide.<sup>3</sup> Banda sea and water strait situated on the north, Timor sea on the south, province of Nusatenggara on the west and Maluku sea on the east of East Timor island.

## 3. Identity of the East Timorese :

"The people of East Timor are predominantly of Malay and Melanesian stock, they are divided into more than 30 distinct ethnolinguistic groups."<sup>4</sup> The atoni are the earliest indigenous people of Timor and Tetum is the largest linguistic group of the island. Timor was visited by traders from nearby Java and many of their descendants still call Timor home, long before the arrival of European colonial powers- the Dutch and the Portuguese. Other non-indigenous residents include direct or mixed-race descendents of the Portuguese colonialists, Chinese, Arabs and Indians, Plus a number of Indonesian citizens from other parts of country who have settled on Timor,. Chinese traders were encouraged by the Portuguese to settle on the island starting at the turn of the century to help commerce.

## 4. Population & Its Ratio :

According to 1990 census the population of Est Timor was 748000. In December 1995 the population of East Timor was estimated to be 843,100. The population of East Timor is 91.4% Roman Catholics, 2.6% Protestants, 1.7% Muslims, 0.3% Hindu and 0.1% Buddhists.<sup>5</sup>

## 5. Background of the Crisis :

Little is known about the history of Timor before the advent of the European colonizers in early 16th century. From the earliest times, Timor has been an

integral part of Indonesian archipelago. Timor had been part of the Sriwijaya Empire since 672 AD to at the end of the 13th century. After the end of Sriwijaya Empire Indonesia came under the rule of Majapahit Empire which lasted for 200 years. In the year 1520 the Majapahit Empire disintegrated into several Muslim kingdoms. The disunited kingdoms were confronted by the arrival of the European colonial powers.

The Portuguese were the first to arrive, entering Indonesian territory in 1509 after the first attacking and occupying Moluccan in what is now west Malaysia.<sup>6</sup> During that time some local rulers in Sumatra, Java and the Moluccan islands joined forces tried to evacuate the Portuguese but they failed to secure the united backing of all the rulers in the archipelago. In that period the Portuguese established cooperation with local kings, who later were baptized along with their subjects. When Sultan Babullah, overlord of Timor came close to the Portuguese, he understood the motives of the Portuguese regarding his own fate. Then he started searching for a means to through off the Portuguese yoke, Baabullah soon renounced his submission to Portugal and sought an ally in the United East India Company (*vercnigde Oost Indische compagnie*) of the Netherlands. However Babullah soon discovered that he had simply exchanged one master for another and his kingdom shortly thereafter fell under Dutch control. The Dutch soon expanded their colonial process vigorously and quickly into Indonesia. They managed to drive Portuguese from most of the islands. In 1651, the Dutch forces captured Kupang in western Timor (now the capital of Est Nusatenggara province, Indonesia.) From this base they extended their influence throughout the next century.<sup>7</sup>

In 1859, a formal boundary was established defining the Dutch controlled western Timor and Portuguese controlled East Timor. East Timor was governed by Portugal as part of the colony of Macau, the island of Hongkong. But in 1896, the two colonies were separated with its own governors. Lisbon continued its historic policy of neglect towards the colony. Maladministration led to unrest, and 1910 saw a large-scale rebellion against the Portuguese, which was repressed with great difficulty after a period of 18 months. The revolt was led by a Liurai, one of the class of traditional tribal rulers who continue to play an important role in Timorese society up to the present time.

The Portuguese remained in power until Second World War, but when the Second World War broke out then the Japanese ousted both the Dutch and the Portuguese from Timor, as well as the rest of Indonesia and much of Southeast Asia. Japanese military ruled Indonesia for three years and six months. In this time, their rule led to famine in Indonesia and at least forty thousand peoples died in East Timor alone before the final surrender to allied forces.<sup>8</sup>

After the surrender by the Japanese, the people of Indonesia proclaimed their independence and embarked upon a more than four years long armed struggle and gave pressure upon the Dutch for the recognition of their freedom and subsequently the Dutch recognized the Indonesian independence on December 27, 1949. However, at that time West Timor joined with independent Indonesia. But the people of East Timor would not like to join with Indonesia.

After the surrender of Japanese force the Portuguese returned to East Timor. In that period East Timor refused to join Indonesia and they took different policy to get independence from Portugal. The Timorese revolted against Portugal but the revolt was brutally suppressed by the Portuguese and denied them the opportunity to decide their own destiny for another 30 years. But by an amendment to the Portuguese constitution in 1951 the Portuguese declared that Portuguese Timor was not a colonial territory but rather an "overseas province of Portugal". The Portuguese claimed that the provisions of chapter XI of the United Nations charter as well as the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514[xv]) did not apply to East Timor. The changing constitution of the Portuguese was imposed without consulting the indigenous inhabitants of the colonial territory. But this change was not accompanied by any *de facto* change in the territories administration nor in any significant improvement in the welfare of the indigenous population. The Portuguese government continued to oppress the people of Timor like before and they denied to admit the promotion of any steps toward self-determination in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. These attitudes remained unchanged until the change of regime in 1974.

At the time of Indonesian independence, the government representatives of Indonesia often stressed that Indonesia laid no claim to the Portuguese Timor.<sup>9</sup> But they emphasized and supported the people of East Timor to exercise their sacred right to self-determination. The United Nations considered the question of Portuguese Timor as part of the overall problem of the territories under Portuguese administration. The United Nations regularly reaffirmed the right of the people of the territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination. But Portuguese administration always refused to take any steps to positive change in the administration and political right of the so-called 'overseas provinces'. That's why the United Nations condemned Portugal.

In the later part of the twentieth century, the people of Portugal did not want to maintain the colony. When the military overthrew the civilian government of president Thomas in Portugal in April 1974, then they tried to establish the people will for steady them in power. For this reason this event made a significant change in the East Timor issue as well as the overseas province in Asia and Africa. The military government was committed to allowing the colonies to exercise their right to self-determination. On May 16, 1974 General Antonio de Spínola, the president of the new military government declared that democratic right would equally be accorded to the people living in the overseas territories in Africa and Asia including East Timor. To oppress the people of East Timor and maintain a smooth colonial administration, the Portuguese government suppressed all political activities in East Timor and all political parties were banned for a long time, except Uniao Nacional Party (UNA), which was a pro-Portuguese party. On 24 May 1974, the governor and military commander of Portuguese Timor, colonel Fernando Alves Aldela gave permission to the people of East Timor to set up political parties in order to decide their own political future through a referendum which

would be held on 13 March 1975. The proposed referendum would have presented the people of Portuguese Timor with three options from which to choose the future political status of the territory. These three options were as follows :

- (a) To become an autonomous territory in federation with Portugal;
- (b) To become a free and independent country (as part of, or outside a Portuguese commonwealth) or
- (c) To integrate with the Republic of Indonesia.

As the wishes of the colonial authority many political parties emerged in East Timor. The five main political parties were as follows :

**(a) The UDT party :** The Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT) party was formed on 11 May 1974. Francisco Lopez de Cruz and Dominos de Oliveira were elected president and secretary general of the party respectively. The main goal of the UDT was to maintain a privileged relationship with Portugal and to lead the East Timorese gradually towards independence. The UDT claimed that they were the most popular party in East Timor. They received the support of 230 of the 472 existing *sukus* (clans) in the territory. These comprised approximately 50% of the total population.<sup>10</sup>

**(b) The Fretilin :** Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) was formed in May 1974. This party was led by Francisco Xavier do Amaral a tax and customs officer and ex-informer of the colonial secret police. Jose Ramos Horta, a former journalist employed by Dili paper (*A Voz de Timor*) was elected as secretary general of the party. The FRETILIN launched its programme for immediate independence and radicalization of the entire social and economic structure of East Timor. This party drew the attention of young people of Timor.

The UDT and the FRETILIN were the main political parties of East Timor. Both parties were committed to East Timor's eventual independence. FRETILIN wanted this promptly, while the UDT proposed a gradual process involving an extended period of association with Portugal.<sup>11</sup>

**(c) The APODETI Party :** The Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI) was formed on May 27, 1974 with the original name of AITI (Associacao Integraciacao de Timor Indonesia). This party was led by Arnaldo Dos Reis Araujo, an ex-teacher and Jose Fernandez Osorio Soares, former employee of Portuguese Timor social service was elected president and secretary general of the party respectively. This party was favoured the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia.<sup>12</sup> Most of the supporters of this party resided in the western part of East Timor.

**(d) The KOTA Party :** Klibur Oan Timur Aswain (KOTA) "son of the warriors" party was formed on 10 November 1974. This party was led by Jose Martins, whose father was a former *Liurai* of Ermera and forced into exile because of his opposition to the colonial regime. The main aim of the KOTA party was to preserve the authority of the *Liuracis* (village head man) as the traditional leaders of the people. This party also supported integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia.<sup>13</sup>

**(e) The Trabalhista party (Labour party) :** This party was formed in October 1974. The leader of Trabalhista was A. Abraao. The main aim of this party was to achieve the independence of East Timor while retaining some association with Portugal, and it was closely tied to the UDT. The main supporters of this party were found in the towns and in the coffee plantations of the territory. Trabalhista also pronounced itself in favour of integration with Indonesia.<sup>14</sup>

After the coup of Portugal a gradual change had been started in the political wind of East Timor. In that time some political parties viewed that Indonesia would be better as their new master and they did not want the domination of Portugal. Under the changing circumstances, discussion over the issue started between Indonesia and Portugal. Indonesian and Portuguese delegation met in New York on 21 September 1974.

Suharto, the president of Indonesia sent a special envoy to Lisbon on 4 October 1974. As a follow up to special envoy, Portugal's minister for Interterritorial Coordination, Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos arrived in Jakarta on 16 October 1974 to discuss with Indonesian leaders regarding the future of Portuguese Timor and the resumption of full diplomatic relations between Portugal and Indonesia (Which had been reduced by Indonesia to consular level in 1964, in protest at Portugal's colonial policy). He declared that he did not believe total independence was a realistic solution, as the majority of the Timorese people wished to maintain ties with Portugal.<sup>15</sup> He said in Jakarta that the Lisbon government would decide the best way to de-colonize Timor on the strength of a referendum which would be organized in March 1975. He also said during his visit that the elections to a constituent assembly would take place before March 1975, and the decolonization process was an internal affair, concerning only Portugal and the local population. In referendum observers would be invited.

Before the visit of Indonesia, Dr. Santos had visited Australia where he had talk with the Australian government. In that regard Australia expressed their opinion that an independent Eastern Timor would endanger the security of the region.<sup>16</sup> In September 1974, an informal meeting was also held in Java between Suharto and Mr. Gough Whitlam the president and prime minister of Indonesia and Australia respectively where they discussed the future of East Timor. The consensus of opinion was reported to be that annexation with Indonesia was the best solution for Timor. A spokesman for the Australian department of foreign affairs said, "an independent Timor would not be capable of surviving as a state and would be a potential threat to the region."<sup>17</sup> But the two governments also emphasized that they would not interfere and would respect the wishes of the Timorese people.

Colonel Mario Lemos Pires, the colonial governor of Timor appealed to Timories to establish a transitional government for their own help. On 22 January 1975 the UDT party agreed to form a coalition with FRETILIN. But this two party alliance lasted only a few months. The UDT party withdrew itself for differences over ideology and political policies with FRETILIN. At the time of uneasy coalition the political situation of Timor was gradually deteriorating. For this reason, the Portuguese government invited the Indonesian government for a meeting to

discuss the overall situation of the territory. The meeting took place in London, on 9 March 1975. The Portuguese and Indonesian government was represented by the minister for de-colonization Major Victor Alves and Lt. General Ali Moertopo respectively. In this meeting the two parties agreed that in order to bring Portuguese Timor to make calm, preparations were to be made for a meeting between the Portuguese government and the various parties in Portuguese Timor to discuss plans for implementing the de-colonization process in a peaceful and orderly manner. The meeting was scheduled to be held from June 26 to 28 in Macao. The March 1975 election date passed amid bickering and violence. At the end of June a conference took place in Macao. But FRETILIN refused to participate on various pretexts. As a result no general consensus could be reached. Separate hearing was held between the Portuguese delegation and representatives of UDT and APODETI about the de-colonization plan for territory. After the Macao conference the Portuguese government promulgated constitutional Law which was to govern the de-colonization process in Timor. As an immediate measure, the Portuguese government ordered the formation of a transitional government for the colony to prepare for the election in October 1976 of a popular Assembly that was to take responsibility for determining the future status of the territory. The proposed transitional government would be headed by a High Commissioner appointed by Portugal, and five members, two of whom would be representatives of the Portuguese government while the other three would be chosen from among representatives of the East Timorese political parties. It was planned that Portuguese sovereignty over Timor should continue until October 1978, unless otherwise agreed by the Portuguese government and the Timorese popular Assembly.<sup>18</sup>

In reaction to the new law, FRETILIN continued its obstructive tactics and insisted on its previous demand that the Portuguese government immediately declare its intention to grant full independence to East Timor. FRETILIN also refused to appoint delegates to the transitional government and it intensified its activities of intimidation and terror in the interior of the territory in preparation for and as a rejection of the October 1976 election. In these deteriorating situation, the UDT launched a "coup" on 11 August 1975 and Portuguese civil and military authorities evacuated mainland Timor for the island of Atauro. Because of the flight of the civil and military authorities of Portuguese Timor and the rapidly growing armed clashes among the warring parties, the Portuguese government sent a special envoy, Dr. Almeida Santos, the minister for international coordination, on a mission to Indonesia, Australia and Atauro Island to discuss possible corrective actions.

After the arrival of Dr. Santos a series of meetings were held between Portugal and Indonesia with the aim of restoring some sense of authority in the territory. The Indonesian government proposed a joint authority comprising of the representatives of Australia, Indonesia, Portugal and Malaysia. Dr. Santos left Jakarta for Australia on 30th August 1975, where he met with the Australian government to discuss about the situation of Portuguese Timor. But Australian

prime minister, Mr. Gough Whitlam refused Portugal's request for the dispatch of Australian troops to East Timor. He stated that Portugal's appeal for international aid to the refugees could only be carried out if and when security and order has been restored in that area and the security problems were the "sole responsibility of Portugal". He agreed that Portugal should jointly decide the political destiny of the territory, the Timorese peoples themselves and Indonesia. Dr. Santos had failed to achieve any concrete solution to The East Timor problem. At the same time, FRETILIN, which continued to expand its military activities in the territory refused to join talks with other political parties in East Timor. The situation continued to deteriorate and FRETILIN began a substantially increased armed offensive clearly aimed at obtaining control of the entire territory. By early September FRETILIN forces had prevailed in the "civil war" and took over the administration of the territory. Between 1500 and 3000 East Timorese are estimated to have died in this conflict.<sup>19</sup> In this time ten thousand East Timorese residents fled across the border to Indonesian West Timor.

At a meeting in Batugate on 7 September 1975 the UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista party jointly declared their desire for the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. They issued a petition to the president of the Republic of Indonesia and in their petition they stressed that the people of East Timor had strong ethnic and cultural links with the people of Indonesia and the Portuguese government had failed in its task of promoting the process of de-colonization in East Timor. As a result in order to prevent further bloodshed and to complete the process of de-colonization they called for the integration of East Timor with the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>20</sup> After the Batugate petition the civil war in East Timor received force and the allied political parties formed a combined force and they launched a series of counter offensives against the FRETILIN forces.<sup>21</sup> With the help of Indonesian force, the combined force recaptured the town of Batugate, Balibo, Maliana, Bobonaro, los palos and Baucau etc. In the mean time from 11 August to 6 December 1975 Indonesian force attacked East Timor several times from their West Timor base. They raped women and killed people. From 1974 to 1975 sixty thousands people were killed in East Timor.

By considering the deteriorating situation in East Timor, the Portuguese government indicated in early October that they are willing to start talks with Indonesia in an effort to reach a negotiated solution to the problem of East Timor. The government of Indonesia welcomed Portugal's proposal for renewed discussion concerning East Timor. It was agreed by the two government that the talks would take place in Rome on 1 and 2 November 1975. Foreign minister Adam Malik led a five member's Indonesian delegation to the Rome talks, which began as scheduled on 1 November and the Portugal's delegation was led by foreign minister Mr. Melo Antunes. After the discussion in Rome meeting the two ministers concurred on the necessity to convene at the earliest possible time, a meeting between Portugal and all political parties in Portuguese Timor simultaneously and aimed at ending armed strife and bringing about a peaceful and orderly process of de-colonization in Portuguese Timor.



But in the meantime on 28 November 1975 the FRETILIN administration proclaimed an independent Democratic Republic of East Timor and they appealed for international recognition and supports.<sup>23</sup> In response to the declaration of Independence by FRETILIN, the UDT, APODETI, KOTA and Trabalhista proclaimed the independence of the territory and its simultaneous integration with the Republic of Indonesia on 30 November, 1975 at Balibo.<sup>23</sup>

The Portuguese government rejected both the FRETILIN and the four parties declaration regarding the fate of East Timor. The Portuguese National Decolonization Commission stated that Portugal continued to consider itself the administering power in the territory. Portugal admitted in a letter to the secretary general of the United Nations that it was unable to deal effectively with the situation in the territory.<sup>24</sup>

**6. Indonesian Invasion of East Timor :** On 7 December 1975, Indonesian forces named Operasi Seroya (Operation Lotus) launched a full scale invasion of the territory, landing troops by sea and air in the principal towns of Dili and Baucau and dispatching a large force across the border.<sup>25</sup> This marked the effective end of colonial power in East Timor. Official Indonesian accounts claimed that the invasion was simply an extension of the earlier "civil war" and that Dili and Baucau had been "liberated" by forces of the UDT and APODETI assisted by Indonesian "volunteers".<sup>26</sup> On 18 December 1975 the formation of a Provisional Government of East Timor was announced, with president of APODETI and the UDT as respectively chief and deputy chief executives. On 17 July 1976 East Timor was made the 27th province of Indonesia.

In reaction of United Nations regarding invasion resolution were passed in the General Assembly and the security council of United Nations in December 1975. This resolution rejected the act of integration and called on all states to respect the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination. Since "integration" in July 1976, the Indonesian government has rejected the UN's right to discuss the question of East Timor. However, the UN General Assembly continued to pass resolutions each year from 1975 until 1982. Its 1976 resolution rejected the act of integration. Indonesia was unwilling to hold any referendum or to respect the demands of East Timorese for independence in view of the fact that the Timorese have already cast their vote for integration with Indonesia in 1976 and second, reopening of East Timor's future would lead to civil war. Indonesia's real fear stemmed from the fact that if the Timorese were allowed to vote for independence, the rest of Indonesia might begin to unravel from Aceh in the far west to Irian Jaya in the remote east. Amnesty International claimed that as many as 200,000 people from a total population of 650,000 may have killed by the Indonesian armed forces during the annexation. The Indonesian government posted huge number of army in East Timor for intimidation of East Timorese. The army made "human chain" in East Timor. For this reason many observer East Timor "most militarized country in the world". The Indonesian army destroyed the culture of East Timories, they also killed the old generation. They set up concentration camp in East Timor. Indonesian authorities declared the end of Operasi Seroya (Operation Lotus) in

March 1979, and announced that thenceforth East Timor would be fully under civilian administration, though the FRETILIN force attacks on Indonesian outpost. Indonesian forces launched 'Operasi Keamanan' (Operation security) from April to September 1981, hundred of East Timorese reportedly died as result of sickness or were killed during this operation.<sup>27</sup> In August 1983 large numbers of additional Indonesian troops were brought to East Timor for another operation "Operasi Sapu Bersih" (Operation Clean Sweep) aimed at eliminating FRETILIN. During 1984 conditions in East Timor deteriorated with widespread hunger, disease and repression among civilians, and continuing battles between rebels and Indonesian troops. During Indonesian rule in East Timor, the Indonesian government migrated people in East Timor from Indonesian mainland and World Bank financed their work.

**7. Freedom Struggle by FRETILIN :** From the very beginning of Indonesian invasion the FRETILIN tried to resist Indonesian force. After the invasion they took big program for East Timor. In one side, the military wing of FRETILIN fought against Indonesian troops, on the other hand they built many school and literate their people by Tetum language. They tried to preserve their culture. FRETILIN received a strong support from student. A cease-fire between the two sides was agreed in March 1983, but it was lasted only five months. In August 1985 Australia recognized the Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor. This recognition made a serious set back for FREILIN.<sup>28</sup> In November 1991, student raised FRETILIN flag in Dili. That's why the Indonesian army killed some students. The dead body of the students were taken to the Santa Cruz cemetery. A huge number of people demonstrated in the cemetery on 12 November 1991 but Indonesian security forces fired on a demonstration. In this massacre between 100 and 180 people were killed. A further 100 witnesses were said to have been summarily executed shortly afterwards.<sup>29</sup> The Indonesian armed froces claimed that 20 civilians had died. Under intense international pressure, Suharto established a national investigation commission, but FRETILIN boycotted the commission because its impartiality was challenged. The commission stated that 50 people had died, and 90 disappeared in the massacre. As a result, the senior military officers from East Timor were removed and 14 members of the armed forces were tried by a military tribunal. A film was made with the fact of Santa Cruz massacre. This film was shown in many countries of the world and this film drew the attention of the international community.

In July 1992 Indonesia and Portugal agreed to resume discussion on East Timor issue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. In August the General Assembly adopted its first resolution condemning Indonesia's violations of fundamental human rights in East Timor. In October 1992 the US congress suspended defense-training aid to Indonesia, in protest at the killing of separatist demonstrators in November 1991. In November 1992 the resistance suffered a major setback when Xanana Gusmao was arrested near Dili. This incident provoked international concern. In May 1993 Gusmao was found guilty of rebellion, conspiracy, attempting to establish a separate state and illegal possession of arms and was condemned to life imprisonment. During this same month

Suharto announced that all government combat forces were to be withdrawn from East Timor, leaving only troops involved in development project; but in September, Konis Santana, the new acting leader of FRETILIN declared that, contrary to announcements, the Indonesian were renewing their forces in East Timor and that killing and atrocities continued.

In January 1994 Indonesia announced to the UN secretary general's envoy that it would facilitate access to East Timor by human rights and UN organization. In August it was reported that the armed forces had held talks with Xanana Gusmao, included in which was the possibility of holding a referendum under the auspices of the UN to determine the status of the disputed territory. A second round of reconciliation talks between Indonesian officials and East Timorese exiles was held between late September and early October, in the United Kingdom and was attended by a UN envoy. The Indonesian minister for foreign affairs, Ali Alatas, also held talks in October in New York, in the USA, with Jose Ramos Horta, the secretary for International Relations of FRETILIN. In January 1995 foreign ministers of Portugal and Indonesia and the UN secretary general met in Geneva, Switzerland for talk on East Timor issue. An agreement was reached to convey a meeting between under the auspices of the UN, called the all-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AETD). The AETD, which was held in June 1995, March 1996 and October 1997, failed to achieve any conclusive progress. In February 1996 president Suharto and the Portuguese prime minister met in Bangkok. This was the first meeting on East Timor issue by heads of government. During this talks Portugal offered to re-establish diplomatic links in return for the release of Xanana Gusmao and the guarantee of human rights in East Timor.

The atmosphere of continuing unrest was strengthened in late 1995 and early 1996, when young East Timorese entered the grounds of several foreign embassies in Jakarta to request political asylum. International awareness of East Timor issue was reached its zenith in October 1996 when the acting Bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo and the secretary for International Relations of FRETILIN, Jose Ramos Horta, were jointly awarded the Noble prize for peace. After hearing the Noble committee's declaration, the Indonesian government announced that there would be no change in its policy on East Timor and they were displeased with the Noble committee's choice. Four days after the announcement of the award, Suharto visited East Timor for the first time for eight years. After hearing the announcement of the Noble peace Prize, Belo repeated demands that the government should conduct a referendum on autonomy in East Timor. He also invited the Indonesian government to enter into serious negotiations on the future of East Timor. In November 1996 the Indonesian government withdrew permission for foreign Journalists to visit East Timor, when they had planned to attend a press conference conducted by Belo.

In July 1997 the president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, met Xanana Gusmao with the approval of Suharto. In that time Mandela requested Suharto to release Xanana. He also tried to mediate the Timorese conflict but his initiative ultimately proved fruitless. In early November 1997 the Australia- East Timor Association

released a report cataloguing a number of human right abuse perpetrated by members of the Indonesian armed forces against Timorese women; abuses cited in the report included enforced prostitution, rape and forced sterilization programs. Belo accused the Indonesian security forces of having used 'excessive force' and this was confirmed by a report made by the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights in early December 1997. In January 1998 Horta attempted to exploit the Government's economic difficulties by urging Suharto to agree to a cease-fire and to co-operate with the U.N. in creating protection zones to ensure the safety to disarmed resistance fighters; but Government had no response. In January 1998 it was announced that a Timorese resistance congress would be held in Portugal in March. This congress would be replaced by a national convention to ensure the participation of the Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT)-Timorese Democratic Union. The said convention held in late April and they signed a charter, which has been considered the 'Magna Carta' of East Timor. The charter intended to provide the basis for the constitution of future self-determination within the territory, and ratified plans for the establishment of the National council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT), a body intended to give the Timorese resistance movement a single national structure and to bring together representatives of the defunct National council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), Fretilin and UDT. Xanana Gusmao was appointed President of the new CNRT and Horta was appointed as Vice-President.

**8. Fall of Suharto Regime and New Hope Arises :** In early 1998 financial crisis of Indonesia caused the fall of Suharto regime in 21 May 1998. In May 1998 Habibis accession to the presidency raised hopes that independence for East Timor might be granted in the near future. In June 1998 president Habibis has given a surprising announcement that his government was prepared to offer a 'special status' to East Timor within the Indonesian Republic. Foreign minister Ali Alatas made this offer more specific in August by proposing a "wide-ranging autonomy" which would exclude 'only the areas of foreign affairs, defense and finance; But all the leading figures in the independence movement rejected this proposal.<sup>30</sup> President Habibis also declared that Indonesian troops might be withdrawn from East Timor. Many prominent political prisoners were released and Xanana Gusmao's 20-year sentence was reduced by a near four months. In July, a limited number of troops were withdrawn from East Timor.

In August 1998, Indonesia and Portugal had agreed to hold discussion on the possibility of 'wide ranging autonomy' for East Timor. In early November the UN was willing to be opening discussion with the two countries regarding a UN plan for extensive autonomy for the territory. But in the later part of this month a severer violence occurred in Alas region of East Timor and 82 people were reported to have been killed. As a result, Portugal has withdrawn its involvement in the talks. However in January 1999 the talks resumed. UN special envoy Jamsheer Marker visited East Timor in mid December 1998. In his visit, he met both Xanana Gusmao and Belo. Xanana Gusmao reportedly advocated that the Timorese people should consider the UN's proposal for autonomy but only a transitional stage prior to the holding of a referendum.<sup>31</sup>

In the meantime the people of Australia gave pressure upon their government to respect the freedom movement of East Timor, because they were aware the repression of Indonesian soldier to East Timorese by Dili radio. The government banned the radio broadcast but the people could not calm. As a result the Australian Government announced a significant change in its policy on East Timor in January 1999, stating that it determined to promote 'self determination' in the territory. In the same month, total independence for East Timor in the near future emerged as a burning question in East Timor and international arena. During this time IMF, World Bank, UN and U.S.A. also gave pressure to Indonesia for come to a conclusion on East Timor issue.

On 27 January, 1999 in order to appease the East Timorese and the international community president B.J. Habibie declared that "East Timor could leave, if it wanted, and then agreed to UN super-vision of a vote in which its people could accept or reject a package offering of broad autonomy within Indonesia. If they said no to autonomy, Jakarta would take that as a vote for independence and act accordingly".<sup>32</sup> In a statement Habibie said that, "we do not want to be burdened by the problem of East Timor after 1 January 2000".<sup>33</sup> The Government announcement occurred a serious violence in East Timor between pro-integrationist and liberationist. Reacting to Habibie's declaration on East Timor, Megawati Sukarnapurti, the leader of the most popular party, The Indonesia Democratic Party in Struggle (PDI), argued that it was a threat to national unity, and that East Timor should merely have the same status as other provinces. Rejecting the idea of a referendum, She concluded that 'His [Habibie's] government is just a transitional one that was not chosen by the people. It would be better if decisions like East Timor and regional autonomy were left to the next government'.<sup>34</sup> It was nothing but a political charisma, because by that type of swiping statement, Megawati wanted to support of mass people in forthcoming election.

The main reason for Habibie's offer was probably his determination both to distinguish himself from Suharto, and trying to establish himself as a figure internationally. He had never had any personal involvement in East Timor policy other than to follow Suharto's dictator policy, and what could be better than a shift in policy, to a large extent only cosmetic, that might enable him to gain a degree of international support and then to use to bolster his position as a serious contender in the 1999 presidential election. Habibie said that, "I will prove to the world that I can make a major contribution to world peace on mandated by our constitution. It will roll like a snowball and no one can stop it".<sup>35</sup>

**9. Voting for Independence :** To hold the referendum on the autonomy package, the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers signed a United Nations brokered agreement on 5 May 1999, in New York, this agreement paved the way for referendum of August 30, 1999. In relating to security the agreement stated that the armed forces of Indonesia would be responsible before, during and after the referendum. In that time the Kopassus, powerful factions of Armed forces were determined to undermine the Habibie's policy. In early February 1999, shortly after

official conformation of the Habibi's new policy, the paramilitary groups attacked Covalima, in the Southwest, Maubara, on the north coast, and Dili. The population was terrorized and fled to neighboring areas. The paramilitary group distributed leaflets throughout the territory, warning that death lists had been drawn up, and that death squads were preparing to go from village to village, eliminating pro-independence supporters. On 4 April they attacked in the Liquica sub-district in a village called Dato. Supported by Indonesian troops they killed five people and burnt down twelve houses. Most of the villagers fled to Liquica, where 2000 found shelter in the Church. On 6 April, a large number of paramilitary force, supported by soldiers from Battalion 142 and mobile police brigades, and commanded by Eurico Guterres, began firing into the church, into which they threw a tear-gas grenade. As people fled they were stabbed with knives and machetes and hacked or shot to death. Farmer Jose Ramos was grabbed by two policemen wielding machetes. 'One sliced my right thumbs off and as I fell the other slashed my back. I managed to get up and run into the forest.'<sup>36</sup> In this killing, 57 were dead, 35 were wounded and 14 had disappeared. In early April, East Timorese human rights groups claimed that 18,000 people had already been displaced. By the end of May, an aid worker claimed that the figure had reached 54,000.<sup>37</sup>

In the meantime on 4 June the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) reached Dili, in preparation for the referendum on East Timor's future, scheduled for 8 August. The work of the UNAMET has been very difficult. The mission was small (241 international staff members, 420 volunteers, an unarmed police force of 280 civilian police officers, and 50 military liaison officers), with the bulk of the staff 4,000 being recruited locally. Throughout June, paramilitary violence intensified. Paramilitary attacks on UNAMET offices in Maliana and Viqueque in late June resulted in UN personnel being withdrawn from both offices. As attacks like these by paramilitaries increased, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan twice postponed the referendum from 8 August to 21 August and then to 30 August.<sup>38</sup> A week before the referendum, Eurico Guterres, the paramilitary leader address a pro-integration rally in Dili, attended by an estimated 15,000 people. The leaders of Aitarak ended by threatening that if East Timor voted for independence, it 'will become a sea of fire.'

Before the referendum, a senior member of the independence movement, Leandro Issac said in a rally in Dili on 25 August that "For the past 23 years, the people of East Timor have been murdered, terrorized and intimidated into silence. Now is our opportunity to show the world that we want nothing to do with Indonesia."<sup>38</sup> Jose Andrade, a local CNRT leader, expressed similar sentiment on the evening before the referendum. He said that, "yes, there are lots of Indonesian flags in the towns and villages, and yes, we seem to be doing nothing. But when our campaigners go out and speak to the people they hear that in their hearts they want independence. Last night people tried to break in, kidnap me and burn the place. But I am very optimistic that Jakarta will get a rude awakening when the result is announced."<sup>39</sup> The statement came true when the counting was finished on 4



September, and the result announced by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. It was announced that 78.5 percent of the East Timorese electorate, number 3,44,580 voted for independence to their territory and rejected the autonomy package. Only about 21.5 percent, number 94,388 of the East Timorese opted for wide-ranging autonomy under Indonesia's protective wing.

The referendum was a remarkable achievement for East Timorese. For many years they had fought for the right to determine their future. This had finally been recognized by the international community. The East Timorese were very much pleased about the result of the referendum. After announced the result, they enjoyed themselves. A farmer in Memo village, expressed his feelings that, 'we are happy, but afraid, afraid that the militias will continue the war'.<sup>40</sup> The UN body was also satisfied to organize the referendum 'peacefully'. The UN Secretary General expressed his feeling in a meeting on Security Council. He urged to all parties to work together for bring peace and prosperity to the next generation of East Timor.

After the official declaration of the result of referendum, Indonesian president B.J. Habibie said that with due respect to the will of East Timorese, Indonesian government accepted the result of the referendum. He ordered to the police and military of East Timor to work sincerely to keep peace and order. He also ordered military to do everything according to their rule to stop the continuous violence in East Timor. But the paramilitaries reacted brutally at the result of the referendum. On 1 September paramilitaries attacked on pro-independence supporters in Ermera, Aileu, Maliana and Dili. In the capital city the paramilitaries wearing black shirts with 'Aitarak' printed on them emerged and began shooting anyone they came across. They advanced on the UNAMET office, burning nearby houses rented by UN staff. Three hundred refugees from previous militia violence who were sheltering next to the UN base fled in panic into the UN compound. Due to this incident, many people were attacked and killed in the streets. An American cameraman reported. 'I saw one man hit with a rifle. He fell to the ground where about five or six people attacked him with machetes. His body was already lifeless by the time the last two joined in.'<sup>41</sup> Such events were repeated in Dili throughout the next week, accompanied by widespread burning and looting of houses and offices. Outside the capital, and particularly in the western areas, the situation was even worsen. In Maliana, Ermara, Aileu and Occussi, UN monitors were forced to evacuate their offices and return to Dili. Throughout the territory paramilitary groups set up roadblocks, and reinforced their control over the camps into which they had herded the local population.

Six days after the referendum, little was left of Dili, and most of its population had either fled to the hills or been transported by paramilitaries to West Timor by trucks or boats sailing from Dili harbor. A Portuguese journalist described "Dili as a ghost city. Everything is destroyed, not only the houses but the apartment buildings, the shops, everything. The only East Timorese people you see are in the police trucks. It's horrible. Dili is dead."<sup>42</sup> A paramilitary leader Herminio da Silva Coasta said, 'We will burn East Timor down and start all over again.'<sup>43</sup>

The paramilitary attacked on sanctuary and its aftermath of the initial killings in Dili, 3,000 refugees had sheltered in Bishop Belo's house. But they burned down the Belo's residence. Thirtynine were reported killed. Below was taken by police to a helicopter for Baucau. Red cross compound also attacked by the paramilitary. At the end of 6 September. UN officials estimated that in the week since the referendum, 150,000 people had been driven to take shelter in schools, churches and public buildings, 25,000 of them in Dili alone.<sup>44</sup> For this increasing violence UN started to evacuate its staff. By mid September an estimated 150,000 people were being held in paramilitary camps in west Timor and 330,000 had fled into the mountainous areas of East Timor. For those living in the mountains, food, water and medicines were in short supply. Every day, every minute, people are dying. To the fear of death from paramilitary attacks was now added a potentially immense humanitarian crisis, with thousands facing starvation. By 30 September aid agencies in west Timor had registered 230,000 East Timorese in more than 28 camps. After the attack on Bishop Belo's house and Red cross compound, however, pressure to intervene increased substantially-not merely as a result of the massive public response in countries such as Australia and Portugal, but from highly influential international diplomats and senior politicians in the United States.

The United Nations Security Council called an emergency meeting on East Timor issue, on 7 September they decided to send a five member ambassadors mission to Jakarta to persuade the Indonesian government to control the violence in East Timor. The mission also planned to visit the territory. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan followed this up with a '48 hours Ultimatum' to Indonesia to improve the security situation. In response, Indonesian army introduced martial law in East Timor there by in effect, simply permitting it legally to transmigrate the population. As Kofi Annan changed the 48-hour to a 24-hour deadline on 8 September. Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas scoffed at the very idea of an international force, let alone a 'peacekeeping force', entering the territory, saying that it would have to 'shoot its way into East Timor'. He warned the world: 'don't pressure us, don't give us ultimatum- because it doesn't help and it is not realistic.'<sup>45</sup>

On 9 September 1999, after Alatas' 'statement of ultimatum', the United States suspended 'all arms ties' with Indonesia. If the situation did not improve, the US government said it would suspend all arms sales. And James D. Wolfensohn, president of the world bank, informed Habbi: for the international community to be able to continue its full support, it is critical that you act swiftly to restore order and that your government carry through on its public commitment to honour the referendum outcome.<sup>46</sup> He then followed this up by deciding to hold a 600 million-dollar loan negotiated earlier in the year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that it was suspending a planned economic mission to Indonesia, which was a prerequisite for approval of the next IMF tranches of 450 million dollar.

It was this combination of moves to suspended arms sales, combined with the threat of particular economic sanctions, which seems ultimately to have persuaded



Habibi, his cabinet and most leading military figures to accept the entry of the international peacekeeping force under UN auspices. With such firm denials, and such strident rejections of the need for a peacekeeping force, president B.J. Habibi's surprisingly announced on 12 September that the Indonesian government had agreed to the entry of a peacekeeping force. As several leading generals quietly voiced their opposition, military representatives in the Indonesian parliament demanded that they have a veto on the composition of any peacekeeping force. To no avail. In New York, foreign minister Alatas conceded, we are putting no conditionalities so it is all up to the United Nations to prepare the composition. Indonesian National Assembly formally accepted East Timor's vote for independence on 20 October 1999, and clearing the way for the creation of the world's newest nation. The decision was immediately welcomed by Australia, Britain, the United States and the United Nations.

**10. Peacekeeping forces in dili :** On 20 September 1999, the first troops of an Australian-led force, with soldiers from many countries, including southeast Asia, landed in Dili in the banner of United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET). A total of 2300 from a force of 8000 were deployed. The remainder followed by sea in the next few days. The United Nations peacekeeping force raised 9150 in number including 200 military observers to replace the Australian led-force on the ground. Now it is a 19 nations force including Bangladesh. On 25 October UN secretary general Kofi Annan named Sergio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian UN official as the chief administrator in East Timor. The UN Security Council has already given Kofi Annan the authority to establish the UN transitional Authority for East Timor to run the territory until independence, expected in two or three years. The UNTAET is not just helping the new country's government of East Timor, it is the government UNTAET issues postage and signs treaties.<sup>47</sup> The aspirations of the East Timorese are embodied in the National Council, a fifteen member committee which the UN Consults on all decisions. The council comprises seven pro-Independence East Timorese Leaders including the de facto president Xanana Gusmao, and three pro-autonomy figures. But one big problem is that, members are not fully united on what needs to be done and when. Different agendas have to be accommodated and things move slowly because consensus is required. The council's overall program reads like the syllabus of an experimental university.<sup>48</sup> East Timor is a test case for UN. That's why the UN sent a team of International technocrats. The most of the top people in UNTAET speak four or five languages; have extensive experience in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. There are now 8,500 well-armed peacekeeping soldiers in East Timor. The soldiers are involved in developing the infrastructure like building bridges, fixing roads etc. They also build the houses. The main works of UNTAET is to introduce a Timorese legal system, judicial system, a fiscal authority, a tax regime, a civil service, a currency, set up a National consultative council, and organize a national election in next summer. By this time some goals are achieved. The UNTAET introduced a new court system, complete with East Timorese judges

and prosecutors, and the beginning of a police force. The first batch of 50 Timorese police graduated in July 2000. National Consultative Council has met regularly since December 1999.

Many East Timorese are dissatisfied with the progress of the works of UNTAET. Because the East Timorese think that the UNTAET working very slowly. The Timorese criticized UNTAET works for hopelessly slowly in delivering economics aid. Six months after the burning of Dili the majority of the building are still without roof for lack of construction materials. Local leaders have been involved enough in the development of a new political structure for the country. Avelino Coelho, secretary General of the Timor socialist party, complained that, "the UN does not understand the culture of the people-- the UN meets with his group only occasionally, for the sake of appearances."<sup>49</sup> Some Timorese leaders acknowledge the need for the expertise of foreign administrators and Engineers. But they warn, "The international mission will fail unless more Timorese are recruited. Outsiders may be in control, but it is time to let the Timorese take charge of their fate." Bishop Carlos Belo, the 1996 Nobel peace Prize laureate said that, "we are grateful for the presence of the international community, but give East Timorese an opportunity to be involved in the decisionmaking, otherwise the UN will leave East Timor with the same problems as before."<sup>50</sup>

The Timorese expected that Independence would bring a better life for them but because of a newest country it has many problems in every sector. Xanana Gusmao, expected president of East Timor, said when he was asked 'what worries him most', he replies, "social dissatisfaction. We were united in a common objective. And now we want to see the difference; each person feels they must have a place. We will have to face many social, economic and political conflicts, many problems."<sup>51</sup> The main problem to survive East Timor is economic problem. Nearly 80 percent of the population is unemployed. Four out of every five working age people in the eilys are jobless. The annual per capita income is somewhere between 100 dollar and 250 dollar. Illiteracy stands at 70 percent and labor skill are non-existent. The territory's only private business- a few bakeries, restaurants, hotels and rental companies. The main export good is coffee. There are also marble and sandalwood for export, though most sandal wood stocks were destroyed. Investors, mainly Australians have invested in short-term project like restaurants, small hotels and car-rental agencies to cash in on the international aid presence. But long time investors are staying away. In March 2000, UNTAET signed an agreement with Australia to recover oil and gas from the Timor Sea promise to generate millions of dollars in foreign exchange. But production won't begin before 2004.<sup>52</sup> Sergio de Mello, the head of the UN transitional Authority, said that, "If is not out of the question that this country may not have to rely on external budget support in four to five years."<sup>53</sup> Political problem is also big problem for East Timor. The political parties are not united. There will be a big possibility of another violence. UN officials, aid workers and some East Timorese fear that "a future election could spark renewed violence" A UN spokesman says 'the aim of the militias, appears to be to "wait out the UN" which is supposed to pull out after next year's election. The people of East Timor see that as an

invitation to disaster'. Efren de Guzman, a Filipino Jesuit Priest in Maliana, also said that, 'the UN should not leave. When the peacekeepers leave, how can the local people defend themselves?'<sup>54</sup>

Abdur Rahman Wahid, president of Indonesia, visited East Timor in first week of March 2000 and openly apologized on behalf of Indonesia for 24 years of repression and bloodshed. Before his visit he had removed General Wiranto, coordinating Minister for security and politics from his office that was charged for 'mass killings, torture, sexual slavery, force deportation and rape of East Timorese after the referendum of August 1999 by a local human rights commission and UN commission. During his visit Abdur Rahman said, "we as a nation have made mistakes." Beside the apology, he came bearing some practical help. He announced the resumption of air and sea link. He also ordered the resumption of a Jakarta funded scholarship program for East Timorese student to study at Indonesian University.<sup>55</sup> But the militia still disturbing the UNTAET. In late July 2000, small but well armed militia force began an offensive from its West Timor base. According to UN intelligence report, up to five 30-man militia units have infiltrated across the rugged border and penetrated as far as 40 kilometers inside East Timor. During the day the guerrillas dressed in military style camouflage uniforms, break into five men units; the regroup at night for guerrilla operations. In late July they killed one NewZeland soldier the peacekeeping force's first combat death. The militiamen severely beat up two UN workers in a refugee camp on the border. That's why the United Nations withdrew aid in West Timor. In September 6,2000 militia killed three UN staff in Atambua, a town in Indonesian West Timor. Among them one is American, one is Croatian and other is Ethiopian. US president Bill Clinton called on Jakarta to put a stop to these abuses'. About the killing abdur Rahman Wahid remarked that the militia did it to humiliate him.<sup>56</sup> After the withdrew of UN official from West Timor, Indonesia said that 'militias have been disarmed and disbanded and that it is safe for the UN to return'. But UN refugee chief Sadako Ogata describes 'west Timor as a virtual no man's land' and other officials say the disarmament program is merely cosmetics.<sup>57</sup> UN agencies are refusing to return until the militias are removed Aid workers worry about the spectre of famine and possibility of refugees going on the rampage in search of food. UN official estimated that 60,000-70,000 refugees would return to East Timor if they were permitted to do so by the militias. The rest of the refugees include 2,600 former East Timorese soldiers, 8,000 ex-civil servants and their families who would loss their Indonesian pensions if they return, would not return to East Timor.<sup>58</sup>

**11. Conclusion :** East Timor has been passing hundred of years with the tragic experience of colonial brutalities. The end of Second World War was the beginning of a new era for the East Timorese. This period is to be the happiest period in the history of East Timor since the arrival of the first European. In the 1960's Indonesia was a big significant regional power and West Timor has a great geo-political significance. As a result to extend their influence in that region and strengthen their defense, Indonesia planned to capture East Timor. The big power, like U.S.A. supports the invasion of East Timor. U.S.A. supports Indonesia

because Indonesia was its key Southeast Asian ally during the period of cold war. U.S.A. not only supports but also helps to establish them in East Timor by giving intensive military aid, training and communication. Over the next decade Washington routinely voted against UN resolutions regarding East Timor issue. But after the cold war the scenario had been gradually changed because the U.S.A. now wants Indonesia to respect the will of East Timorese. The financial crisis and political change of Indonesia inspired them to come to a conclusion. In this period the international organization like UNO, IMF, World Bank, also gave pressure upon Indonesia. As a result President B.J. Habibie called for a referendum with a choice between incorporation within Indonesia (autonomy) or independence. But the army moved at once to prevent this outcome by terror and intimidation. Indonesia's failure to keep its commitment to ensure security in East Timor has raised the clamor for an international peacekeeping force to replace Indonesian troops. U.S.A gave logistic support for international peacekeeping force to replace Indonesian troops. U.S.A. gave logistic support for international peacekeeping force but no troops. The United Nations transitional administration for East Timor holds the first parliamentary election in 30th August 2001. 93 percent of eligible East Timorese cast vote in their first free election to elect 88 members assembly, which will draft a constitution for the fledgling nation and become its parliament by early December. Full independence may be declared in March or April in next year. The main task of the political leaders of East Timor is to achieve political freedom as well as economic freedom. In the past, Timorese had to fight for political freedom. But now they have to fight for economic freedom with the critical world. For this they should unite in for framing a common interest for the national development.

### **Latest Development**

It was recorded that East Timor became independent on 20 May 2002 and was renamed as "Timor-Lester". It is mentionable that the country's first ever parliamentary election was held in August 2001 and the Timorese people gave their vote to elect 88 members of constituent Assembly. They also voted in April 2002 for their president and Xanana Gusmao received 82.69 percent of valid vote. The United Nations delegated its interim authority to democratically elected government led by the presidentship of Xanana Gusmao. From the very beginning Xanana Gusmao emphasized on the enhancement capacity and transparency of political institutions and the administrative apparatus that were experiencing a critical dilemma in regard to the appropriate development in the domain of law and order as well as the overall national development and progress. He also pointed out that to maintain and sustain security and stability of the nation, a comprehensive as well as interwined process need to be explored with careful attention. To materialize all these aspirations and goals, he seeks support from the international community that seems to be essential for some time to come in future. Now the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) assisting the new state in three critical areas of public administration, law and order and external security.<sup>59</sup> Moreover the government of Timor-Lester identified 16 national goals. These are :

1. Improve the education, health and nutritional status of the East Timorese people.
2. Transform the subsistence economy into a market economy.
3. Achieve and sustain economic growth with low inflation, increased employment, and a stronger financial sector.
4. Reduce poverty among women and men; establish a social safety net.
5. Promote private initiatives, innovation and investments by creating and enabling supportive environments.
6. Secure and maintain the unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the nation.
7. Promote rural development, and reduce the gap between rural and urban areas.
8. Promote orderly development of cities and towns.
9. Achieve balanced regional development to reduce poverty.
10. Achieve growth in government revenues to improve financial independence.
11. Develop and administrate an effective, accessible, and impartial system of justice.
12. Further strengthen civil society, enhance participation of citizens in public and national affairs.
13. Foster a culture of respect for human rights.
14. Promote good governance through popular participation.
15. Foster a robust multiparty democratic system
16. Build and Strengthen regional and international political, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.<sup>60</sup>

It was widely recognized that the resources are limited to achieve the goals and aspirations. So from the very beginning the government has been facing extreme difficulties in implementing his designed objectives due to financial constrain. In this regard, financial support and technical expertise need to be come forwarded form the international community for a substantial development for a newly born state called "Timor Lester."

### **Chronology of the Major incidents of East Timor**

- \* **1633** : First Portuguese settlement in East Timor.
- \* **1769** : Portugal establishes Dili as the capital of East Timor.
- \* **1896** : Portugal separates East Timor as a colony from Macau.
- \* **1910** : First major rebellion against Portuguese rule on East Timor is violently suppressed after 18 months.
- \* **1942-1945** : Japanese occupy Indonesia, driving Portuguese from East Timor.
- \* **August 1945** : People of East Timor begin rebellion against Portuguese rule. The rebellion is brutally suppressed.
- \* **April-May 1974** : Portugal's government is overthrown and the new regime announces democratic rights would be given to its overseas territories, including Portuguese Timor.
- \* **May-November 1974** : Five political parties are organized in East Timor in preparation for self-determination.
- \* **September-October 1974** : First Indonesian-Portuguese talks are held on decolonization of East Timor.
- \* **August 20, 1975** : FRETILIN Forces seize control of the capital.
- \* **August 20, 1975** : Portuguese government abandons Dili, Governor and staff return to Lisbon.
- \* **November 28, 1975** : FRETILIN administration proclaimed an Independent Democratic Republic of East Timor.
- \* **December 7, 1975** : Indonesian forces launched a full scale invasion in East Timor, and 10 days later, the provisional government is proclaimed.
- \* **December 1975** : General Assembly and Security Council of United Nations passed resolution rejecting the act of integration.
- \* **July 17, 1976** : President Suharto formally proclaims East Timor Indonesia's 27th province.
- \* **April-September 1981** : Indonesia forces launched 'operation security' in East Timor.
- \* **March 1983** : A cease fire agreed between Indonesia and FRETILIN force, but lasted only 6 Months/
- \* **August 1985** : Australia recognized the Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor.
- \* **November 12, 1991** : Santa Cruz massacre occurred by Indonesian security force in Dili and Killing between 100 and 180.
- \* **July 1992** : Indonesia and Portugal agreed to resume discussion on East Timor issue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.
- \* **November 21, 1992** : Xanana Gusmao commander of military wing of FRETILIN arrested near Dili.
- \* **April 21, 1993** : Under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal meet in Rome to discuss questions surrounding East Timor.
- \* **22-24, 1994** : UN Secretary General's envoys visit East Timor as part of UN sponsored talks.
- \* **January 1995** : Foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal and the UN Secretary General met in Geneva, Switzerland for talks on East Timor issue.
- \* **February 1996** : President Suharto and Portuguese prime ministry met in Bangkok for discuss East Timor issue.
- \* **October 1996** : The acting Bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo and the Secretary for international relations of FRETILIN, Jose Ramos Horta, jointly awarded Noble Prize for peace.
- \* **April 1998** : National council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT) was formed.
- \* **May 21, 1998** : Suharto regime end.

- \* **June 1998** : President Habibti has given a surprising announcement that his government was prepared to offer a 'special status' to East Timor within the Indonesian Republic.
- \* **July 1998** : Limited numbers of troops were withdrawn from East Timor.
- \* **December 1998** : UN special envoy Jamsheer Marker visited East Timor.
- \* **January 27, 1999** : President B.J. Habibti declared 'East Timor could leave, if it wants and than agreed to UN supervision of a vote.
- \* **May 5, 1999** : Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers signed a United Nations brokered agreement to hold the referendum.
- \* **June 4, 1999** : United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) reached in Dili.
- \* **August 30, 1999** : The referendum was held and 78.5 percent Timorese electorate voted for Independence and reject the autonomy package.
- \* **September 7, 1999** : The United Nations Security Council called an emergency meeting on East Timor issue.
- \* **September 20, 1999** : United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) landed in East Timor.
- \* **July 2000** : Militia killed one Newzeland soldier.
- \* **September 6, 2000** : The militia killed three UN staff in Alambua, a town of Indonesian West Timor. Among them one is American, one is Croatian and other is Ethiopian.
- \* **August 2001** : Timorese people vote for 88-member constituent Assembly.
- \* **April 2002** : President election was held and Xanana Gusmao became the first president.
- \* **May 20, 2002** : East Timor became independent state and UN hands over authority to elected government.
- \* **September 27, 2002** : UN General Assembly admits Timor-Lester as 191st member state.

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